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ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 17 Nov

LD1711074793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0556 GMT 17 Nov 93

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow November 17 TASS—NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on Yeltsin's role in tackling major problems. The newspaper's editor-in-chief Vitaliy Tretyakov believes that in the present situation President Boris Yeltsin is not a decisive figure as regards problems that are most important to the country.

The president "is not Hamlet but is a flute which his staff know how to play", Tretyakov maintians, pointing out in this connection that "the experince of our political life proves, rather, the predictability of Boris Yeltsin, even more than that, the programmed nature of his actions aimed at promoting advance to the goal.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on December 12 referendum on a draft new constitution of Russia.

Publicist Vladimir Lafitskiy declares against a possible "hard line" in the policy of the state. His opinion is that the country is being threatened with the assertion of an authoritarian power, the lack of real parliamentarism, the possibility of crises in federal state power, and that the very federative set-up of Russia is being questioned.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on Yegor Gaydar.

Pointing out that Yegor Gaydar, Russian vice-premier and leader of the Russia's Choice Bloc, "is heading the list of Russia's most promising politicans by a wide margin" suggests that the newspaper's readers ask Gaydar any questions through the newspaper on November 19.

TRUD on the October 3-4 events in Moscow.

"A redistribution of property became one of the causes of the bloody tragedy in Moscow".

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA carries an interview with Colonel-General Andrey Nikolayev, commander of Russia's frontier forces. "The Russo-Chinese border, which was a line of confrontation some ten years ago, is becoming an area of cooperation", General Nikolayev said.

PRAVDA runs an interview with Arkadiy Volskiy, leader of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.

The Union "considers it its main programmatic task to overcome the slump as soon as possible and to achieve a steady growth of industrial production", Volskiy said.

The newspaper ROSSIISKIYE VESTI features a report on President Yeltsin's two-day visit to Tula, which began on Tuesday. Touching on his meeting there with the heads of the administrations from Russia's constituent republics, territories and regions, held to draw on the experience gleaned by local executives during the switchover of Tula defence enterprises to civilian rails, the newspaper notes the unanimous view of the participants of the meeting that the government was failing to fulfil its promises to reprofile such plants. They noted that "this programme is kept afloat mainly due to the enthusiasm of the regions".

Informing the readership on the 5th Congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Businessmen, held in Moscow on Tuesday, which was addressed by the union's leader Arkadiy Volskiy, who bitingly criticised the Russian Government, the newspaper notes that Aleksandr Shokhin and Viktor Gerashchenko, members of the Russian Government, who attended the forum, had agreed with this criticism. However, the newspaper notes, "judging by Volsky's platform, with which Shokhin had agreed, it envisages not a slight correction of the present course, but its radical revision."

The newspaper also carries an article by Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, who claims that rumours about the excessive sale of property in the Russian capital are "greatly exaggerated".

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA publishes an interview with Colonel-General Dmitriy Volkogonov, presidential adviser on military matters, in which he stresses that the Armed Forces should be safeguarded from the political designs of some concrete individuals, but the Army would always be an instrument of the official policy.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA today comments on the ongoing election campaign. It quotes member of the Central Election Commission Valeriy Bagin, who is responsible for financing the elections, as saying that a control and auditing service was being set up on the president's order. It will be headed by one of the members of the Central Election Commission.

Bagin said it was yet impossible to control the financial sources of the election blocs, associations, and individual candidates.

PRAVDA publishes an interview with former executive secretary of the Russian Constitutional Commission Oleg Rumyantsev devoted to the December referendum. According to Rumyantsev, the previous Russian Constitution was much too ideologised and "abounded in such terms as Marxism-Leninism, Communist education, etc. It contained many restrictions on civic liberties and curbs on political initiatives". Today, during the elaboration and adoption of a new constitution, "incompetent people, nominated at meetings by crowds of people, are now coming to power. They often represent the poorer sections of the population and are eager to taste the 'joys of life'," Rumyatsenv claims.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA criticises the new draft constitution, claiming, in particular, that the powers vested in the Russian president "have no analogues in the world and represent such a concentration of power that the state system could be defined only as authoritarian".

The newspaper TRUD calls attention to the conflict between the government and the miners. The newspaper notes that "the government of Russia has

repeatedly shown that it would fulfil its promises to the miners only if pressured by massive actions of protest". "The more than ten days long hunger strike, called by the trade union leaders of Vorkuta, judging by everything, has not moved the hearts of Russia's leaders," it points out. "Only the one-day stoppage of Vorkuta pits forced the Finance Ministry to pay the debt, and the miners finally got their wages. Coal began to be mined again in the polar area. The solidarity of miners has proved its worth once more," it adds.

Libyan Economic Ties Pursued Despite Sanctions

PM1711101393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Nov 93 First Edition pp 1, 3

[Gennadiy Charodeyev report: "Is Minister Davydov's Trip Compatible With Sanctions Against Libya?"]

[Text] The report that a joint group of Russian private entrepreneurs and leading specialists of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations headed by Minister Oleg Davydov is paying an official visit to Tripoli suggests the thought that Russia, having voted in the UN Security Council for the introduction of additional sanctions against Libya, does not intend to fulfill them.

In fact, it turns out that one department in Moscow—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—issues an instruction to its representative in New York to vote for the introduction of sanctions against Libya, while another—the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations—simultaneously sends a delegation to conduct talks with Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's people on strengthening bilateral economic ties.

Competent sources have told IZVESTIYA that work is in full swing in Tripoli in three commissions—on questions of reciprocal capital investments, on trade and economic ties, and on financial problems—which have been formed within the framework of the joint Russian-Libyan Economic Cooperation Committee. Discussion is centering on the involvement of Libyan companies in implementing economic projects in Russia and on setting up a number of joint ventures and companies.

Nevertheless, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations is in no hurry to provide journalists with an explanation for this, evidently unwilling to clash with its neighbors in the building on Smolensk Square. Andrey Kozyrev once complained that he found it hard to deal with the former foreign trade ministers—Petr Aven and Sergey Glazyev. He hoped at the time that he would manage to achieve greater mutual understanding with Oleg Davydov....

"Yes, we supported the Security Council decision to step up international sanctions against Libya, but we stay with our economic interests," one diplomat declared. "Thanks to our persistent efforts, an amendment which confirmed the need for Libya to repay its debts was included in the document."

Foreign Ministry spokesmen declared: Moscow does not intend to breach the sanctions and will comply with all the points of the Security Council resolution. But, on the other hand, it turns out that Smolensk Square is aware that the Americans, the French, and the British, forgetting about directives, have long been conducting separate talks in Tripoli and Baghdad on the possible resumption of trade and economic cooperation.

The amount of the debt to Russia reaches approximately $4 billion. But Yuliy Vorontsov was allowed to make these amendments when the initiators of the draft resolution—Britain, the United States, and France—had already drawn up the document with due regard for their own economic interests. At first, the Russian delegation was left on the sidelines, as it were. But we stood our ground, and the country's economic interests were taken into consideration, the Foreign Ministry pointed out.

The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations rightly believes that Libya remained until recently one of the few Third World states cooperation with which had brought Russia hard currency earnings. "Today," it emphasized, "we are already banking on Libya as a future economic partner."

Paper Notes Damage From Libyan Sanctions

MK1711124193 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 47, 21 Nov 93 (signed to press 16 Nov) p A7

[Report by Anatoliy Yegorin, president of the Oriental Problems Analytical Studies Center, under the "In the World" rubric: "Al-Qadhdhafi Punished. Russia Too"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The damage done to Russia by sanctions is fairly great. Approximately since the mid-70's, Libya has been our largest partner on the African continent. In 1990-1992, the annual volume of economic cooperation (without military deliveries) with Libya amounted to $1 billion. The same amount was paid to Russia for military-technical assistance. A total of 80 percent of combat equipment in operational service in the Libyan army is Russian-made.

Of course, the current relations between Moscow and Tripoli are not what they used to be, and Russia is hardly interested in defending the al-Qadhdhafi regime. Our interests in Libya, however, have remained. So, both Resolution No. 731 and the tightening of sanctions should be assessed precisely from the point of view of Russian interests.

Meanwhile, in March 1992, when Russia voted in the Security Council for anti-Libyan sanctions as they were proposed by the Western powers, it dealt a blow at these interests by itself. In fact, the sanctions forced us to leave Libya overnight. At the same time, the sanctions did not apply to Libyan oil, which has been purchased primarily by the Western countries.

As a result, we have been underpaid over $3 billion for our military-technical cooperation with Tripoli. We have abandoned unfinished projects worth around $4 billion in Libya, and Libyan arrears reached $1 billion in 1993. All this at a time when Europe is literally choking with Libyan oil.

Under Article 50 of the UN Charter, Russia could have raised the question of damages as early as April 1992. At that time, this was not done. Moreover, as it fought back against the Supreme Soviet, the Russian Foreign Ministry was swift to assert that Russia would allegedly sustain no losses. Since that time, they have apparently had enough time to calculate how much all this costs. It

is not a coincidence that Moscow even threatened to use its right of veto if Russia's special interests are not heeded.

Although there has been much fuss about this, I have the impression that Moscow apparently wanted to bargain in order to win at least something under the tight pressure exerted by the United States, Great Britain, and France when a new draft resolution was being drawn up. It transpired from Western sources that Europe was asked, in particular, to compensate Russia, at least partially, to the tune of $4 billion.

Nothing of the sort happened. The West chose an entirely different tactic: It made it a condition for lifting the sanctions that Libya should also repay its debts to Russia. Smolenskaya Square has been trying to hail this as a big triumph for Russian diplomacy. Meanwhile, this decision does little to bring Russia any closer to collecting at least some of its debts. No doubt, now the Libyans will cite the fact that their deposits have been blocked in Western banks, let alone that Russia's support for the sanctions will clearly worsen our already strained relations with Tripoli. Nor will it help promote our relations with other Arab countries and the Afro-Asian majority in the United Nations in general. If Moscow were at least to abstain from voting—and it had every reason to do so—this would probably have also helped it to resolve the question of compensation because this would have shown the West that Russia is intent on defending its interests in a more decisive manner.

Yet the fact that Russia made this attempt at all, instead of giving its backing automatically to the United States, France, and Great Britain, is noteworthy in itself. A certain shift is evident. But this does not alter the fact that people on Smolenskaya Square often make arbitrary political decisions that clearly underestimate our specific economic and, in the end, strategic interests.

Sukhoys Cause 'Bombshell Effect' in Dubayy

PM1711112193 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Nov 93

[Report from Dubayy Air Show by Mikhail Zotov; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] It is possible right now to draw some conclusions from the Dubayy-93 International Aerospace Show, which ended 12 November.

Aircraft from the Sukhoy Design Bureau, be it the widely known fighters, or the latest Su-35, and the sports Su-29, caused a bombshell effect in the Emirates. The word Sukhoy was used by the Arabs only accompanied by the thumbs-up sign. Virtually all the shaykhs from the ruling al-Maktum family visited the Sukhoy stand to shake hands with the Russian pilots.

The Kamov helicopters, and especially the anti-tank Ka-50 Werewolf, received great publicity in the press despite strong competition from the U.S. Apache. Representatives of Iranian and Turkish Airlines were literally chasing after Russian helicopters. At the same time the Arab press wrote about a Russian technology boom at the Dubayy Air Show. The organizers were well aware that without the Russian presence the Dubayy Air Show could hardly have claimed third place in the world after Farnborough and Le Bourget.

Nonetheless, the sales results, while inspiring hope since many countries have expressed the wish to buy civilian Russian aircraft equipment, are weighed down by strong pressure from the competition. It is possible that thanks to the presence at the Air Show of the French Minister of Trade and Charles, prince of Wales, part of the potential contracts ended up in Western hands. Russian firms experienced a deficit of political support in the Emirates. Nonetheless, Arab dealers, fond of speaking in metaphors, described the Russian position in the Near East market after watching displays by Kamov helicopters and Sukhoy aircraft succinctly in one phrase—the Russian cobra is ready to pounce.

DPRK Envoy Warns on Japan's Nuclear Program

LD1711113693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0901 GMT 17 Nov 93

[ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Aleksandr Krylovich]

[Text] Moscow, 17 Nov—"The fuss being whipped up in the West over the problem of nuclear security on the Korean peninsula could lead to unanticipated consequences for the world community. As against the mythical threat from North Korea, which has never even thought of building nuclear weapons, a real threat is arising that a new nuclear power might appear in the region in the shape of Japan." This was the view expressed to an ITAR-TASS correspondent by Son Song-pil, ambassador in Moscow of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

He said that "short-sighted actions by overly zealous politicians, who intend to put pressure on the DPRK, could provide a convenient pretext for launching a military nuclear program in Japan. Certain Japanese politicians," Son Song-pil stressed, "have long been harboring plans to create their own nuclear weapons. The implementation of such plans is currently inhibited by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which expires in 1995, and by public opinion, both in Japan itself and in the rest of the world. The fuss sponsored by the U.S. Administration over a so-called 'DPRK preparations for war' could provide moral justification for Japan to launch a militarist nuclear program."

"Now that preparations are under way," Son Song-pil noted, "for the third round of talks between the DPRK and the United States on nuclear safety on the Korean peninsula, it is essential to ensure that each side assesses the actual situation in as balanced a way as possible and

does everything necessary to reduce tension in this region as rapidly as possible."

Prospects for Resolving DPRK Issue Examined

PM1711102993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 3

[Mikhail Pogorelyy report: "Last Front of the Cold War"]

[Excerpts] The Foal Eagle military exercise, involving virtually all the ROK Armed Forces plus the 35,000-strong contingent of U.S. forces in the country, is being held 15-25 November. U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin has proposed to Japan that they pool their efforts to develop an antimissile system on a theater of operations scale, pointing out the vulnerability of important sites on Japanese territory to North Korea's Nodong missiles. U.S. President Bill Clinton has publicly proclaimed that his country's policy toward Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions will be "tough." While unofficial Pentagon sources have dropped heavy hints to journalists as to the form this "toughness" could take: A scenario "altering the structure" of the troops stationed in South Korea is being studied; plans to use sea-launched cruise missiles to destroy sites in North Korea are being prepared. [passage omitted]

The mounting military tension on the Korean Peninsula cannot be stopped by mutual recriminations or by flexing military muscle, but it can be stopped by patient, calm, and mutually respectful dialogue. Dialogue between the two Korean states alone or dialogue with the participation of interested parties—the United States, China, and Japan. There is another option—launching in Asia a process similar to that in Europe and, in particular, starting up a Conference on Security and Cooperation. Mutually acceptable solutions could be sought and the foundations of general peace laid within the framework of such a conference. No matter how the CSCE is criticized for its poor effectiveness, the Yugoslav crisis has remained an internal, bloody, but civil war rather than a small-scale world war, as many people feared it might become.

Of course, the successful political resolution of crisis situations requires commitment and good will to be shown by all parties involved. It is not easy to achieve a mutual approach when the DPRK Foreign Ministry, for example, responds to the well-founded disquiet of Russia's leaders by tirades: "It is highly ludicrous that the Russian Federation should go on about our 'nuclear question.' After all, it has the former USSR's nuclear weapons under its control." And Russia's desire to adhere to civilized standards of international relations is clearly seen, from the North Korean diplomats' standpoint, as "pursuing an unseemly and foul goal" and slandering the DPRK.

It is not difficult to foresee that the situation on the Korean Peninsula will be a subject of discussion at the meeting of heads of Asian states and governments in Seattle on 17 November and at the U.S.-South Korean summit in Washington on 23 November. What conclusions will be drawn at their close and what decisions made? One can assume with sufficient certainty today that the United States will insist on toughening political, economic, and military measures to stop North Korea's nuclear program. Assuming that the program is actually being implemented at all. Hitherto U.S. experts (including those from the CIA) assumed that the DPRK possessed the potential to create at least two nuclear munitions; last week, however, they acknowledged that there is no evidence for this. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service has drawn the following conclusion on this score: "The widespread view that the DPRK has made a 'breakthrough' in creating its own nuclear weapons is subject to serious doubts." Those doubts are generated by a gap in the manufacturing chain at the plutonium production stage.

So the nuclear question, for all its importance in the global Korean problem, is most likely simply a convenient pretext: For the one side, to mobilize the public to combat one of the last orthodox communist regimes; while for the other participant in the conflict it affords an opportunity to continue mobilizing and rallying the people to struggle against something or someone instead of struggling to improve the people's lives. What is bad is that the lack of clarity surrounding this problem on the Korean Peninsula could prompt other East Asian countries to embark on the same nuclear arms race. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are already being talked about in this context.

A little less arrogance and a bit more political realism and consideration of neighbors' interests, and peace will become a bit more stable. And peace will then finally be able to replace the 40-year-long unstable truce.

Space Agency Director on Alfa Space Project

LD1611175293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1446 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Russia and the United States are to reorientate their national programs for manned flights and new generation orbiting stations by focusing on a joint Alfa project. The two sides meeting in Washington early this month reached agreement to set up an international space complex which will be participated in by Canada, Japan and the European Space Agency.

This will bind Russia and the United States to abandon their Mir-2 and Freedom projects respectively, General Director of the Russian Space Agency Yuriy Koptev told a news conference in Moscow on Tuesday.

40 percent of space missions by U.S. shuttle spacecraft will be carried out in the interests of the Alfa project during the first stage covering the period of 1995-1997. The Russian program for manned space flights is also to be aimed towards the creation of a new orbiting station. More robust solar batteries are to be delivered to the orbiting Mir station by U.S. shuttle spacecraft to prolong the station's life and ensure normal functioning of its new two modules.

Russia and the United States are expected to sign a final agreement on Moscow's participation in the Alfa project as U.S. Vice President Albert Gore arrives for a two-day visit in Moscow on December 16. Koptev said the two countries would also strike a $350-370 Mn deal to pay for Russia's services in the initial stage.

He said the detailed plan for an international space station was now being considered by U.S. congress which is expected to pass a resolution before Gore's visit to Moscow.

Until then, Russia is expected to receive an invitation from the Canadian, European and Japanese space agencies as three other parties to the project having bilateral agreements with the U.S. government.

Further on Interview

LD1611232193

[Editorial Report] Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian at 1912 GMT on 16 November 1993 broadcast a 5-minute report on a news conference given by Yuriy Koptev, the general director of the Russian Space Agency, in which Mayak correspondent Vladimir Bezyayev asked about the space station planned as a joint venture with the United States. Koptev spoke of the need to coordinate system specifications.

Asked how the project will be financed Koptev noted: "Each participant in the project will bring his own set of equipment, for which he will pay. If we do not simultaneously develop Russian stations of the Mir-2 type because we are participating in this project, a considerable proportion of our resources that were allocated for Mir-2 will go toward implementing this project. Beyond this, there will be reciprocal settlements. That is, there will be settlement for the proportion of the station's resources you use, and for the proportion of the expenditure you bear for using it and ensuring its viability. If the balance is one way you pay, if the balance is the other way you get paid."

Asked about problems with Baykonur now that Kazakhstan has left the ruble zone, Koptev says: "This is outside the competence of the Russian Space Agency, and I can say only one thing, that if an appropriate agreement is not found...[pauses] I proceed on the basis that it will be found because Kazakhstan is also interested—perhaps not as much as Russia—in the continued functioning of the cosmodrome, after all, there are a number of projects involving Kazakhstan that use Baykonur and space equipment, which must be launched from the Baykonur cosmodrome.

"It would be incorrect to regard the question of Baykonur as just a factor affecting the international space station. Today one must proceed on the basis that if Baykonur ceases to operate tomorrow, 80 percent of Russian space programs will be halted."

Correspondent Bezyayev recalled that the fate of the project is now in the hands of the U.S. Congress. The United States stands to save $4 billion by cooperating with Russia on the project. "If Congress agrees, then on 16 or 17 December U.S. Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin will give the go ahead for the new station, which currently bears the name Alfa. Its assembly in space is planned for 1997. In 10 launches—five from each side—it is planned to put into orbit the main block of the station, the Russian one, and other basic equipment. The station will be able to accommodate six people and will have a volume of 1,200 cubic meters. In its third stage, Japanese, Canadian, and European modules will be docked to it. Next year the shuttle will open up the way to the future space home when it docks with the Mir orbital complex. In the first stage this will bring us $350-370 million."

Export Controls Said To Meet COCOM Demands

PM1611163793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 3

[Igor Ivanenko report: "Barrier to Dual-Purpose Goods and Technologies. Some 2,000 Items on 'Restricted' List"]

[Text] The list includes goods and technologies which are just as good as, and in several ways superior to, similar foreign models. However, this certainly does not mean that the customs service never gives the "OK" to goods that appear on the list.

The lists are permissive, Rustam Safaraliyev, senior secretary of the Export Control Commission, stressed, which is to say that you only have to meet a number of conditions that are generally accepted in world practice, and any item may be sent abroad.

These conditions basically boil down to three basic points. The importer must guarantee that the equipment or technology he has bought in Russia will not be used for military purposes, that reexport to third countries will not be permitted without Russian consent, and that all these facts should be officially confirmed by the government of the country to which we intend to make the delivery. At the same time, the Russian exporter has the right in certain circumstances to check that the points listed in the contract are being implemented.

Following President Yeltsin's ratification of the commission's decision and the introduction in the country of a tough export control regime, we can say that Russia has met virtually all the formal demands presented to it by the members of Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls. In other words, the member countries of this organization no longer have any arguments with which to justify the need to maintain tough restrictions on exporting dual-purpose advanced technologies and equipment to Russia.

World Bank Urges More Spending on Social Needs

PM1511135393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Aleksey Portanskiy: "World Banks Recommends Russia Spend More on Social Needs"]

[Text] Russia will have to increase by 5 to 20 percent the proportion of its GDP that is earmarked to meet the population's social needs in order to compensate for the adverse consequences of the change in the economic system. That is the opinion of the World Bank leadership.

Hitherto 13 percent of GDP has gone on social needs in Russia, according to World Bank data. But, with the beginning of liberalization in the economy, enterprises will not be in a position to guarantee the level of social services that existed under the communist regime, Wilfred Talvits [name as transliterated], vice president of the World Bank responsible for World Bank policy in the countries of East Europe, believes. The transformation of the economic system is a painful business, since "different groups of winners and losers" are being created, he said.

The current transformation of the military-industrial complex in our country is one factor in the heightening of social tension. According to the World Bank, a 50-percent reduction in military production would increase unemployment in Russia by 20 percent. In this situation you need a corresponding system of social security and the World Bank is helping Russia set one up.

The World Bank vice president said that he was impressed by the Russians' support for the course of reforms despite the fact that the country's economy is still a very long way from being stabilized. He attributed this attitude toward the reforms to the success of privatization.

According to Talvits, the rate of economic growth in the CIS countries over a period of 10-15 years will be among the highest in the world. The World Bank, for its part, intends to continue to support the process of reforms on the territory of the former USSR, planning to double the number of its projects for the countries of East Europe in the next few years. In the past four years the World Bank has allocated $9.5 billion for the states' development needs.

FRG Journalists Arrested at Sovetskaya Gavan

PM1611140193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 1

[RIA-"Own Information" report under the "From Our News Bureau" rubric: "Secret Agents Posing as Journalists"]

[Text] Two foreigners were detained within the confines of a naval base in the region of Sovetskaya Gavan. The two journalists from the FRG were there with expired visas and were taking an interest in submarines. Captain Third Rank Arkadiy Orlov, who presented these facts, reports that criminals, poachers, and staffers of foreign secret services are going into what was at one time a completely closed area by taking advantage of the lifting of entry restrictions.

According to information from reliable sources, of 10 foreigners taken at random who arrive in Vanino or Sovetskaya Gavan, at least one secret agent will definitely be discovered after a thorough investigation.

Army Chief Meets With Bulgarian Leaders

LD1611182793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1503 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Abrosimov]

[Text] Sofia November 16 TASS—Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev praised the position taken by the Russian armed services during the attempted coup in Moscow in early October this year. Of special significance is that the Russian army resisted a rift in its ranks which could have led to civil war. The Bulgarian leader stressed during a meeting with visiting Chief of Russia's General Staff Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov.

According to President Zhelev, the position of the Russian army serves to promote democracy in the country.

General Kolesnikov informed the Bulgarian leader about the basic provisions of the Russian military doctrine. Participants in the meeting discussed the states and prospects for the development of relations between Bulgaria and Russia, primarily military-technical cooperation between them, the Bulgarian presidential spokesman told journalists.

These questions were also in the centre of conversations between the Russian military leader and Prime Minister Lyuben Berov and Defence Minister Valentin Alexandrov.

General Kolesnikov told journalists that his conversations with the Bulgarian leaders were "absolutely sincere" and stressed that in many instances the positions of the two countries coincided.

Further on Kolesnikov Visit

PM1711114193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Nov 93 p 1

[ITAR-TASS report: "Visit to Bulgaria"]

[Text] Sofia, 16 Nov—Colonel General M. Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, has arrived here on a visit at the invitation of Army General L. Petrov, chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian Armed Forces.

During a conversation with journalists, Kolesnikov stressed that the Russian side attaches great importance to the visit, which will, according to him, help resolve a number of issues pertaining primarily to military-technical cooperation between the two countries. During his meetings with his Bulgarian partners Kolesnikov also intends to familiarize them with the key elements of Russia's military doctrine. In a conversation with your

ITAR-TASS correspondent, the chief of the Bulgarian Army's General Staff noted the importance of organizing regular contacts between the two countries' military departments, something that will be served by the signing of a document on cooperation between them next year.

Foreign Ministry on Ukraine Nuclear Policy

LD1611175493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1538 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Reports by Diplomatic Correspondents Dmitriy Voskoboynikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] In respect to the nuclear arms deployed in Ukraine, Russia has observed all provisions of the relevant international documents and norms of international law. The trouble lies in Ukraine's "stubborn refusals" to honor its commitments connected with nuclear disarmament. This is how a senior official from Russia's Foreign Ministry commented, in an interview with INTERFAX, on the televised statement made by Anton Buteyko, foreign policy adviser to Ukraine's president, on Sunday.

As we reported earlier, in his statement Buteyko accused Russia of seeking to implement the START-I Treaty at the expense of Ukraine, refusing to make payments to Ukraine for the use of former Soviet property abroad, and evading the division of the Diamond Fund. Besides, said the adviser to Ukraine's president, "each successor state should decide on its own how many missiles it should reduce."

In this connection, INTERFAX's interviewee pointed out that the Declaration on Sovereignty along with several other documents signed by Ukrainian officials mention Ukraine's nuclear-free status. "Under all documents the nuclear arms deployed in Ukraine belongs to Russia and must be withdrawn to Russia without any compensations—which are not stipulated anywhere. This question should have been closed long ago," the diplomat said. According to him, the stand taken by Kiev now "only points to Ukraine's desire to receive from Russia and from the world community large amounts of money for nothing, using the fact of nuclear arms deployed on its soil to these ends."

With reference to the use of former Soviet property abroad, INTERFAX's interviewee said that all CIS countries, including Ukraine, had signed with Russia a treaty on dividing the debts and assets of the former USSR abroad. Under the treaty Ukraine is entitled to 16.34 percent of the foreign debts and to the same percentage of assets. Unlike other CIS countries, Ukraine refuses to accept the so-called "zero option," under which a country transfers its share of the foreign debt to Russia in exchange for giving up its share of property abroad. "Since Ukraine has not paid a cent of its share of the foreign debt, it cannot expect to receive profit from the use of the foreign assets of the former USSR. These things are interconnected," the diplomat said. According to him, the Paris Club recommended long ago that Ukraine should sign an agreement on the "zero option" with Russia. "The longer Ukraine delays solution to this issue, the tighter the knot of contradictions becomes," INTERFAX's interviewee concluded.

Nuclear Commitments Said Ignored

LD1611161193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1339 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] A senior official at the Russian Foreign Ministry said Moscow's policy on the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine was solidly based on international agreements and international law.

The problem is that Ukraine "persistently ignores" its commitments for nuclear disarmament, he told Interfax. He said Ukraine had proclaimed its intention to become a non-nuclear state in its Declaration of Sovereignty and some other documents. "Under all documents, the nuclear weapons stationed on Ukrainian territory belong to Russia and must be taken to its territory without any compensation, for there are no provisions on that anywhere. An end should have been put to the affair long ago," the official said. Ukraine today takes a position which "only shows its desire to receive large sums of money from Russia and the international community for no serious reason by making use of the fact that it has nuclear weapons on its territory," he said.

Grachev Views Troop Withdrawal From Baltics

LD1611233893 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1930 GMT 16 Nov 93

[From the "Radio Slavyanka" program of the Russian Defense Ministry]

[Text] [Announcer] The UN General Assembly has adopted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries. The document was adopted at the proposal of Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs. I will remind you that Russian troops have already been withdrawn from Lithuania, and last Monday Russia resumed its talks with Estonia and Latvia regarding this issue. The leaders of the Baltic states think that the problem could already be resolved by the end of this month. But what stand does the Russian military department take? This is what Russian Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev stated to our correspondent, Valeriy Borisenko.

[Begin Grachev recording] If the issue of the Russian-speaking population in these states is resolved, then there are no problems preventing the issue of troop withdrawals from swiftly being resolved with the military leaders. But naturally we will raise one of the main aspects of the withdrawal. That is the rendering of material aid to the troops that are being withdrawn and compensation by the countries from which the troops are being withdrawn for what we have built there.

Lithuania is a good example. We came to an agreement with the leadership of Lithuania. The withdrawal was carried out precisely according to schedule. At the same time, in parallel, Lithuania is building housing for our servicemen with its firms in Kaliningrad Oblast. Recently the first block of apartments was ready for people to move in; other housing is being built. In this manner we are prepared to talk with the country, with Latvia. As far as the process itself is concerned, the technical withdrawal of troops, there are no problems. [end recording]

[Announcer] The withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia may be completed by 31 August 1994, and not by the end of 1995 as planned. This was stated to journalists by Sergey Zolotov, head of the Russian delegation at the talks with Latvia. He noted that this step became possible after a number of Western countries expressed a readiness to render financial aid in building housing for Russian servicemen.

Vorontsov Views Issue

PM1711122993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 17 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed, untitled report under "Focus" rubric]

[Text] The UN General Assembly has adopted a resolution on the question of the Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltic states. Yu. Vorontsov, Russian Federation permanent representative to the United Nations, noted when speaking at a session that since the time this question was discussed at the 47th General Assembly session "significant progress in withdrawing Russian troops from Latvia and Estonia has been achieved." Their numbers on Latvian territory have been reduced from the 57,000, when the withdrawal began, to the present 17,000, that is, by over two-thirds, and from 25,000 to 4,000 in Estonia, that is, by over five-sixths." At the same time the Russian representative drew the Assembly's attention to the "dramatic situation" of military pensioners and members of their families in Estonia and Latvia, who have the threat of deportation hanging over them.

Plan Requires Prepayment on CIS Oil Purchases

MK1611143093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 79, 16 Nov 93 (Signed to press 15 Nov) p 3

[Unattributed report: "Russia Will Sell Oil to CIS Countries According to New Pattern"]

[Text] The Russian Government may adopt a new procedure for the sale of fuel to CIS countries based on prepayment.

Paying before the actual delivery of oil, CIS countries will also have to pay their debts for oil already delivered to them. According to figures of the Russian Federation State Committee for Economic Cooperation with the Commonwealth Members, CIS oil debts to Russia as of 20 October amounted to 386 billion rubles. The biggest debtors are Ukraine with 204 billion rubles, Kazakhstan with 133 billion, and Lithuania with 45 billion rubles.

Official Urges Dual Citizenship in Russia, CIS

LD1511185993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1816 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow November 15 TASS—A Russian top official called for establishing a system of dual citizenship in Russia and other republics of the former Soviet Union where Russians live.

Abdulakh Mikitayev, head of the presidential Commission for Citizenship, told a news conference in Moscow on Monday that all Russians living in other republics should enjoy equal rights with their residents and be allowed to return to Russia any time.

He called for signing agreements with these republics on dual citizenship. "The institute of dual citizenship is a path towards trust between the states," Mikitayev said.

He stressed that the problem of Russian minorities living outside Russia should be solved at the state level through negotiations. "We should convince our neighbours that discrimination on nationality is inadmissible and that all problems can be solved through negotiations on the basis of generally accepted international norms," Mikitayev said.

He said the government is developing a programme of support for Russians living outside their motherland.

Shokhin Views Problems of Creating Ruble Zone

PM1611145593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Article by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin: "We Have Adequate Response to Threats of Taking Russians in Nearby Foreign Countries Hostage"]

[Text] Over the last few days threats have been circulating in some of the former Union republics in connection with the problems involved in creating a new-type ruble zone, saying that Russia should take on a considerable proportion of the expenditure involved in improving their financial position, otherwise ethnic Russian living in these republics will be in for a hard time. This kind of blackmail can hardly be serious, but such irresponsible statements should not be overlooked.

First, it is absurd to use ultimatums when talking to Russia; second, Russia has adequate levers and means to oppose the methods of marauding "people's diplomacy" to ensure that the "architects" of this policy regret it. And the old ideological litany about "imperial practice" should not be hyped up—Russia is able to defend its current interests.

Going back to the issue of the new-type ruble zone, I would remind you that the worsening of the cash problem in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan could have been

avoided had the republics not upheld the idea of expediting the unification of their monetary systems. But the Bolshevik "five-year plan in three years" did not work, everyday practices confirmed the experts' evaluations regarding the fairly lengthy period needed to implement the agreement on a new-type ruble zone.

Incidentally, I would remind you that the 7 September multilateral framework agreement signed by six states on the new-type ruble zone envisaged a transitional period, the duration of which was naturally not fixed. During this period, it was intended to ensure the stable operation of the monetary systems and monetary units, including 1961-1992 rubles or other interim paper currency, ensure a stable rate of exchange for these currency units against the Russian Federation ruble and their mutual convertibility (exchangeability) at the prevailing par exchange rate. Moreover, provision was made for the possibility of the states introducing their own paper currency during the transitional period if necessary.

However, some of our partners in practice refused to introduce any interim currency units, keeping the 1961-1992 rubles in circulation in their republics—the currency of the old ruble zone minus national affiliation. And after circulation of the old rubles was suspended in Russia, they had problems with an unauthorized influx of cash from other regions. These republics then confronted Russia with the question of most speedily taking the old rubles out of circulation on their territory and replacing them with 1993 Russian rubles before all the preconditions were created for the total unification of their monetary systems and cash and noncash turnover.

Thus an acute problem arose over the new money, discussion of which was accompanied by emotional outbursts, threats, and sometimes ill-concealed blackmail. The matter should have been settled calmly, in isolation, by being excluded from the plan for a gradual move to the full unification of monetary systems.

Two options were possible, moreover. First, the accelerated introduction of interim paper currencies in the republics for a definite transitional period with technical assistance from Russia. The other option is for a large state loan in 1993 rubles to be advanced in the near future in exchange for promissory notes from the subscriber states.

The second option was preferable to the republics, but Russian citizens have to pay for it—this operation will require a considerable increase in the size of Russia's internal state debt and will thus objectively help reduce its citizens' standard of living. What is more, there is the danger that Russia will not receive its banknotes if, for instance, a common monetary system is not set up. That is why Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were ultimately offered a 6-month state loan.

The drama of the situation was thus relieved and the sides got a chance to calmly resolve the remaining problems involved in the unification of their currency systems. Admittedly, some people may have thought the terms of the loan tough (furnishing a deposit of at least 50 percent of the total loan in U.S. dollars; monthly charging of interest at the Bank of Russia's official discount rate, and so on), but we did not devise these conditions, the whole international credit system uses them. Moreover, one must take into consideration the special features of the loan in that the above states might not repay the loan if mechanisms for the total unification of their monetary systems were introduced before the term of the loan expired. Nor would interest be charged or paid.

In the sphere of clearing transactions, an option was proposed whereby the Bank of Russia would at the same time pay the sum of money in Russian currency into the national banks' correspondent accounts needed to ensure an adequate level of liquidity for the banks' operations, thus enabling noncash transactions to be carried out between banks, enterprises, and the population on a continuous basis.

However, our proposals were not accepted. During the latest working meeting of Russia's and Kazakhstan's government delegations in November our partners went back to the idea of introducing their own paper currency. The Russian side took an understanding view of that operation and voiced willingness to provide technical assistance in resolving the technical problems. The sides also agreed on the need to create a Russian-Kazakhstani payments union and also draft an agreement forthwith on a mechanism for free trade and customs regulation.

Uzbekistan has gone a somewhat different road. After talks in Moscow in early November it was decided that the republic would introduce an interim parallel means of payment—the summ-coupon [summ-kupon]. At the same time work on unifying the two countries' monetary systems is continuing.

The answer to skeptics, who previously dismissed a new-type ruble zone, could be that tremendous preparatory work has now been accomplished, which has made it possible to produce protocols enshrining the idea that there are no obstacles associated with differences in legislation in the way of adopting decisions to unify the Kazakhstani and Uzbek monetary systems with the Russian Federation's monetary system. On 12 October, the Republic of Kazakhstan ratified an agreement on creating a new-type ruble zone based on unification with Russia's monetary system, and a Kazakhstani presidential edict has been issued on the monetary system, consolidating the legal base in the republic for recognizing the Russian ruble as the Republic of Kazakhstan' only legal unit of payment when its monetary system is unified with Russia's. The Kazakhstani Government has submitted draft laws to parliament on changes to the laws on banks and on the regulations for conducting monetary operations, as well as a draft law on a customs code.

For its part the Republic of Uzbekistan has informed Russia that it is carrying out the intrastate procedures

needed to ratify the agreement on unifying their monetary systems. An Uzbek law has been adopted, whereby the ruble—the currency of the Russian Federation—is used as the republic's official monetary unit (currency).

Common sense will inevitably prevail over emotion and, clearly, the creation of mechanisms for economic integration will continue within the framework of the economic union, one of which could be a single monetary system based on the Russian ruble or an effective payments union based on stable national currencies.

Understanding Sought on CFE 'Flank' Limits

PM1611124193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Nov 93 pp 1-2

[Article by Lieutenant General Vladimir Zhurbenko, first deputy chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff: "CFE Treaty: One Year On. Commitments Being Met But Problems Remain"]

[Text] It is exactly one year since the beginning of the full-scale implementation of the CFE Treaty signed on 19 November 1990 in Paris by the heads of 22 states and governments (16 from NATO countries, six from the Warsaw Pact). Now the number of parties to the treaty has risen to 30 with the inclusion of states that are successors to the USSR and Czechoslovakia.

It is hard to overestimate the treaty's significance. The parties to it have ceased to view each other as enemies. The ideology of their military policy has changed radically, as has the thrust of their military doctrines and military organization and development. Today the CFE Treaty is regarded by all the European countries, including those not party to it, as a cornerstone of security on the continent.

The practical fulfillment of the treaty began on 16 November 1992. It is now possible to summarize some of the results and to assess how the commitments contained in are being met.

When the treaty was signed its main aims were defined as follows: the establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels; and the elimination of the historical inequalities and, first and foremost, the potential for launching a surprise attack and for waging large-scale offensive operations.

I would note with satisfaction that very tangible progress has been made toward these goals. The concentration of troops and armaments in Central Europe has fallen sharply and their structure and geographical placement have changed.

But if you look at specific provisions of the CFE Treaty, you will see that it places quite rigorous limitations on the number of battle tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery over 100 mm caliber, combat planes, and strike helicopters in the whole region from the Atlantic to the Urals. Limitations on armaments in these categories were set both for groups of states (NATO and the former Warsaw Pact) and for each country party to the treaty. Furthermore, sublevels were set for tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and artillery in individual regions (Central Europe, the "enlarged" Central Europe, and the rear and flank regions). There are also certain limitations on armaments and hardware in other categories. The final deadline for achieving the prescribed levels is 17 November 1995.

The protocols regulating notification and inspection activity, the procedure for the reduction, reclassification, and refitting of armaments and hardware for nonmilitary uses, and other questions form an integral part of the treaty.

The CFE Treaty was signed in the name of the Soviet Union, for which the following maximum levels were prescribed: for tanks—11,350, armored fighting vehicles—20,000, artillery—13,175, combat planes—5,150, and strike helicopters—1,500. After the disintegration of the USSR its commitments were shared out among the states which succeeded to the territory affected by the treaty's area of application. An agreement on this distribution was concluded on 22 May 1992 in Tashkent. Under this agreement the following maximum levels are set for Russia: tanks—6,400, armored fighting vehicles—11,480, artillery systems—6,415, combat planes—3,450, and strike helicopters—890. Within these limits 700 battle tanks, 580 armored fighting vehicles, and 1,280 artillery systems may be stationed in the Leningrad Military District and the North Caucasus Military District (the regional limitations do not extend to the deployment of combat planes and strike helicopters).

It should be acknowledged that unanimity was not easy to achieve. The commitments that were acceptable and feasible for the Soviet Union became too complex and in some cases burdensome when it became a question of their distribution among the independent states. The question of finding levels sufficient to ensure each state's security had to be resolved according to a completely new schedule.

The viability of any agreement is determined by how effective the corresponding verification measures are. In this regard, it should be stressed that the verification regime elaborated for the implementation of the CFE Treaty and its operating mechanism meet the very highest criteria. The main aims of verification are observance by the member states of the prescribed quantitative limitations, observance of the reductions of the arms and equipment subject to reduction under the treaty in the reduction locations, and observance of the certification of reclassified multirole strike helicopters and combat training planes. The corresponding inspection activity is being carried out for those purposes. In the past year 99 Russian facilities have been inspected. In addition, 55 inspections have been carried out at the sites of reductions in armaments and equipment. The Russian side in turn has carried out 185 inspections of other states' conventional armed forces.

It is important to stress that since the time the treaty went into force not a single attempt to circumvent its

provisions has come to light, nor has there been a deliberate attempt to conceal information pertaining to armed forces. Exhaustive explanations have been given with regard to all discrepancies in statistics on the quantity of conventional arms and equipment at the sites under inspection. A mutual understanding and mutually benevolent attitude have been established between the inspection groups and the sides under inspection, which has helped to strengthen trust and confidence in the observance of the treaty's provisions.

The most important condition for the fulfillment of the treaty and the basis for the functioning of the verification mechanism is the system of information exchange and notification activity. This system is designed to ensure a sufficiently high level of transparency with regard to conventional armed forces, effective and reliable verification, and predictability. The regime prescribed by the relevant treaty provisions envisages the timely and reliable presentation of notifications and exchange of information between the member states on the structure of their ground forces, air forces and air defense aviation, and other elements of the conventional armed forces and data on quantities, types, and the deployment locations of conventional arms and equipment. Information is provided promptly on all structural and quantitative changes, troop movements, and the acquisition of new and withdrawal of old types of armaments and equipment subject to elimination, and so forth. In less than a year now the Russian National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center—in our country this body bears the main responsibility for notification and verification activity—has prepared and dispatched more than 500 notices and received and processed around 2,000 notices and other information.

However, it cannot be claimed that the implementation of the treaty is proceeding easily and smoothly. From time to time difficulties and problems do emerge. This is no wonder, because there are 30 countries taking part in the process of disarmament.

For example, there has been confusion over the data with regard to conventional armed forces that the member states exchanged when signing the treaty and subsequently when it went into force and also with regard to the allocation of the commitments of the former Soviet Union among its successors, primarily the armament and equipment reduction norms. Quite a few questions have emerged during inspection activity, especially in the period of verifying the initial data. All these questions plus a number of practical proposals aimed at improving the mechanism of the treaty's implementation and increasing its viability have been examined and resolved in a special working organ that has been set up—the Joint Consultative Group.

It should be noted that the fulfillment of the treaty by Russia requires a great intensity of effort. This is so first and foremost because the commitments imposed by it have to be fulfilled in the conditions of a complex economic situation in the country, the ongoing withdrawal of troops from Central Europe and the Baltic, and the pursuit of a thoroughgoing military reform.

The fulfillment of arms reduction commitments is proving particularly difficult. In all Russia has to eliminate almost 12,000 units of arms and equipment. Of that figure, around 4,000 units (25 percent) have been scrapped in their area of deployment in the past year. In addition, the commitments that we made with regard to some of the arms and equipment removed from the Urals before the signing of the treaty must be borne in mind. Although reductions are being carried out in somewhat easier conditions in that region (the elimination and verification regime procedures are not so strict) the timetable remains the same.

The difficulties are due primarily to the weakness of the material base for carrying out the reductions. After the signing of the treaty, sites for the scrapping and refitting of arms and equipment were created mainly on the territory of Ukraine and Belarus. This was due to the conditions of the placement of troops, arms, and equipment as well as to considerations of keeping transport costs to a minimum. With the disintegration of the USSR, the number of sites of that kind on Russian territory proved insufficient. They had to be organized during the reduction process itself.

It should also be noted that the scrapping of arms is quite a costly venture. The destruction, for example, of a single tank costs more than 800,000 rubles at current prices. Nevertheless, irrespective of the difficulties involved, Russia is doing everything in its power to meet its treaty obligations in full.

The most acute problems for Russia have emerged in connection with the arms and equipment limitations in the flank region—the Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts.

This problem has already been discussed in the mass media, including KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Nevertheless, I think that it is important to return to it.

In today's conditions, the regional division stipulated by the treaty and especially the separation [vydeleniye] of the so-called flank region has not only lost political and military significance but has also acquired a character that for Russia is particularly discriminatory and has placed it in a position of inequality with regard to other parties to the treaty.

A profound reform is taking place within the Russian Armed Forces in accordance with our military doctrine and in light of treaty commitments in the sphere of the reduction both of strategic and conventional arms. We need full clarity so as to select the optimum defense potential configuration and prepare the corresponding military and social infrastructure for the organization of the forces. In southern Russia in particular such a configuration already exists. The construction of a further nine military towns (with more than 10,000 apartments) is nearing completion there and Russian units

due to be withdrawn from German territory will go there. But unless the problem of the flank limitations is resolved we will have to create the necessary facilities in other locations. That will entail a considerable rise in the cost of construction, which is more economical in the south than in other regions such as the north. Ultimately this may affect the timetable for the withdrawal of forces from abroad as well. Furthermore, a rise in social tension cannot be ruled out. After all, what is the point of withdrawing servicemen together with their families to unequipped regions where there is no housing or possibility of finding work? In addition, the increased cost of troop settlement could create extra financial difficulties and we have enough of those already.

We are insisting on the solution of the problem of flank limitations without detriment to the security of any state. Our proposals on this score accord with the treaty principle of equal rights and obligations for all the parties. In particular, we have proposed suspending the operation of the relevant article of the treaty regarding flank limitations. At the same time, we are ready to discuss any other reasonable proposals. We intend seeking a solution to this problem, which is important to us, and we hope that the other parties to the CFE Treaty will correctly understand our concern and meet us halfway.

It is only stage one of the fulfillment of the CFE Treaty which is drawing near. However, even now it may be said with confidence that the treaty's mechanism has begun operating fully and that the reduction of armaments and equipment has assumed an irreversible character. A very impressive step has been made: In Europe all the parties to the treaty have already scrapped over 4,500 battle tanks, almost 5,000 artillery systems, over 500 warplanes, and 60 strike helicopters. A new era has begun on the continent—an era of real disarmament and further strengthening of security and confidence.

Political Affairs

Yeltsin Interviewer Said 'Set Up' by ARD

MK1611140793 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 2

[Aleksandr Nadzharov report under the "Scandal" rubric: "How Eldar Ryazanov Became... A German Reporter"]

[Text] The sensational interview Boris Yeltsin allegedly gave to a correspondent of the German ARD television company has produced a tremendous scandal.

On 12 November, when the ill-starred program appeared on television screens in the FRG, it became clear than no ARD correspondent existed at all. Our president was interviewed by film director E. Ryazanov. According to Eldar Aleksandrovich, he and one of the female anchors of the private Russian television company REN-TV, who had arranged this interview, were simply set up by their German counterparts. They crudely violated the gentlemen's agreement in accordance with which the program was to be shown simultaneously in Russia and Germany on Tuesday, 16 November. Instead, they first trumpeted the world over that it was their work and then put the interview on the air, never mentioning who the real authors of the program were.

One of the finest Russian lawyers is looking into the situation at REN-TV's request, but even before he determines to what degree the rights of the television people were infringed, many of them have already come up with their verdict: They and Ryazanov were simply robbed by the Germans, who did them both moral and material damage. A statement turned over to KURANTY by REN-TV President Irena Lesnevskaya says among other things that usually "Western mass media speak with great feeling about the difficult conditions in which private businesses and independent press have to work in Russia, about the obstacles thrown in their path by our power structures." "We must state with utter responsibility," Mrs. Lesnevskaya goes on to say, "that we encountered no opposition either from the president's press service or Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's family as we were producing this program in which Eldar Ryazanov asks the president very pointed and candid questions. Neither the press service nor the family made any attempts to smooth over the questions, neither did they try to do any censorship on the program, and the ARD defenders of private enterprise and freedom of the Russian press did not act in the most dignified manner."

President Yeltsin's interview goes on the air tonight on our television. Viewers will learn B.N.'s opinion about who can take his place in the top state position, why the White House was blocked so late during the Communist-Fascist revolt, what was going on in the Kremlin on the night of 4 October, and how they prepared an edict on shooting the president's family. All these things of course are interesting primarily to you and me. Like indeed to the German viewer who has in fact been deceived by the television company.

Ostankino TV, IZVESTIYA Interview Yeltsin

LD1611195993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1908 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin has reiterated that he personally would not like to contest early presidential elections in 1994. In an interview with Ostankino Television Broadcasting Company, he said his November 6 statement on a possible cancellation of the elections was a "touchstone." At his meeting with the chief editors of leading newspapers on November 6, he admitted such a possibility.

However, Yeltsin stated that his decree No.1400 to hold early presidential elections in June 1994 remained valid in an interview with IZVESTIYA newspaper later this week.

Yeltsin dismissed allegations of breaking the former Soviet Union in 1991. "It was the putsch that broke the USSR, not me personally," he emphasized. After the August 1991 coup he ceased to feel any faith either in the Soviet Union, or in its then leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. Yeltsin said he felt no respect for Gorbachev now.

Commenting on the future of the CIS, Yeltsin hoped that the Commonwealth will eventually come to be "something like the Maastricht agreements in Europe."

Asked if Russia's future president could be a representative of nationality other than Russian - "Chuvash, Tatar, Jew or mixed descent," - Yeltsin was quoted as saying: "Theoretically, he could, but practically it is unlikely."

The president stressed that the future of the instigators of the October uprising in Moscow will be decided by court. He said these people were "engrossed by gross craving for power."

Asked about a step he could be proud of having taken, Yeltsin pointed to his decision to leave the Communist Party. At the same time, there are deeds he regrets. Among them, his consent to the destruction of the Ipatiyev building in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg - IF) where Bolsheviks shot the family of Zar Nikolay II in 1918. (In those times, Yeltsin was the secretary of the regional party committee - IF). However, he could not assume all guilt upon himself as that was a collective decision by Politburo, Yeltsin pointed out.

The president said his favorite writer was Anton Chekhov.

Yeltsin added that his mother was a convinced believer. He said he could not call himself a deeply religious person, but that he had a feeling of respect towards religion. He said it could eventually lead to the true piousness.

TV Interview Broadcast

LD1611212493 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1645 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Interview with President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin by correspondent Eldar Ryazanov in Yeltsin's dacha; date not given; filmed by the REN-TV Company; from the "Men's Talk" program—recorded]

[Text] [Ryazanov] Boris Nikolayevich, first I would like to thank you for finding the time to meet me, for keeping your word you gave in the last program that we would have another conversation. I have to say that that meeting of ours, with you and your family, was at a very difficult time, it was just prior to the referendum, when it was still unknown what would happen. The situation now is different. Your position is now very solid.

I will tell you honestly that the questions that I am going to ask you are not only my questions, because following that program a great many letters came in, letters approving, praising, berating, dismissing everything I had done. Well, near the Lenin museum, for example, there was a leaflet: The people had a producer, now jewboy Boris has a bumlicker, and so there were telephone calls, all sorts of different things. I do not regret what we did in the program, and I think it was right. If anything helped then, it was Naina, because you have a wife whom you made public in that program, and it seems to me she brought you plenty of additional votes. Now the situation is different, I was saying, and now it seems to me that those questions that I will be putting to you are questions from a great many people who support the reforms but who feel a certain bewilderment. So take care, stay alert, there will be different kinds of questions.

First of all I would like to ask you this question. Suppose I bring the president a blank form, you fly to some country and on the form is written: profession. What is your profession at present?

[Yeltsin] My original profession is construction engineer.

[Ryazanov] Construction engineer is your original profession, but you know, now we have done a bit of damage to one of the buildings which you defended two years ago.

[Yeltsin] That is true.

[Ryazanov] And so, let us leave that profession for now; that is in the past.

[Yeltsin] Politician.

[Ryazanov] Politician? I also think that you are now a politician. Politics, according to the everyday view, is a dirty business, a game, requiring one to weave about, to make compromises of the heart. Do you like your profession?

[Yeltsin] There you go again.

[Ryazanov] Yes, I am afraid so.

[Yeltsin] My life has taken this turn. I did not have a say in choosing it. It has always been the case that I was tossed this way and the other. That is why I worked on the production side of things, I was a party employee, a politician and now I am a president. I will not really be able to say to you that I fully like this job. No. Although, I do not agree with people saying that politics is a dirty business. It is up to an individual, to a politician to make politics as dirty or as clean as he likes. If a politician is playing a politically dirty game, then politics is a dirty business. If a politician is morally honest and pure, then politics is a clean business. In other words it depends on a politician himself.

I would like politics—and I am trying as hard as I can here—to be honest and clean.

[Ryazanov] Are you succeeding? Or do you sometimes have to sacrifice some of the notions you believe in?

[Yeltsin] To be honest, I do not always succeed. Sometimes I have to compromise, but it is not a compromise with my conscience, it is a compromise with circumstances. We presently have such a set of circumstances, that one has to compromise to make things better for the future. I accept this, but not to the point when this compromise is more of an indecency.

[Ryazanov] Could you tell me to what extent you are free in your actions. How often do you manage to do the things which you want to do despite the opinion held by your entourage, the generals, the opposition, Western states and so on and so forth? How often do you succeed in doing the things you want to do? Does it happen often or rarely?

[Yeltsin] I would say it happens quite frequently.

[Ryazanov] Quite frequently?

[Yeltsin] Yes. I do not agree with people saying that—and it has often appeared in the press and still does—that Yeltsin does everything which his entourage tells him to do.

[Ryazanov] Yes, I even read once that he only signs decrees brought to him by the last person who visited his office. I read this phrase somewhere.

[Yeltsin] I cannot agree with this. I cannot agree with this because in the first instance, I always have the last word. Yes, various other people make the preparations. Yes, there are people with whom I do not agree and I do not sign at all. There are quite a few such decrees. I do not sign and that is it, and they leave.

But there are those who really do go away as if it were the last, but they leave a decree with me, and only after I have personally finished it off do I then put my signature to it because without being personally involved I cannot imagine being ...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] Of this I have no doubt.

[Yeltsin] ... that it would be possible to issue a document of any kind. That is impossible.

[Ryazanov] Then explain this to me. Why is it that a number of decrees were signed and then revoked, or you

have commented on them in such a way as if they were intended quite differently? How has this come about?

[Yeltsin] This happens. This really does happen.

[Ryazanov] But this should not be the case, Boris Nikolayevich, don't you think?

[Yeltsin] Well, look, does everything turn out right for you?

[Ryazanov] No, not everything turns out right with me, but I do not have such a responsibility, not such a degree of responsibility as you have. You understand?

[Yeltsin] I understand. I understand. But equally, the questions which it is necessary for me to tackle are of a different order. You understand? So, of course not 100 percent of what has happened has come off. There are mistakes, and if I have spotted a mistake quickly, in any decree say, if I have detected it quickly or if I have been advised that it is a mistake, then one must not be afraid to correct it. That is the issue.

If one were to act as if nothing had happened, that it is not a mistake, that it is OK, that I am not able to make a mistake, then this will be a tragedy; this wil be a real mistake. There can be mistakes of a strategic and tactical nature, but one must prevent mistakes being of a strategic nature. This must not be permitted because this is linked to the destinies of people, it is linked to the destiny of the country. These are questions which are too serious. They can be of a tactical nature however, although of course one has to aim for there to be none of these, but that is not how it turns out.

[Ryazanov] Boris Nikolayevich, when you repeal or change a specific decree, there are situations, it seems to me, when you rarely appear in front of people directly. I do not have in mind any sort of interviews, or any sort of speeches at meetings, no. It seems to me, though, that you need to explain your policies because sometimes—well this is how I perceive it—sometimes it seems to be a shortcoming. I am being perfectly frank with you. For instance, let me tell you honestly that you failure to appear on television on the night of 3-4 October was completely incomprehensible. You know, well, it is simply that everyone expected it because it was a decisive, make-or-break time.

[Yeltsin] All the same, I addressed a written message to the people.

[Ryazanov] You did do that.

[Yeltsin] I do understand, though. I was unable to put in a personal appearance on the night in question.

[Ryazanov] Why? Was the situation so very precarious? Or were there any other reasons? Why?

[Yeltsin] I was at work all night. Moreover, questions were being resolved—well, let us say we were at the Ministry of Defense—that would later on decide the country's destiny. When all is said and done I am, in principle, in agreement with you that it would have been possible to find the time somehow to address the people. On the following day, on the 4th, I would have addressed the people, on the following day.

[Ryazanov] An address to the nation? On 25 July, when we had this financial affair involving the exchange of bank notes and everyone expected it too, you did not address the people. On the following day you did do that, all of it in written form—you extended the deadline, increased the amounts, all of it in writing. This in a situation in which people expected explanations, or for the guilty to be punished or for things to be elucidated. The president—the most important person in the country—who should explain and elucidate his position to us is nowhere to be seen. You know, this seems to me to be a kind of shortcoming. Well, forgive me for saying this to you.

[Yeltsin] No, why? I am, as it were, a normal person and my attitude to criticism is normal.

[Ryazanov] You do not persecute people for criticism?

[Yeltsin] No.

[Ryazanov] So it is possible to disagree with you?

[Yeltsin] Absolutely.

[Ryazanov] So, in that case, can I go on to ...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] And many people disagree with me. But a choice has to be made as to whether they are right or wrong, since they disagree with me.

[Ryazanov] That is clear.

[Yeltsin] That is where it is at. Maybe such a person is peddling his own line of one kind or another and I would be making a mistake agreeing with him? So here a discrepancy between his position and my position must be known, as it were. I agree with your original thought that if an error is to be found, let us say within a decree, then it is best if the president himself should explain it.

[Ryazanov] Of course.

[Yeltsin] Well, this I do agree with. This would never ...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] You agree that the president should personally address the people at decisive times for the nation?

[Yeltsin] Undoubtedly. I now address the people a bit more often, but I am not generally speaking in favor of frequent television addresses.

[Ryazanov] But Iosif Vissarionovich did not like that, either. He spoke but rarely.

[Yeltsin] Yes, I do understand, I do understand. Many more analogies can be made.

[Ryazanov] No, it is not an analogy; it is just the way I put it.

[Yeltsin] People are fed up ...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] No, I just wish to test your tolerance to criticism with me as a guinea pig, because you may or may not be tolerant of criticism and you may or may not throw me out of here.

[Yeltsin] No, why?

[Ryazanov] As for your 25 September decree, I regard it as absolutely correct; it is only that it was a bit late in the day. It should, from my viewpoint, have been promulgated earlier. However, you have a clearer view of the situation, as it were, the context within which events take place and so on and so forth. You said there that elections to the new parliament, the Duma, would be taking place on 12 December, and subsequently the Federal Assembly was added to this, and you said that the presidential elections would be held on 12 June. However, several days ago, that is to say yesterday, addressing newspaper editors, you said there would be no presidential elections and that you would stay in your job until the end of your term, as it were. I do understand the political expediency of a step of this kind. However, the moral and ethical aspects of this issue? Irrespective of whether you decide to stand or not, once you say that elections will take place, you have committed yourself.

I understand even that the Federal Assembly may turn out well, as it were, well, all the same I hope that it will be a reformist body in keeping with your policies and it is something I would very much like to see. I could even be asking you about not having presidential elections—but it seems to me that once you say something, you should be true to what you said, this is the way I think, you know? Once you have given your word, keep it. I am saying all of this by way of criticism, as it were.

[Yeltsin] Naturally, it is impossible to disagree with you, but this was done bearing in mind the prevailing considerations of that time to balance things out: If you have elections to the Federal Assembly, you also have presidential elections, albeit six months later. People insisted that these should take place simultaneously.

[Ryazanov] The so-called zero option.

[Yeltsin] Yes, yes, the zero option. However, it could not be done and I was categorically against it, because you cannot leave the country to its own devices when everyone is busy with the elections to the exclusion of everything else.

[Ryazanov] That is logical.

[Yeltsin] No one would be in charge of the country, you know. Subsequently there was a huge number of requests, insistent requests, I would say, to the effect that no elections should take place on 12 June. Well, when meeting chief editors, I floated this idea—that, quite possibly, they should not take place. Maybe I personally would not want these presidential elections, but you are right, the moral aspect must be taken into consideration here.

[Ryazanov] You came to the presidency, to the supreme power in general, on the crest of a moral wave. You condemned privileges, you, so to speak, condemned this communist terror and all such things, but what happened further—from a moral point of view—upset me personally very much. When all of you—I mean after August 1991—when you came to Staraya Ploshchad and occupied their offices, their apartments and their dachas, when you got into their cars, you understand that the people started to unintentionally identify the new people who came with the old ones. Yes, I understand, it was convenient to come to Staraya Ploshchad, there were all the communications and offices, and everything was ready, but the moral loss was huge.

Now we are holding our conversation at the dacha which Gorbachev had built for himself. Naturally, now you will say that this is not Gorbachev's dacha, but it is the presidential—presidential country residence—as the President of the United States has the White House, but in this situation for me to enter the house, where my predecessor used to live, would be—Boris Nikolayevich, please understand me, now I speak about the moral and ethical aspect alone—and the loss has turned out to be huge. Of course, there may have been an economic gain ...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] It was difficult for me too.

[Ryazanov] Forgive me for what I am saying, but I say what I think, namely because I am not afraid of you and because I respect you. Otherwise, I would not have told you all this.

[Yeltsin] Let us assume that I have taken criticism on board.

[Ryazanov] Good. Thank you. Boris Nikolayevich, there is another question. Tell me, please, it is known that power eats away at the soul, tell me, please, do you yourself observe the influence of—you have enormous power now, in the past month especially it has become colossal. Before this it was not small either. Is your soul being eaten away? Do you observe any newly appearing traits or intonations in yourself? This is a very dangerous question, Boris Nikolayevich. Do not rush with your answer.

[Yeltsin] Of course, I would have liked to say that I was not affected by this. Nevertheless, changes have taken place in me.

[Ryazanov] In what way?

[Yeltsin] Well, let us say in the fact that—you said it yourself—before, I would have never moved into such a residence. That is, you know, such moral things, connected with certain privileges, I have started taking a calmer attitude toward them than before.

[Ryazanov] But do not you feel a certain peremptoriness at times, does it not seem to you sometimes that you have cut someone short because you won't suffer objections?

[Yeltsin] I cannot deny that such cases occur.

[Ryazanov] But they occurred previously?

[Yeltsin] They occurred previously, too. Only perhaps they were on a smaller scale, the scale was smaller in what it concerned, but as regards there being sometimes a certain intolerance, certainly, perhaps sometimes I should relate to people more calmly. On the other hand—Eldar Aleksandrovich, you still have to bear in mind, remember my biography over the last eight years.

[Ryazanov] I remember it very well.

[Yeltsin] All of it, it was a constant fight, not a single month, not a single week, could I work in peace anywhere at any time. Everywhere there was some fight with someone, and of course, it embitters a person.

[Ryazanov] Tell me, in general terms, are you a man who bears grudges, are you vengeful?

[Yeltsin] No, this is the definition I would apply here: soft palm and hard fist.

[Ryazanov] You do not turn the other cheek if you have been hit?

[Yeltsin] No, of course not.

[Ryazanov] Tell me, you understand that you owe your popularity in the Soviet Union—I say Soviet Union because at that time there was still a union—to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. However paradoxical it might seem, it was Gorbachev who did it, precisely by unjustly sending you into exile. What do you feel toward him, because on the one hand you should hate him, which is understandable, but on the other hand he has been of inestimable service to you.

[Yeltsin] I cannot say I hate him, of course, but I have no feeling of respect toward him, either as a former politician or as a human being.

[Ryazanov] Tell me, when you got together in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, the three of you, Kravchuk, Shushkevich, and yourself. Hanging over you, was there not—generally speaking, an unprecendented situation had occurred—usually the presidents of a country have been toppled, killed, exiled, but what had happened then, had never happened before, they just pulled the country from under Gorbachev, and he had hung in a vacuum together with the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, culture and so on, and the government, with no country beneath him. So, what guided you three? I think that some of you there had certain wishes, ambitions to reign—I won't say of whom I am thinking, because perhaps these are heads of states friendly toward us, you understand, and why offend them? But did you yourself not also have some desire to some extent to settle accounts with Gorbachev?

[Yeltsin] No. I was offended for Russia. I can say that honestly, because for all these years Russia had had no statehood of its own. It had no independence. It had been under some kind of harness, yoke. It was unable to resolve anything properly, Russia. Nothing. You understand, it could not decide to build a kindergarten somewhere in Russia without having heard what the State Planning Committee of the Union had to say. It was offensive for Russia above all. That's the first thing.

Second, the Union was destroyed all the same—although at times people make the accusation that the Belovezhskaya Pushcha destroyed the Union—but at the end of the day, the Union was destroyed by the putsch.

[Ryazanov] It acted as a catalyst for all these processes?

[Yeltsin] Yes, it struck in such a way of course that the states and leaders of states could have no trust in the Union and in the leaders of the Union and in Gorbachev personally. At that moment he lost everything, it was not the Belovezhskaya Pushcha.

Third, there was the Ukraine referendum, when it stated its independence under the Belovezhskaya Pushcha. At the end of the day, I think that we are gradually—look, we have already created the economic union—we are gradually arriving at something along the lines of the Maastricht agreement in Europe.

[Ryazanov] I understand, that is, a kind of single community.

[Yeltsin] A kind of unified space—but each will nevertheless be an independent state.

[Ryazanov] As a result everyone gulped down independence, separatism, sovereignization, and everyone started living worse. There is no republic which has started living better—I mean this in the economic sense—than before.

[Yeltsin] Precisely for this reason ...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] Because all economic ties were severed, and because ...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] Not only because of this. No! How can you say such a thing!

[Ryazanov] Why then?

[Yeltsin] Eldar Aleksandrovich, because reform is underway, a unique reform in a unique Russia. There has been no such reform in the world and no one in the world has carried out such reform. Not having had and not knowing what private property is in the course of 75 years and then to change over to private property when people's psychology is unaccustomed and unadapted to this, this is a provisional period of reforms—it is intermediate. Now stabilization is already beginning and in 1994 there will be stabilization all the more, in the economy, in finance, etc.

[Ryazanov] You are saying this about Russia?

[Yeltsin] I am speaking about Russia, and many other states besides, even though not all, because [changes thought], and why, by the way? Why, say, in Ukraine are things worse? Because they decided to proceed slowly, to

slow down reform and this has had a very bad effect on their situation, a very bad effect. Even though you are right as far as ties are concerned. Ties have been disrupted. It is understandable that this has also affected the economy as a whole of the states, both of Russia and all others. But again, why have they been disrupted? Well, look.

[Ryazanov] Because they all believe that will survive on their own, but no one has succeeded in surviving.

[Yeltsin] And again, not only because of this. Reducing the defense industry by 60 percent: What does that imply? Reducing the defense industry by 60 percent. That means volume of production. That means economic ties between the republics, among themselves. And this 60 percent is no longer there. That is to say, there are too many different nuances for anyone to, so to speak, get up and explain that it is only because of the get-together in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha that things got worse, that the Union collapsed ...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] No, this ...

[Yeltsin] ... in this way, of course, with respect, one should not think so primitively.

[Ryazanov] This is not how I think. Perhaps I was provoking you. [bursts out laughing]

[Yeltsin] Ah, I see what you mean.

[Ryazanov] Boris Nikolayevich, explain the following situation to me. Now in our former republics, in many independent states, virtually everywhere, the former first secretaries of the central committees of these republics, people who professed communist dogmas, communist ideals, have suddenly all restructured themselves, and suddenly all have become democrats and suddenly all have become in favor of the market. What is it all about? I want to understand this. I think that probably some have become democrats because they have understood that in the prevailing conditions it is advantageous to be a democrat, that it is disadvantageous to be a communist. Others, evidently, were, so to speak bais [rich landowner in Central Asia], that is to say, princes, who essentially were the bosses and sheltered behind the communist ideology. You know, there were evidently yet others who matured slowly and agonizingly and went from one creed, from the communist creed, to the democratic creed. Perhaps they were like, well, you know the apostle Paul. He was anti-Christian, he also persecuted Christians, and on the road to Damascus the light suddenly dawned on him and he became a Christian believer to such an extent that he became one of the first apostles, Paul and Peter, so to speak, as it were.

Well, I would like to find out what happened in your life. I am interested in how a former communist, as it were, has become a democrat, I am interested in this evolution.

[Yeltsin] According to your terminology, you have named four categories and I fully agree that all four exist, I am in the third one.

[Ryazanov] The third, that is to say, a process of gradual and agonizing transition.

[Yeltsin] An agonizing transition. It was very complicated. Nor was there any revelation, nor were there considerations at the time.

But gradually, gradually, especially when I got into the Politburo, I began to understand that ours was not the way. After this realization I had a major struggle with myself ...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] I remember when you asked for political rehabilitation, do you?

[Yeltsin] Yes, rehabilitation, followed by me leaving the party at the congress, it was all ...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] It was an agonizing break for you to make.

[Yeltsin] Very agonizing.

[Ryazanov] You did not sleep all night before that day.

[Yeltsin] Absolutely right. The night before and quite a few afterwards. It was a difficult process.

[Ryazanov] In that case when was the first time you felt you were not a communist? I do understand that to a large extent you were occupied with economic matters and that you had many tangible tasks and that you were not an ideologue of Marxism.

[Yeltsin] Let me tell you it was Gorbachev who helped when he delivered a report at the Politburo and a draft report at a party congress, and I disagreed with him on 20 counts and listed all 20. This is when I understood that ...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] It was your speech at the congress?

[Yeltsin] No, at the Politburo.

[Ryazanov] At the Politburo.

[Yeltsin] But it was not published.

[Ryazanov] It was a long time before the famous October [1987] Plenum, right?

[Yeltsin] Yes, yes, yes, of course, yes. This was a certain crack in the edifice. After my speech he abruptly left the room where the Politburo was sitting. There was a dead silence. He was out for 30 minutes. After 30 minutes he comes back and starts to preach at me with no holds barred. It was then that I understood that our ways have to part.

[Ryazanov] Boris Nikolayevich, when the October plenum was held, you immediately fell straight into the embraces of the Inter- regional Group—Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov, Popov, Sobchak, Starovoytova, Afanasyev. This whole group, which you suddenly fell in with, did it exert any influence on you, because it seems to me that you turned out to be receptive to the influence of the democratic milieu, you see—or am I wrong?

[Yeltsin] No, you are right. Of course, these were, first, people who were really democrats, second very clever people, not to mention the very talented Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov and all the others, and so when I was constantly surrounded by them, and then, when they made me chairman, or rather co-chairman, together with Sakharov, Afanasyev and so on, we met very often, and we discussed these matters very often. At this point, regarding communist morality, it was already the end, it had already been exterminated. It was no more.

[Ryazanov] Boris Nikolayevich, what do you think, not so long ago the Czechs passed a decree declaring communist ideology criminal, just as in Germany after the World War, Nazism was also declared a criminal ideology. What do you think, is such a thing possible or necessary in our country? What do you think about such an idea? I don't mean criminal people, especially as the founding fathers have left us long ago, but the actual ideology. Has it disgraced itself, so to speak?

[Yeltsin] From the point of view of my attitude to it as an opposition, I think that such an opposition, non-belligerent opposition, is necessary.

[Ryazanov] That is, communists with a human face, not ones with knives. Is that how it is? Or is it your past that is speaking in you?

[Yeltsin] No, I just do not want to act by those methods which should not be used by a democrat.

[Ryazanov] Tell me please, there is this thing—perhaps you recall there was this little ditty—of course it was mocking Great Russian chauvinism: It is good that our Gagarin is neither Georgian nor a Tatar, nor a Jew, nor an Uzbek—he is our Soviet man. What do you think, in principle, is it possible in Russia for a Kalmyk, or a Chuvash, a Tatar, a Jew, a person of mixed blood to be president in Russia?

[Yeltsin] In theory, it is possible, but in practice it is improbable.

[Ryazanov] Which writers do you like? Do you read? Do you have time to read?

[Yeltsin] My favorite writer has always been and has remained for many many years—starting from the school bench—Chekhov.

[Ryazanov] And what is it about him that you like? What is it that is close to you?

[Yeltsin] It is the kind of clarity of exposition. The succinctness of thought, it just always struck me. It literally hits the nail on the head, it is literally fine, and it is all life—there are no kind of invented and far-fetched cliches of some kind, of the imagination. No. You read and you feel that yes, that does exist in life, such a situation can happen, and you believe him.

[Ryazanov] Often, we see you at the opening of a church or, say at Easter or at Christmas together with his holiness. Concerning your attitude—do you appear there as the head of state who has good, normal relations with the Church, or inside yourself do you actually have some kind of religious feeling?

[Yeltsin] You see, my attitude to religion was instilled in me by my mother. She was deeply religious, she believed, and she believed throughout her life, although later when I had become a communist, and at times she started to reproach me for this, she used to hide the little icons somewhere, but she prayed all the same, and so this feeling, gradually, has evidently somehow remained with me, and I started to have an attitude of greater respect. This does not mean that I am deeply religious. No. I can't say that. But I have great respect for religion. Perhaps, gradually, this will grow into true religiousness. Possibly.

[Ryazanov] Tell me please, Boris Nikolayevich, what do you believe was the greatest blunder in your life? And for what deed of yours do you respect yourself most?

[Yeltsin] Well, as to the second part, I can say [pauses] that it was quitting the party at the congress. Then one needed to have great courage to do it, and then a wave—this is very important—the wave of leaving the party swept across the entire country. I think that this deed is the most valuable one. For me it was so difficult, and complicated that it was worth a lot of trouble for me to overcome it. Regarding ...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] What would you have liked to be omitted from your biography altogether? Any blunder, any ...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] Well, the question is sudden, of course.

[Ryazanov] Tell me, Ipatyev's house [where the czar was executed] was demolished in your time?

[Yeltsin] Well, you have prompted one of the topics, but, I think, it is not the only topic [pauses]. Though I cannot take the entire blame for this, as I was given an instruction, but even then I had sufficient character to disassociate myself from it—from the decision of the Politburo.

[Ryazanov] But you obeyed?

[Yeltsin] I obeyed.

[Ryazanov] Do you regret this?

[Yeltsin] Of course.

[Ryazanov] Tell me now, when this program is on the air, I think that your enemies in Lefortovo are watching it. What would you like to tell them now? Imagine that they are in their cells, I don't know whether they have television sets or not—maybe they are given one on this occasion, if they do not have any. What would you like to tell them, those people, who spilled blood.

[Yeltsin] I spoke so much to them prior to that and I spoke individually to each of them and I appealed to them and repeatedly made compromises. I awaited

answers literally from all of them, I waited for constructive replies. Unfortunately this thirst for power, a kind of, you know, crude thirst for power, it swallowed up everything else.

I cannot say that they cannot be forgiven—of course not, the courts will decide what they deserve. Well, I would like to say to them: What is it you wanted? After all, it is possible, is it not, to work with Yeltsin.

[Ryazanov] But they wanted to work without Yeltsin.

[Yeltsin] They wanted to work without Yeltsin, that is perfectly correct.

[Ryazanov] But the stakes were so high—after all, people lost their lives as a result, due to political ambitions, you know and due to a thirst for power.

[Yeltsin] That is why we do not say victory; we say that a tragedy took place.

[Ryazanov] Boris Nikolayevich, one more question to you, possibly not very pleasant as well. When the August putsch was taking place, you spoke over the graves of those three lads and you said: I am guilty, I am the president and I failed to protect you, it is my fault, these are your words. On this occasion, many more people lost their lives. But you never delivered such a speech. Let us recall General Franco who erected a monument to those killed in the civil war, the Republicans and Franco supporters alike.

On 3 and 4 October those killed were children of Russia, Russian citizens, irrespective of their political ...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] Maybe we will erect one, maybe we will.

[Ryazanov, continuing] ... convictions. Well, my reproach to you is this: Why did you not speak? Why did you not utter some important and bitter words that had to be said?

[Yeltsin] I have no answer.

[Ryazanov] Boris Nikolayevich, forgive me, I speak my mind. I speak my mind because, in the first place, I have no official capacity you can remove me from and I do not fear you, you know, and it is fine that I do not fear you, because it is an achievement of the past few years of our life, you know. Earlier such intercourse would have been altogether impossible. Just for one of my questions, I would be in the company of these lads in the Lefortovo prison. [chuckles] Boris Nikolayevich, what do you understand under human happiness? This is a standard question, a stock question which is always being asked.

[Yeltsin] I hope my family members will not be hurt, but as far as I am concerned ...

[Ryazanov] You will have to deal with them later, on your own.

[Yeltsin] OK then, I will deal with them later—it is work satisfaction, which happens but rarely.

[Ryazanov] I am not talking about satisfaction, I am talking about happiness, the feeling of happiness. When do you feel happy?

[Yeltsin] This is what I mean. It happens so rarely that it is like happiness because I do not know any other happiness.

[Ryazanov] In other words, the larger part of your work leaves you dissatisfied.

[Yeltsin] Absolutely. I get 5 to 10 percent satisfaction from my work, and 90 percent of my work leaves me dissatisfied, constantly dissatisfied with my work. This is a frightening thing. And when all of a sudden I get dazzled by the fact that I am satisfied with something I have done, I feel ...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] In a nutshell, happiness for you is when you feel you have done something useful for society, to put it bluntly, is that right?

[Yeltsin] Yes, of course.

[Ryazanov] What human qualities do you like most and which do you like least, you detest?

[Yeltsin] I cannot handle indecency and baseness. I like clever and honest people.

[Ryazanov] What about such qualities as kindness, openness, and naivety?

[Yeltsin] These come later.

[Ryazanov] These are just variations.

[Yeltsin] Yes, these are variations. To be precise, some things come first, others come second.

[Ryazanov] I remember that when we were talking then, you said that every minute your schedule—well, that you were busy every 10 or 15 minutes, you have your schedule, and I thought to myself, heavens, the poor unfortunate man, I felt very sorry for you. I wonder how one can live like that, when a person is imprisoned by his schedule. Surely when you wake up on a Saturday you must feel like saying, go to hell all of you, I am going to lounge around until noon and that is final.

[Yeltsin] I wanted to today.

[Ryazanov] Well?

[Yeltsin] Well what? You spoiled it all for me.

[Ryazanov] You could have refused me. [laughs]

[Yeltsin] No, I can't refuse you. I respect you too much.

[Ryazanov] Thank you. It's mutual. [Yeltsin laughs] Thank you very much. I am very grateful to you for meeting me.

[Yeltsin] Thank you.

[Ryazanov] Thank you. [Video then shows a Russian flag with a caption reading "PS", then Yeltsin and Ryazanov walking along a road through woods, holding discussion]

[Ryazanov] You have a difficult burden.

[Yeltsin] Yes, it is difficult. Sometimes I have a feeling which says: Step down, step down, step down, step down. Then I think: Who else, who else, who else, who else?

[Ryazanov, talking to Yeltsin in a room] Boris Nikolayevich, I am happy to be able to meet you for the second time. You know, in my mind I was going through what was said before and why I let rip at you so?

[Yeltsin] I was also surprised.

[Ryazanov] Yes, I let rip at you and I preached at you, but I think this is because I am older. Well, you see, Boris Nikolayevich, when I was your age—I am two and a half years older—when I was your age I listened to my elders with attention.

Well, I can say that all this happened only because of one thing. You know, there is a saying: You always hurt the one you love.

[Yeltsin] That is no good to me because I do not regard myself as young. I am now older.

[Ryazanov] No, well, you understand, I do understand you, all in all, but, nevertheless, you must be young. You have such a burden to carry.

[Yeltsin] Incidentally, today I recorded a television address to the citizens of Russia on the occasion of the fact that work on the new constitution was completed yesterday.

[Ryazanov] And you think that it is the people who should decide whether the constitution is suitable?

[Yeltsin] No doubt about that. This is the highest measure of democracy.

[Ryazanov] Yes, but what I fear is that the people writ large, well, I too am a rather dim person, it may be that they will lack the patience to read it, to analyze it, to understand the differences—surely some explanations are in order here?

[Yeltsin] You know, in the first place there will be explanations, for a whole month. Second, the legal subtleties are not something everyone must be aware of. Principles—these must be known. What must be known is what people have been given, what rights, as it were, what duties and so forth. What must be known is the fact that it is indeed our country's first democratic constitution as befits a civilized state.

[Ryazanov] Is our constitution as good as the American one?

[Yeltsin] Yes.

[Ryazanov] It emerges into the daylight some 200 years later.

[Yeltsin] Of course it has its own features, adapted to Russia. That is the reason why it is, of course, not a carbon copy of the American constitution, no way. However, from the point of view of human rights standards, it is fully in keeping with international standards.

[Ryazanov] God willing, one would like to live in a normal, civilized, prospering state.

[Yeltsin] Well, you know, I used to say and I still say that it may well be that our generation will not be able to implement this whole constitution—but our children will, without fail, will implement the whole constitution.

[Ryazanov] As Nekrasov put it: It is only a pity that neither you nor I will be alive during that fine time.

[Yeltsin] No, but our children, sons and daughters will.

[Ryazanov] I meant you and I. Boris Nikolayevich, one topic is unavoidable. Everyone is worried by it, interested in it and concerned about it. It is the question of the mutiny on 3 and 4 October. You know, one of the classics said that a mutiny cannot be victorious, for in that case it goes by a different name.

[Yeltsin] Precisely.

[Ryazanov] I remember that in the summer you used the term of battle in September, that is how you put it. It was incomprehensible: If you indeed intend to act, why lay your cards open? You remember what Prince Svyatoslav used to say—he used to say he was going to confront the enemy. To be honest, it was perceived by many as bluff in the context of the situation of diarchy and strife. Many thought that the president was no longer up to it and that these were just threats, just idle threats.

[Yeltsin] Do I look like I am not up to it?

[Ryazanov] No, but when many of your decrees were being paralyzed, when all your actions engendered counteraction by the Khasbulatovites, Rutskoy, the parliament, the opposition and so on and so forth—well, to me you seemed like a Gulliver tied up by the Lilliputians, as it were. But when he was tied up, he was not up to it. Please tell me, when you uttered that phrase, did you know that such a decree would be coming? How many people were in the know? Were you not afraid of being betrayed? It is just that it is very interesting to find out how it all happened.

[Yeltsin] It is, perhaps, the only decree which I wrote entirely on my own. Handwritten, it was in my safe and waited for its time to come.

[Ryazanov] Did you write it much in advance?

[Yeltsin] No, I wrote this draft decree about a month before I said that there would be battle in September.

[Ryazanov] And no one knew about it?

[Yeltsin] No one.

[Ryazanov] Tell me please, it is very difficult, diabolically difficult to carry out such an action single-handed. Did you not take anyone's advice? Did you not get someone's backing?

[Yeltsin] No, I only drew up the text. I created, so to speak, a draft decree. When the time has come to implement it, first of all, I drew in the power [the foreign, interior, security, and defense ministries] structures.

[Ryazanov] That is, you had an agreement with Grachev, Golushko, and Yerin?

[Yeltsin] With Yerin ...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] Well, Golushko was not appointed for a long time. After Barannikov was dismissed, there was a long interval before a security minister was appointed.

[Yeltsin] Well, I was simply studying him.

[Ryazanov] I understand.

[Yeltsin] This is the only reason. Well, the power structures plus the chairman of the government—this is the group of people who discussed all the details of how and what to do, etc.

[Ryazanov] Was there any leakage of information about your conferences?

[Yeltsin] Well, they suspected something. They may have suspected something somehow, but there was nothing obvious.

[Ryazanov] Tell me, the time you have chosen—did you choose it because you believed that it should be now and later it may be too late, or was it that some emotional impulse played its role, say, Khasbulatov's insulting behavior or the gesture he made—or did you not see it or hear about it?

[Yeltsin] Lately I stopped paying attention to him. You know, simply the time came when it became dangerous for Russia, when we learned that on 6-7 October they might provoke a general revolt and a civil war.

[Ryazanov] Did you have information to this effect at the security ministry?

[Yeltsin] Yes, there was such information.

[Ryazanov] Well, some sort of plot, putsch was being planned.

[Yeltsin] Quite correct. Why would they have so many weapons? They have been accumulated. When did they take self-defense detachments which arrived here from the regions? When did they take those who came to the White House from the Dniester region in advance? When did it all come from?

[Ryazanov] Boris Nikolayevich, if you knew all this, why did you notblock off the White House completely once you had issued your decree? Why did you not take the White House before they entered it? Why did you not do that?

[Yeltsin] Time and time again, it was our desire to make peace with the deputies and the others. We appealed to them time and time again, asking them to come to their senses, time and time again, until the very last moment, until we realized that there was no use in doing it, and then...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] Boris Nikolayevich, naturally, you have to forecast people's reaction to every decree you issue, otherwise it is impossible to issue them. Had you foreseen the things which happened later? For instance, the blockade of the White House, the convening of the congress, the appointment of a pseudo-president and pseudo-ministers? Did you anticipate that things could take this turn, or did you not? Or was it all news to you?

[Yeltsin] Oh, no, no. We did not just anticipate it, we anticipated an even bigger turn of events.

[Ryazanov] Meaning?

[Yeltsin] Having studied the situation in individual regions, we forecast that people there would not be indignant. Second, we forecast world public opinion, exactly spot on.

[Ryazanov] You were right in both cases, were you not?

[Yeltsin] We were.

[Ryazanov] In other words you realized that the source of infection would not be strong.

[Yeltsin] Yes, it was kept within Moscow, and although I made Chernomyrdin responsible for St. Petersburg, I knew that it would not happen there.

[Ryazanov] You know, I was to some extent, maybe not upset, but hurt—I don't even know how to put it—when you tried to lure deputies from there [White House], promising them new posts and salaries. In essence, this encouraged treachery, and moreover, these people were promised new posts and later joined the presidential apparatus and the government. After all, they make up a fifth column.

[Yeltsin] I do not agree.

[Ryazanov] It is wonderful that our opinions differ but I am telling you what I think. I have more respect for those deputies who stayed there—although, I do not share their views in the least—than for those who changed camps.

[Yeltsin] Yes, they can be divided into three categories. The first consists of those who honestly stayed from the beginning to the end and behaved appropriately at the Supreme Soviet and did not stay in the White House. This is the purest category.

[Ryazanov] Well, let us say that these were democratically minded deputies.

[Yeltsin] Yes, yes. The second category consists of those who are democratically minded and behaved properly at the Supreme Soviet but carried out certain work in the White House, you see. It was impossible to abandon them. Well, and the third category consists of obvious

traitors, and everything was clear with them, but it was impossible to abandon the second category, they had to be socially protected. After all, they worked at the Supreme Soviet, they differed from [Mikhail] Chelnokov, they behaved in a democratic way and tried to carry out their propaganda and agitation at the White House.

[Ryazanov] And how many such deputies came over from the White House?

[Yeltsin] Eighty-five.

[Ryazanov] And their fate now—are they working?

[Yeltsin] It has been settled, depending on their abilities. It was impossible to act otherwise. After all, we could not start proceedings against all of them or put all of them in Lefortovo prison.

[Ryazanov] No, I am not speaking about proceedings, but it is one thing to say: If you lay down arms, we will spare your lives, you will leave and we will not ask for your identity papers. This is one thing, but it is quite another thing to say: Come over to our side and we will give you a yearly salary. This is a different thing indeed, there is a difference here. I can feel it.

[Yeltsin] Well, your feeling is not unfounded, but I thought at the time, and I am convinced of it now, too, that a certain part of deputies who behaved honestly had to be protected, not lured out—they could stay in the White House—but protected.

[Ryazanov] All right, Boris Nikolayevich, but what was going on during the night of 3-4 October when militia suddenly disappeared somewhere? Was it done deliberately to lure out the defenders of the White House? Moscow was defenseless for a period of time.

[Yeltsin] No, no! Never.

[Ryazanov] What do you mean? The mayor's office was seized, bus and truckloads of those hoods went to Ostankino ...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] That is not true.

[Ryazanov] There was a feeling that Moscow was defenseless and that the mutiny could have had a different outcome. I am conveying a view which very many people share.

[Yeltsin] I understand, and I am telling you how it was because I know the facts.

[Ryazanov] This is exactly what I want—to learn about it from a primary source.

[Yeltsin] You are welcome. The thing is that during the night of 3 to 4 October the premises were allocated. I was also at the Defense Ministry. We all gathered there and divided up what premises would be defended by the Defense Ministry and what premises would be defended by the Ministry of the Interior. The Security Ministry was in fact defending itself.

[Ryazanov] I think that nobody was making an attempt on it.

[Yeltsin] Well, noone attempted, but they were afraid that there might be attempts, and that is why they tried to defend themselves...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] What sort of security ministry is this, if it is afraid for itself and of attempts being made on it?

[Yeltsin] Well, that's how it happened. Well, the military were a bit late. Do not try to get a greater secret out of me than I, so to speak, know or can tell.

[Ryazanov] Well, that is is exactly what I am doing. I am not trying to get out of you more than you know, but my task is to learn as much as possible from you...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] Or I may know. Well, I am telling you that the military were delayed and the militia had left these premises. While we—before the military arrived—were sending the militia back to these premises; we sent them back. We sent the special purpose detachment back to the mayor's office. We sent the special purpose detachment and the OMON [special purpose militia detachment] back to Ostankino. We sent them back and, incidentally, they saved the situation.

[Ryazanov] I agree about Ostankino, but the mayor's office was surrendered.

[Yeltsin] But they liberated it right away, four floors of it. The special purpose detachment liberated four floors immediately.

[Ryazanov] Boris Nikolayevich, these four floors should never have been occupied. This is my point of view. Of course, it is easy for me to dish out advice. There is a saying that it is easy to be wise after the event.

[Yeltsin] It is a different matter that, well, are we waging a war every week?

[Ryazanov] No, not every week, especially a war that is waged by one's own people against one's own people.

[Yeltsin] One like this is particularly unnecessary. Yes, such a war—that is why...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] But in general did you derive certain lessons for the future from this?

[Yeltsin] Undoubtedly. There was a meeting of the Defense Ministry collegium, and a meeting of the Interior Ministry collegium. I met the heads of all the power ministries [defense, security, interior, foreign affairs], and we carried out a post mortem. Of course we identified where we were too late. We were too late, never mind which troops, Defense Ministry or Interior Ministry; we were too late. The Defense Ministry [troops] arrived too late at Ostankino, so the Interior Ministry [troops] had to return there. By the time the Defense Ministry [troops] arrived, there was already nothing to do there, and then the Defense Ministry [troops] headed for the White House.

[Ryazanov] Was the lateness accidental, due to confusion and bungling, or was it deliberate?

[Yeltsin] That is a psychological problem.

[Ryazanov] Whose psychological problem is it, now?

[Yeltsin] For the heads of the ministries.

[Ryazanov] All right. I am not going to torture you, I am beginning to sound like a torture specialist. [laughs] I will, however, ask you this: Were you afraid that night? Did you have moments when you thought that everything might collapse, and in general, are you afraid of death?

[Yeltsin] No.

[Ryazanov] You are not afraid of death?

[Yeltsin] Absolutely not.

[Ryazanov] Why not?

[Yeltsin] I do not know. Maybe it is because I was brought up that way; maybe it is because I have been in so many different situations during my life. I am not in the least afraid of death. I do not even think about it.

[Ryazanov] To start with, you do not have time to think about it; I understand that.

[Yeltsin] There was no question of it, but there was some question of whether or not the Defense Ministry would keep its word. That's where there was a small...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] Uncertainty?

[Yeltsin] An uncertainty, or even perhaps a certain element of fear.

[Ryazanov] That is what you felt?

[Yeltsin] What if they had not obeyed the supreme commander in chief?

[Ryazanov] It was then, at that moment, that Gaydar made his appeal?

[Yeltsin] No, that was later. I settled everything during the night. At three in the morning...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] Gaydar made his appeal earlier.

[Yeltsin] No, they were unaware of this. They were sitting there in the ministry at three o'clock. For them, ultimately—it was necessary for me to have said it, do you understand? My view is that the minister of defense ought not to await a command from the supreme commander in such a situation. He himself should understand.

[Ryazanov] What was it that was stopping you?

[Yeltsin] A great responsibility, and also, possibly, to a certain extent lack of faith or distrust of certain military leaders—that they would obey his command.

[Ryazanov] So, nevertheless, to a certain extent, the situation hung on a thread, because it was, so to speak...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] No. In fact, the military leaders proved to be significantly more disciplined than we thought them to be.

[Ryazanov] Boris Nikolayevich, you understand, generally, what would have awaited you personally if the putschists had come out on top, and what, generally, would have happened to Russia?

[Yeltsin] Of course as far as I am concerned, I have no doubt, inasmuch as the Supreme Soviet had decided to shoot me.

[Ryazanov] It simply adopted such a...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] Yes, of course...

[Ryazanov] I see, so...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] Shoot myself and my family, shoot without any... [pauses] So here I had no doubts whatsoever. The main thing is not me, the main thing is Russia, the main thing is that this would have been civil war because, broadly speaking, the people would not have agreed with their system of government.

[Ryazanov] Do you know that the situation here is such that if, God forbid, what you are talking about had taken place then immediately there would have been such repressions, and great experience has been accumulated in our system, that the people perhaps would not have been able to come to its senses, to put it crudely.

[Yeltsin] The people are no longer like that. Yes, the system has still remained, but equally, the people are not the same. The people would not have resorted to this, just as the people did not allow the White House to be taken in August 1991.

[Ryazanov] Just as the people supported you in April this year.

[Yeltsin] Yes, absolutely right.

[Ryazanov] Boris Nikolayevich, please tell us: You yourself also said in our previous conversation that in this situation there are no victors. It is a tragedy for the people, and this is correct. Sometimes, however, perhaps this comes from you or from those around you, people who have the upper hand behave as if they are victors. In particular, I will tell you honestly, for example, and this is not just my opinion, I experienced a feeling of discomfort when the golden shower of awards rained down, because it seemed to me that it was not the right thing to reward people for fratricide. That golden rain for heroism in general, the orders were essentially given, if one is to be frank about it, because they did not betray, because they did not desert, because they did not go over to the other side. You understand?

[Yeltsin] No, because they came close to death.

[Ryazanov] Not all of them. It was only several dozen people who came close to death.

[Yeltsin] But there was no golden shower. If one compares this with the shower [of awards] that were given in the not so distant past, this one compared with those is just a thousandth part of what was awarded. Only those who stood around the White House, the individuals that were shot at first...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] There is no doubt about those, of course.

[Yeltsin] Those are the ones, and not simply one after the other, so to speak.

[Ryazanov] The opposition, you understand, has reproached you with dictatorial strivings and to the slightest thing, any normal, lawful demand or request, they immediately shouted: He wanted personal power. I do not share this view, because I think that you had the opportunity, in particular after August 1991, to take control of everything. At the present time, however, you do in fact have power that you never had before, unrestricted power. There is no counterweight. There is no parliament for the moment. This is just for a month. There will be in a month's time, that is, I think it will be a civilized parliament, in which there will be some kind of opposition group all the same. They will have a go at you, get on your nerves. Well, and thank goodness for that, incidentally. God willing that they should do that, because whether you like it or not, you will have to make your acts commensurable to theirs. I think, however, that at the present time you should—I apologize for moralizing—you should have contact with the people all the time. It seems to me that every week you should explain to them what and how it happened.

So, for example, where there is the slightest chink there are rumors. To be specific, we are told that several thousand people were found dead in the White House and that trucks took them away in secret, by night. Again, I want to hear from the horse's mouth: How many died, specifically?

[Yeltsin] One hundred and forty-two.

[Ryazanov] One hundred and forty-two. So, this conjecture—why is there this conjecture, because information was provided in a slack way, imprecisely, carelessly, perhaps?

[Yeltsin] It was in the newspapers. This figure was on television; this figure was everywhere. If it was not pronounced by the president, that is another matter; perhaps it should have been. To weigh against that, however, I would reply clearly and firmly here that the only counterweight now is one's own conscience. That is the counterweight.

One can be speaking every day on television and still can have mixed feelings inside. One can disagree inside even with what one is saying, but one can never get away from one's own conscience. It will always be with a person, always in the back of one's mind—one's own conscience. That is why I am not allowing myself over this period to pass any decision so important that it might affect the destiny of Russia. No. I will not make any such decision until we have the Federal Assembly. Yes, I will be making executive decisions, as I have already, decrees and other things, but these will be of an executive nature. The only thing I have passed is the decree on land, private ownership of land...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] And that was very delayed; it should have appeared long ago.

[Yeltsin] It was delayed, all the more so because the Congress discussed it, the Supreme Soviet discussed it, but the matter was ready even then. The people supported it. I know that the people support it, you know. This decision was therefore passed and, as I wrote in my decree, is subject to the endorsement of the Federal Assembly. Do you know the form I chose? That such profound, very major decrees actually concerning all Russia and the life of our state—it says at the end of the decree—are subject to the endorsement of the Federal Assembly. That is, when the Federal Assembly gathers, it should take this decree, discuss it, and say: Either leave it, or bury it. If they bury it, it will be in force for one month. Taking account of how we implement our decrees, that is in practice, it's real effect will be very, very small.

[Ryazanov] Well, I think that the Federal Assembly will confirm this decree, because...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] I am sure of that as well.

[Ryazanov] Because it has been due for a very long time, and it should have been done.

[Yeltsin] Yes, well, I am talking about the principle. Maybe there are several other decrees, but they are with reference to the Federal Assembly, with reference... [pauses] that is, I want to be straight on this.

[Ryazanov] Boris Nikolayevich, there is this question: They say of Yeltsin that he is suberb at getting out of a situation when his back is against the wall, when you have to climb on to a tank, that is, when the situation is really—he has an amazing sense of intuition, but when it is a matter of everyday, mundane work, he is either late, or loses out, shows indecisiveness. I am saying what people say, and you have probably come across it.

[Yeltsin] Yes, and I know myself all too well not to agree with that.

[Ryazanov] So it is true?

[Yeltsin] Yes.

[Ryazanov] So you have to constantly create emergency situations so as to make maximum...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] You have to keep me stretched the whole time.

[Ryazanov] And that is what I am doing now, I think, the whole time.

[Yeltsin] Yes, that is what you are doing at the moment, yes. Even in sport, when I was playing volleyball, when I was a student, in the country's top league, I played for Sverdlovsk. If it was an ordinary game you would not see me, but if the game was close, I could work wonders.

[Ryazanov] Well, all you have to do is revive all the communist organizations so that they go around shooting the whole time, and then you will be at your best. I am joking, of course.

[Yeltsin] No, all you need is a big needle on hand and constantly...

[Ryazanov, interrupting] Give you a jab! Then you will need a special person to do it! [laughs] To stick the needle in! Tell me, Boris Nikolayevich, you have had an amazing fate, if you think about it. The whole time you are like a phoenix, because you have had such falls you would think you will never get up again.

Here, one involuntarily thinks that there is some kind of higher hand of providence. I do not know, you are always on the brink of defeat, always on the brink of downfall, always on the brink... [pauses] well, you even became a member of the Supreme Soviet because Kazannik gave you his place, and if he had not given it to you, you would not have become a member of the Supreme Soviet, would not have become chairman. With what difficulty you became... [pauses] and you would not have become president of Russia. You understand, this is incredible, so to speak. How do you feel about this, yourself, because it seems that you are completely down and out...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] Well, you know, I do not rule out that someone on high is perhaps guiding me. These improbabilities are so frequent, frequent, that I personally feel that someone up there is guiding me. Really, say it is all over, failure, as it were, complete failure, and suddenly, everything is okay.

[Ryazanov] Boris Nikolayevich, who, for you is a kind of benchmark, an ideal, among the democratic leaders, and what would you like to leave after yourself?

[Yeltsin] I am resolved not to touch on this topic, but, as for a person before whom I bow my head in our country, in our country, then it is Sakharov. Beyond the borders of our country, Margaret Thatcher.

[Ryazanov] These are contemporaries, yes.

[Yeltsin] Yes.

[Ryazanov] From history?

[Yeltsin] Peter the First.

[Ryazanov] Peter the First.

[Yeltsin] Yes.

[Ryazanov] But you know for example that Peter the First himself cut off heads—you know this?

[Yeltsin] Of course I know, of course I know. On the other hand, he did so much for Russia. This must also be borne in mind.

[Ryazanov] Boris Nikolayevich, I have this question: You have very many supporters, but not a few opponents, and they are now probably sitting watching their televisions listening to our conversation. What would you like to say to those people who do not trust you, who do not accept your policy? It seems to me that you should say to them something very important, some main thing, concerning your main aim in life, because it seems to me that this is very important.

[Yeltsin] I would say to them that they should nevertheless have trust in me, and that I am doing this not for myself or my personal power. No. I am willing to resign now, but I realize that I cannot resign now. Do you understand? I do not relish that kind of personal power when you experience a fervent feeling and gleefully rub your hands together over how you have done something to someone using this power. Believe me that I do this only for the sake of Russia, for the sake of its regeneration, for the sake of its future and because I love Russia and because I believe in it; believe that it will be regenerated, and I would conclude our conversation with that.

[Ryazanov] Two more questions and we will finish it. You cannot get rid of me that easily, Boris Nikolayevich. Tell us please this: What do you think now about our people? You see, our people have many marvelous national traits, but it is no secret that the last 75 years have severely warped some of our spiritual values. You know, we have forgotten how to work, we are lazy, we drink, we generally want to take everything and divide it up equally. What do you think about the people and what is the main task, say, for the intelligentsia and cultural figures with respect to say—for us? After all, we ourselves—and that goes for you and me—are part of the people.

[Yeltsin] Yes, of course. In so far as I meet people very often, on the streets, in factories, at plants and in other establishments, and judging from the results now available, I get the fairly clear impression that we are beginning to rid ourselves of that 75-year-long plague when we were indeed simply frightened and scared of that totalitarian monstrosity, when we did not know the market, when we did not know private ownership, and we are beginning to realize this. That is what is most important, but if one is to generalize about the people, to say that they are patient and so on, well, one can say a lot about our people. They are a clever and talented people, but what is happening now is a breaking up and dispersal, as it were, of all those old stereotypes, a shift to new values and a purification of the individual. Well, it is still a unique country, with a unique people.

[Ryazanov] Wonderful. Boris Nikolayevich, I have to say that I have an enormous liking for you, and very many people support you, not only for your state, political views, and actions, but also because in you they

see and feel moral health. I would just very much like to wish you success in your work and remember that every political act has a moral aspect because there are situations when it is very difficult to reconcile these things, and it is precisely your moral health that is a kind of guarantee and hope for us. So do not hide from the people. Show yourself, communicate, be frank and friendly with us, and we will repay you in kind.

[Yeltsin] It will be a lesson for me. Thank you.

[Ryazanov] It is just that I am really grateful to you, and I thank you for your frankness and for not dodging the questions, and I apologize for giving you a bit of a rough ride! Thank you.

[Yeltsin] Thank you.

[Ryazanov] Thank you, Boris Nikolayevich. Till we meet again.

[Yeltsin] Till we meet again.

Yeltsin Orders Stepping Up Public Order Protection

LD1711114493 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Report by press service of the Russian president]

[Text] Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, has promulgated an instruction endorsing a plan of measures to step up protection of public order and the protection of the rights and personal safety of citizens and their property against illegal encroachments.

It is planned to implement the measures during the second half of 1993 and during the first half of 1994. In particular, the plan provides for the elaboration of a draft law on protection of public order; for introducing changes and supplements into the existing laws to effect a stricter liability for hooliganism, illegal possession of arms, and vagrancy; and to give the Militia functionaries the right to examine passengers and their luggage on all types of transportation.

It is planned to introduce visa regulations for the residents of the former USSR republics who want to enter Russia.

It is planned to speed up the elaboration of the draft laws which increase liability for organizing anti-constitutional paramilitary and armed formations and for cutting off main transport routes, individual territories, and premises. It is also planned to speed up the elaboration of the laws on state protection for judges and personnel of law protection and monitoring bodies, on the protection of witnesses and aggrieved parties, and on the social rehabilitation of persons released from incarceration.

It is also planned to elaborate draft presidential decrees concerning the prevention of crime and the organization of sanitary control of and social support for persons with no fixed place of abode, on the introduction of changes into the President's 29 January 1992 decree on the freedom of trade.

The Government of Russia is to prepare proposals concerning effective preventive measures to avert antisocial activities of juveniles and young people where they live, study, and work.

The plan includes a list of measures to improve material, technical, and financial back-up for the sub-units of the Militia and the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and also to increase welfare support for the Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel, including the allocation of resources to build housing for them.

Yeltsin Forms Commission To Design State Emblem

LD1611205093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1908 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin today formed a commission to design a new state emblem for Russia. The presidential press office said the decision was caused by the need to bring the country's state symbols in line with the modern concept of Russian statehood and the coming adoption of the new constitution.

Russia's chief keeper of archives, Rudolf Pikhov, was appointed chairman of the commission.

The commission was asked to submit the description and the image of a new emblem designed on the basis of Russian national symbols directly to the president within a fortnight.

Shakhray Warns of Possible Military-Police State

LD1611174093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1622 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow, 16 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—"The Russian parliamentary system has yet again been seriously harmed. The current executive authorities are so weak that they certainly do not deserve to be accused of being authoritarian, and it is the military that is increasingly beginning to acquire real political weight," says Sergey Shakhray, deputy prime minister of the Russian Government.

Replying to the IZVESTIYA daily's request (17 November issue) to forecast how events will develop in Russia in the nearest future, Sergey Shakhray says: "A situation may emerge necessitating the military machine being kept on a permanently active footing to suppress armed interregional conflicts. In such an eventuality, the army's political influence will inevitably grow."

Sergey Shakhray thinks that if the confrontation between the center and the regions intensifies, Russia may have to face the alternative of being threatened with disintegration or turning into a military-police state.

The deputy prime minister is convinced that Russia's new constitution may avert this kind of development of events.

Zhirinovskiy Interviewed on Political Situation

BR1611150293 Rome L'UNITA in Italian 15 Nov 93 p10

[Interview with Russian Liberal Democratic Party Chairman Vladimir Zhirinovskiy by Sergio Sergi in Moscow; date not given: "We Moderates Will Save the Russians"]

[Excerpts] Moscow—"We are neither communists nor fascists. We are of the center-right, moderately conservative." This was said by the man who came third in the 1991 presidential elections—[Liberal Democratic Party Chairman] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who at that time gained 8 percent of the votes. Is he the clown of new Russian politics? A KGB puppet? There are many opinions concerning this controversial, theatrical, and complex figure. In this interview with L'UNITA he criticizes Yeltsin, describes himself as neutral in the violent battle between the Kremlin and Parliament; expresses the wish for a return to Russia's old borders; dismisses the strategists of the economic reforms; and proposes himself as government leader.

[Sergi] What is your goal?

[Zhirinovskiy] A normal life, that everything be calm, that there be no tragedies or disasters. No AIDS, just influenza. Just a few sneezes, and that is all. We do not need political AIDS.

[Sergi] But do you really think that it is possible to achieve what you call the Russia of the beginning of the 20th century?

[Zhirinovskiy] Certainly, and that is what the West itself is doing; it is pushing us in that direction. We would have stayed happily within the borders of the USSR, but they destroyed the USSR. So we will not stop, and now we are demanding whatever we want. People want to achieve a good life, to lead a good life, as soon as possible. Therefore we will be forced to pursue the same path: We have been ruined, and now we will ruin others. We have always been a peaceful country; we have not attacked anyone; and now they have organized an internal war here.

[Sergi] Tell me about your party.

[Zhirinovskiy] We are a party that proposes concrete solutions. In our country the left tried to build socialism and failed, and now the right is trying the build capitalism, and obviously it will not succeed. We promise the voters to raise living standards twofold within six months, by July 1994. There are three directions: to stop all aid to foreign states, to halt the conversion of the defense industry, and to destroy the criminal gangs. That is the minimum program that will produce a real rise in living standards for all. We believe that we must have two allies—Germany in Europe and India in Asia. We are neither communists nor fascists. We are a center-right party, moderately conservative.

[Sergi] What was your position during the 4 October crisis?

[Zhirinovskiy] We adopted a neutral stance. We did not support either side. There were violations of the Constitution and the use of arms on both sides. So we hope to win the elections, inasmuch as both the communists and the democrats have bloody hands and dirty consciences.

[Sergi] What political model do you follow?

[Zhirinovskiy] We would like there to be a synthesis between the Russian experience and the best of world practice. We want a strong executive, but we will also accept a strong parliament, and obviously we are in favor of multiparty democracy and a mixed economy, taking account of Russia's special characteristics.

[Sergi] You said you are opposed to delusions of grandeur, but one of your demands is a return to the Russian borders of 1900...

[Zhirinovskiy] Yes, to Russia's natural borders.

[Sergi] With Poland, Finland...

[Zhirinovskiy] Not necessarily. It will be enough to return to the borders set in the 1977 Constitution. We will also be satisfied with the borders of the purely Slav states—Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. The important thing is to restore the main part of Russian territory. It is not a matter of bringing 100 percent of certain territories under our rule. Let us say that the Caucasus could languish in uncertainty and allow all their problems to explode.

[Sergi] What is your opinion of Yeltsin?

[Zhirinovskiy] He did not want to be president. It should have been Sakharov, but after his death it was decided that Yeltsin was the best choice. So, in a sense, Yeltsin is both to blame and not to blame, and would already have resigned willingly. He receives advice and follows it. Like a doctor who does not know how to diagnose, has no medicine, and is working in the dark. The patient could recover, but he could also die.

[Sergi] Do you miss the Soviet era?

[Zhirinovskiy] No, I think it is a good thing that things turned out the way they did. If the USSR had survived, Russia's resources would have been drained for another 10-15 years. Now it will be easier to change. For a start, we will rebuild only Russia and will no longer give anyone else anything. There will be only trade based on mutual benefit.

[Sergio] What do you think of the many labels attached to you?

[Zhirinovskiy] The Red democrats [demorossi] are envious of the support won by my slogans, but their policy is nearing collapse and they are forced to assimilate my ideas.

[Sergi] You hope to achieve 25 percent in the elections...

[Zhirinovskiy] No less than that if the elections are free. We will form a coalition with all those who accept our model of government.

[Sergi] What would you like to do?

[Zhirinovskiy] If we do form a coalition, I will be its prime minister. If we gain fewer votes, I will accept the foreign ministry. Otherwise, we will go into opposition .

[Sergi] Will you not meet the same fate as the White House?

[Zhirinovskiy] Yeltsin has already envisaged this option if the communists gain many seats in the Duma. They have already placed assault troops near Moscow. You will see what those democrats are like! On 4 October they bombed parliament, and in March 1994 they could eliminate the State Duma and establish an authoritarian regime.

Deputy Minister Cited on Media Law

PM1711113793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Nov 93 First Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with David Tsabriya, Russian first deputy minister of the press and information, by Lev Korneshov; place and date not given: "David Tsabriya: Is the Law a Sacred Cow?"]

[Text] ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's political observer talks with David Tsabriya, Russian Federation first deputy minister of the press and information.

[Korneshov] David Davidovich, some mass media have published what is, to put it mildly, a strange interpretation of the interview which you gave to INTERFAX... How far does all this correspond to your views and to what you really said in the interview?

[Tsabriya] I was also surprised to read what I appear to have said. And of course, without entering into polemics, I should like to say that I adhere very firmly to democratic views of the mass media. As one of the participants in the elaboration of the law on the mass media, I am convinced of the need for a respectful attitude toward that law. So if the public has formed a somewhat negative impression of my arguments in favor of the law on the mass media I should like to get rid of these suspicions.

I want to say that the law on the mass media has played a tremendous role in the processes of the democratization of society. But life is life and I am convinced today that the necessary amendments and additions must be made to this law. What should the nature of these amendments and changes be? Only such that they are connected with the consolidation of the law's democratic content, with the effective application of its articles. It should be "filled" with a more effective mechanism for the protection of the rights of journalists and of the mass media as a whole.

In no circumstances is it a case of introducing to the law changes and amendments which, as the "interpretations" of my interview which you mention stated, would restore an extra-judicial system for bringing charges against the mass media.

[Korneshov] Yes, indeed, sharp words were used: "extra-judicial system," "revolutionary tribunals..."

[Tsabriya] Today no one would consider such a return. It is a case of it being possible to raise the question of the responsibility of particular mass media if the need arises only through the legal system. And when I spoke of a "simplified" system I had in mind again a legal system, but not through civil proceedings but administrative proceedings. It is well known that there there is criminal legal procedure, civil procedure, and, within the framework of administrative legislation, administrative procedure. It also presupposes the legal examination of all questions. A judge examines the case, defense lawyers and representatives of the sides and so forth take part. But strict deadlines have been set there for examining all cases. That is what I had in mind. But even these are only proposals, which the public must discuss. I did not have in mind that the deed had already been done, that we were on the point of presenting the draft for such a law to the relevant bodies...

And the second point: That we, the ministry, decided to close down so-called fascist extra-judicially. I want to refute that too. Yes, the relevant ministry decree was adopted on suspending the publication of these newspapers for the duration of the state of emergency. But when the state of emergency had been lifted all cases and all relevant documents were submitted to the Russian General Prosecutor's Office, which will make a decision.

[Korneshov] David Davidovich, it is known that your ministry has been accused of inertia with regard to publications of a fascist bent and toward those which oppose democratic transformations...

[Tsabriya] I cannot be more active or less inert, because I cannot transgress the law. There is a complex and lengthy procedure for suspending the publication of a particular mass media publication. As you know, before an appeal is made to the court within the established procedure there must have been at least two warnings over the course of a year. Those who accuse us of extremism are deliberately ignoring the fact that the law places reliable obstacles before officials and the ministry if any arbitrary actions are taken. Questions can be examined only within the procedure and at the pace determined by the law.

[Korneshov] At the same time, there are cases of let us call it "pressure" from interested political circles and people...

[Tsabriya] The position of our ministry is unequivocal: We are seeking to defend journalists if they are subjected to unlawful influence. Incidentally, that is one reason why we suggest making changes to the law on the mass media.

I want to say that we are conducting a public discussion of possible changes with the journalistic public. I want to take this opportunity to appeal through ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA to all mess media, to newspapers, journals, and journalists: Put forward your proposals for improving the law. They should reach us within a month, by mid-December. We will publish them, study them together, discuss them in public on the basis of the opinions and suggestions of professionals. It would be a good idea ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's pages were to become the platform for this discussion. Indeed, talk of the imperfection of the law on the mass media has already been begun in your newspaper with the publication of an open letter from RABOTNITSA journalists (9 November issue no. 209).

If during the discussion the majority say that the existing law is a sacred cow and should not be touched, well then, so be it. But in our view we must strengthen both the law and the mechanisms for the efficiency of its application.

[Korneshov] And to conclude our talk I should like to cite the words of one television commentator: Do not fear a man with a gun but a man with a pen...

[Tsabriya] Like every joke, this one contains a certain amount of truth.

Election Issues

Shumeyko To Run for Federation Council

LD1611133593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1123 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Russian First Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko agreed to run for the Federation Council in the 39th Kaliningrad electoral district in the December 12 elections.

In an address made public in Moscow Tuesday Shumeyko emphasizes the economic value of the Kalainingrad Region for Russia "as a Baltic outpost in the center of Europe with ports which operate throughout the year." In his view, the regional economy can be improved fairly fast once legislation on the region's special status and a state program for its development are adopted, enabling it to flourish as a free trade one.

Khasbulatov, Others 'Cannot Be Registered'

LD1611132293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1123 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Ruslan Khasbulatov, former speaker of the Russian parliament, Ilya Konstantinov and Stanislav Terekhov who have been nominated for the State Duma in Daghestan, Novosibirsk and Volgograd cannot be registered as candidates, Anastasiya Tur, Central Election Commission member, told Interfax Tuesday.

She explained that the presidential decree of October 19 on steps to ensure security in the run up to the elections bans registration of those "who have been charged in a legal procedure of complicity in the armed rebellion in Moscow on October 3 and 4 and in the earlier armed attack of the CIS Joint Force General Staff." This applies to three men, Prosecutor General Aleksey Kazannik said in a letter.

Khasbulatov, Konstantinov and Terekhov can vote in the December 12 elections. Anastasiya Tur said that Anatoliy Lukyanov, a defendant in the August 1991 plot case, could be elected to the Federal Assembly. He is currently running on the federal Communist Party list and has been registered as a candidate in a Smolensk single-mandate district.

Election Blocs To Hold Open Political Discussion

LD1611133993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1123 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] The Russia's Choice election alliance led by Yegor Gaydar, and the Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc have agreed to hold an open political discussion at 1830 on November 19, in the cultural center of Moscow's Institute of Aviation Engineering.

The Russia's Choice alliance will be represented by this alliance's chairman Sergey Kovalyov, economist Vasiliy Selyunin, Vice-Chairman of the president's Commission for Legislative Initiatives Boris Zolotukhin and President of the Liberal-Conservative Fund Arkadiy Murashov.

The Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc will be represented by Academician Nikolay Petrakov, Vice-Chairman of the president's Commission for Legislative Initiatives Viktor Sheynis and member of this commission Vladimir Lysenko.

Address: 4 Dubosekovskiy Proyezd, the metro station "Sokol"

Tel.: 158-00-18

Commission Discusses Structure of New Parliament

LD1611162793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1436 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow November 16 TASS—"We need political structuralization of a new parliament to have more deeds and avoid unnecessary debates," Deputy Head of the Commission for Legislative Proposals Under the Russian President Viktor Sheynis told today's public hearings of the commission to discuss the future State Duma time limit.

In his opinion, the former Supreme Soviet factions had a "club character" and the new legislative body should encourage "the creation of rather stable and well-knit groups to minimize excessive debates." Faction leaders should have an access to the State Duma's ruling bodies.

Participants in the hearings supported this idea and said it will help prevent dictatorship of a person or a small

group of parliament heads. "In order to prevent ambitious efforts of some leaders," a group of officials nominated by the parliament chamber or a special committee should regulate material provision of deputies.

There were also other proposals to make the State Duma "a live and self-controlled body and not a red tape institution."

Commission Chairman Mikhail Mityukov stressed the draft time limit presented today to jurists and representatives of party blocs carries normative grounds for "efficient activities of the parliamentary majority and a possibility of the opposition to defend its point of view." In the opinion of meeting participants, deputies must carry greater responsibility for their actions, and Petr Filippov, head of the Analytical Center for Social and Economic Policy of the Russian president staff, believes draft laws should be adopted in open nominal voting.

The law-making itself should be simplified and done in committees, commissions and factions, noted jurists. "The draft Russian constitution outlines the basis for formation of a new parliament," and the commission will have to specify it. The body will, thus, prepare time limits of the Federation Council, joint meetings of the Federal Assembly chambers, status of deputies in each chamber and drafts necessary to approve presidential decrees on legal regulation.

Draft Standing Orders for State Duma Discussed

LD1611214693 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 2000 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] The draft standing orders of the State Duma were discussed in open session today by the Commission for Legislative Proposals of the president of the Russian Federation. Here is Yevgeniy Zherebenkov with the details:

[Zherebenkov] The document debated by representatives of the electoral blocs, scientific institutions, and bodies of power was defined by Mikhail Mityukov, chairman of the Commission for Legislative Proposals, as the first rough draft of the general provisions on the State Duma and on the order of its work and relations with other branches of power.

The draft, based on the provisions of the new constitution, considerably changes the competence of the future parliament, practically depriving it of supervisory and managerial functions.

In the new draft constitution being put to referendum, the State Duma is defined as a legislative and representative body and this is fully in keeping with the proposed version of its standing orders.

The new parliament, Mikhail Mityukov considers, is to engage primarily in legislative activity. The main part of its lawmaking work is, however, laid on the government. The role of parliament boils down to adopting and rejecting bills and also making amendments to them.

In the proposed version of the standing orders of the State Duma, any leading body like the Presidium which existed in the former parliament is ruled out. And the powers of the Speaker are substantially limited. It is proposed that his competences should exclude any distribution of material benefits and foreign trips. It is proposed that a special committee for internal organization of the activity of parliament should deal with these things.

It is proposed that deciding the agenda of sessions and agreeing political decisions is to be handed over to a conference of deputies and an assembly of representatives of factions and deputies' groups.

The proposed provisions of the standing orders of the State Duma and especially the limitations on its supervisory function brought serious objections from representatives of electoral blocs which will insist on substantial adjustments being made to this document.

Electoral Commission Allots Radio, TV Time Slots

LD1611183593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1746 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow November 16 TASS—Televised and radio addresses of representatives of political parties and coalitions which have registered federal lists of their candidates for deputies of the State Duma will be offered within 13 days—the number of electoral associations with the right to continue the election campaign.

Their broadcast time lots were cast today by the Central Electoral Commission. The representatives will have access to the Ostankino and Russia TV companies and three Russian Radio channels.

In accordance with provisions on elections of the State Duma, federal state tv and radio companies shall give no less than one broadcast hour each working day for three weeks before the elections to electoral coalitions registered by the Central Electoral Commission. The pre-election marathon will start on November 22 to finish on the election eve.

It was hard for electoral associations to make a broadcast schedule, since everyone was to "receive equal broadcast time under equal conditions" and wanted to address the audience in the best time and as closer as possible to the election day.

After long and heated debates, interests of each coalition were met. Some of the coalitions preferred to split their address into three parts, others preferred to have two half-an-hour broadcasts. Blocs headed by Yegor Gaydar, Anatoliy Sobchak and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy pulled [as received] their efforts to meet the electors thrice—a twenty-minute broadcast each time within three days.

More Details Given

LD1611191593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1705 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] On Tuesday lots were cast at the Central Electoral Commission in Moscow to determine the order in which the 13 parties and coalitions running for parliament will be given access to free time on the air between November 22 and December 8. On December 9 and 10 all parties might appear on TV simultaneously.

The TV appearances are due daily on Ostankino TV channel between 19:45 and 20:45 and on the Russian Channel between 18:45 and 19:45.

As a representative of the Democratic Party was dissatisfied with the order, the chairman of the court of arbitration Anatoliy Vengerov has told INTERFAX, the court will hear the complaint in the future.

The order of radio appearances on Radio Russia, Mayak and Radio-1 between November 2 and December 10 was also defined.

Parties' Socioeconomic Programs Summed Up

PM1711151193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed question and answer feature: "What Are the Blocs and Parties Promising?"]

[Text] On 12 November our newspaper reported the positions of some of the blocs and parties that have embarked on the election campaign for deputies' mandates in the State Duma with regard to what we consider two fundamental issues of interest to voters:

1. What is your social program?

2. What is your attitude to private land ownership?

Today we continue our publication of the answers given to these questions by representatives of the blocs and parties that have been allowed to participate in the election by the Central Electoral Commission.

Aleksandr Tsyganov, press secretary of the "Party of Russian Unity and Accord" [PRUA] bloc:

1. Social orientation of the economy means encouraging widespread development of compensation for socially weak groups—children, the extremely old, and the disabled. Social policy should ultimately set the task of achieving a higher standard of living. We need to create conditions in which a Russian can earn as much as he wants. Enterprises should choose for themselves how to pay for labor. Only the minimum wage should be established by legislation.

PRUA sees no need to impose statutory wage "ceilings." Normal taxation policy measures can be used to achieve this. During the switch to the market, unemployment is inevitable. But this does not mean that a wholesale increase in unemployment is unavoidable. Everyone who loses his job must be afforded protection. But benefits are not the main protective measure. A system of retraining, creation of new jobs based on accelerated reorganization of production, assistance for the implementation of intersector and interregional employment programs, and special measures for youth policy—these are the areas in which PRUA will be developing its activity in parliament.

The amount of pensions, in PRUA's opinion, should be based on a correlation with pay on the basis of the minimum wage for working and disabled citizens.

PRUA's priorities are support for youth enterprise, scientific, technical, educational, and environmental projects and youth association programs, and housing and everyday self-help schemes for young families. The basic work in this sphere needs to be done at regional and local level. Loans rather than subsidies are the main way of supporting young people.

2. Protection of private property from any encroachment should be the duty of the state. PRUA supports private land ownership and believes that President B.N. Yeltsin's edict removes the bureaucratic logjam on this path, as well as giving a real impetus to the development of the peasantry's creative energy and the broadening of agricultural production.

Aleksandr Lomakin, cochairman of the "Dignity and Charity" Federationwide Political Movement:

1. The movement will try to ensure that the government presents society with a clear and universally comprehensible state social program that guarantees Russia's citizens a decent standard of living and social stability at all stages of the reforms. Any measures that have the potential to cause a fall in the population's living standards must be preceded by social protection measures.

The movement favors radical reform of the pension provision system based on realistic expenditure by different groups of the population.

2. We are convinced that the purchase and sale of land can only be carried out by taking local conditions, opportunities, and traditions into account. We need to prepare and adopt a new law on the basic principles of land use and land ownership in Russia.

Aleksey Likurtsev, director of the "Cedar" Constructive Environmental Movement of Russia Press Service.

1. "Cedar" favors a strong, unified, and indivisible state. We want to provide every Russian with decent economic, legal, social, and environmental living conditions.

2. The movement favors diversity of forms of ownership. First and foremost we advocate the development and consolidation of private land ownership. We unanimously adopted the president's recent edict on land. While supporting the measure as a whole, we are nonetheless concerned whether mechanisms will be formulated to implement it.

Aleksandr Berdnikov, press secretary of the Russian Federation Communist Party Central Executive Committee:

1. The basic guidelines of the party's election campaign are to raise the population's living standards; to guarantee the basic socioeconomic right of working people to free education, medical care, and social security; to advocate cheap housing and public transport; to halt the unchecked price increases and mass impoverishment of the people; to provide priority material support for the family, for mothers and children; and to shield them from the propaganda of the cult of debauchery and violence and all types of spiritual and physical decadence. In addition to this, we stand for protection of the country's intellectual potential and state support for science, culture, and education.

2. In the economic sphere, the party stands for a mixed economy with a leading role given to ownership by the whole people, primarily ownership of natural resources, the land, and the deposits that lie beneath it; it also supports diversity of forms of economic management on the basis of a combination of planned and market regulation. Regarding private land ownership, our position is that we are in favor of freely handing it over to all those who wish to work it, and we support unlimited-duration ownership with inheritance and transfer rights, but not the right to buy and sell land.

Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms Executive Committee Press Center:

1. The reforms need to be geared to the needs of the people. Nobody in Russia should pay his workers less than the minimum wage. The movement favors stabilizing the income of workers in budget-financed sectors, primarily the income of pensioners, people who receive benefits, and investors, with a view to minimizing the impact of inflation on them. We need to formulate and implement a program guaranteeing that every Russian will receive higher education and medical care. This can be made possible by issuing social vouchers guaranteed by the state which will enable citizens to obtain services in any chosen institution within the sphere of education and health care; any difference can be made up by paying supplementary amounts out of personal funds.

The norm for minimum financing of education, science, and culture needs to be enshrined in law as a percentage of GNP.

Pensions and all other social payments need to be securely protected against inflation. The movement favors indexation of pensions.

2. The Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms has always stood for the introduction of private land ownership, the development of private farming, and at the same time the preservation of sovkhozes and kolkhozes that operate efficiently. We need to implement the first stage of agrarian reform more rapidly by giving every Russian one-tenth of a hectare.

Viktor Kobelev, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Central Committee apparatus:

1. The Liberal Democratic Party favors a market economy, but with some elements of regulation. This particularly applies to sectors that have an impact on the implementation of social programs. Newly created fee-charging health care institutions and schools have a right to exist, but free hospitals and schools should also remain. The party favors the maintenance of a procedure whereby every Russian can acquire his housing allotment in accordance with his position in the waiting list.

Pensions must definitely be indexed. This task should be tackled by the legislative rather than the executive branch.

2. The Liberal Democratic Party basically advocates the introduction of private land ownership in Russia. At the same time this step looks hasty in the present situation. A land privatization mechanism should have been formulated first to eliminate criminal capital, abuses, falling fertility, and so forth from this process.

Commentator Welcomes Invitation to Observers

PM1711113593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Nov 93 First Edition p 6

[Commentary by Lev Korneshov and Voldemar Koreshkov under "Elections" rubric: "We Observe and Are Ourselves Observed..."]

[Text] Russia and its top statesmen have decided to invite foreign observers to view the elections. Figures glimpsed indicate that no less than 100 will arrive in our country. Well, we are glad and would like to welcome them, as they say.

On the basis of the Russian president's directive being published today, the Central Electoral Commission has approved the Statute on the Status of Foreign Observers in the Elections. A working group of representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Russian Transport Ministry, and the Moscow Government is being set up under the Central Electoral Commission to provide everything necessary for the foreign observers' activity. This group will be responsible for accrediting foreign observers, coordinating their visits to polling places, maintaining contact with polling places, organizing briefings, and so forth.

As is the custom here, two different viewpoints on the observers' arrival have immediately taken shape. "Are we so inferior that we need observers?" some say. "Why not? Let them come and look," others say. The latter, incidentally, are in the majority. Indeed, why not?

It also seems to us that there is nothing detrimental to our national prestige in this. The institution of foreign observers has long been well known. Some countries, including those with well-developed democratic traditions, always invite foreign observers. Not because they have no faith in their own resources: It is simply a question of ensuring maximum openness and clarity in

elections. But, most important of all, it guarantees objective information for the international community on how elections are prepared and conducted.

For the first time, elections to the State Duma and the Federation Council will be conducted on the basis of a highly complex system involving political parties and election blocs. Moreover, some places will be taking their own election measures. And all this in a political climate where the echo of October's dramatic events has not faded and Russian citizens are still interpreting the "October lessons."

We should also remember that the experience of past election campaigns abounds in numerous breaches of electoral law (fundamental or minor). After "successful" elections, we would try to forget these breaches as quickly as possible—why spoil the picture of general well-being, we would say? Like sportsmen who use banned stimulants before crucial contests, some officials and party functionaries—for various reasons—want to secure "victory" at any cost and hope that they will get away with breaches of the law—after all, victors are not judged. Already, some parties and blocs are accusing one another of juggling with voters' signatures and monopolizing the election campaigning. Feelings will undoubtedly run high as the elections draw closer. Moreover, it is somehow forgotten that accusations may be groundless but they always leave their mark. They help to make up the general "portrait" of our Russia for the world community. We personally—and not only we—certainly do not want this "portrait" to be black or to be painted in crooked strokes by ambitious politicians.

Foreign observers are given broad and specific rights: to be present during voting; to attend sessions of electoral commissions; to read election documents; to be present when votes are counted; to submit proposals to electoral commissions; to meet journalists, and so forth. Moreover, they carry out their observation independently and are under the protection of the host country.

Of course, an observer cannot be posted at every polling place. However, well-developed, tried and tested methods will make it possible to build up an objective picture from the details. Russia is now being followed closely—its political life is contradictory and complex and there is a broad range of opinions on the events taking place in our country: From full support to rejection. We hope that we will be sent really authoritative people, specialists in their field, who will be able to objectively assess what they see.

But we Russians must also grasp a simple fact: By inviting foreign observers we are taking on an additional responsibility. Namely, that the elections must be organized honestly and on democratic principles. In other words, we ourselves must ensure that the election campaign is conducted in a civilized manner and that its results are summed up objectively.

Government Seeks To Prevent Election Forgery

LD1611230893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2104 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 16 TASS—Signature collection lists submitted to electoral commissions to back would-be candidates for the new Russian parliament's two houses are presently thoroughly examined.

The Constituency Electoral Commission of the Buryat Republic in southern Siberia registered nine candidates to contest three seats on the Federal Assembly. The check-up of signature collection lists here was completed on Tuesday and revealed no falsifications, Electoral Commission Chairman Roman Nimayev told TASS today.

The number of contenders from the Kurgan region in southwestern Siberia surpassed all expectations of local sociologists. As of today, 15 applicants were registered as candidates and decision on another two is to be passed in two days. Only about one third of the candidates, senior regional officials, are quite well-known. The names of the rest are largely unfamiliar to the region's residents.

Chairman of the North Ossetian Electoral Commission Khasan Bekuzarov announced at today's meeting of the commission that 14 people submitted their applications to stand in the Federation Council elections, of which nine were registered as candidates, and seven out of 15 applicants were registered as candidates for the State Duma elections.

Elections to the St. Petersburg City Assembly will be held on March 20, 1994, according to majority system. This is the decision passed by the city council at its 20th session which adjourned on Tuesday. The deputies rejected a proposal about self-dissolution and discussed three versions of a draft provision on the reform of St. Petersburg state power bodies.

As was reported earlier, the emergency session of the Leningrad Regional Council lacked quorum today. Under the presidential decree of October 9, 1993, "On reform of representative power bodies and local self-government bodies in the Russian Federation", head of the regional administration Aleksandr Belyakov stripped the deputies of their mandates and dissolved the Regional Council from November 16.

Elections to the regional Duma are also scheduled for March 20, 1994.

The introduction of private ownership of land will not bring about any economic anomalies, since free sale of land is not to become the determining factor in agricultural production. This is one of the main points of the electoral platform of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Zaveryukha, which he presented at today's meeting with voters in Stavropol. Zaveryukha was nominated a candidate for the State Duma by the federal list of the Agrarian Party.

Electoral Commission Disregards Breaches

PM1711110193 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Viktor Maslinin: "What The Central Electoral Commission Does Not Say"]

[Text] Around 3 million signatures included in the party support lists were checked at the Central Electoral Commission in two stages. The first stage involved checking whether there were 100,000 signatures and the second involved ensuring that the 15,000 quota for signatures per single region had not been exceeded. It was found that many electoral associations had been most assiduous when it came to recruiting supporters in Moscow, Moscow Oblast, and St. Petersburg. The "democrats"—the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms, headed by A. Sobchak, the "Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin" bloc, and a number of parties that had been "screened out"—were responsible for major overcollection in the capital's regions.

At the same time, the Central Electoral Commission "turned a blind eye" to certain breaches. One is reliably informed that it ignored cases where the same person filled out more than one signature form, where the signatures were identical but the names were different, where there was the wrong number of digits in the identity card number (five, or seven, instead of six). Central Electoral Commission analysts are of the opinion that such breaches are most often encountered in the signature forms of the "Cedar" election association, which was the first to submit its 100,000 plus signatures. The signature forms of the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms often lacked the top part, indicating the date. If you remember that the application was often very late, then it is easy to figure out why this breach occurred.

If the Central Electoral Commission had checked the signature forms more thoroughly (but it was only give four days to do the job), in the opinion of a number of experts, graphological evaluation would probably have resulted in the "Russia's Choice," Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms, and "Russia's Future—New Names" blocs ending up with fewer than 100,000. Incidentally, some electoral associations declared obviously inflated figures on support. For instance, it was announced in the press that "Russia's Choice" had garnered around 200,000 signatures. In actual fact, according to some assessments by staff of the Central Electoral Commission, the commission had received around 110,000 signatures. It is no accident that the Central Electoral Commission failed to announce officially its data on the number of signatures in support of each bloc, which it deemed valid.

Worries Over Delays in Compiling Lists

PM1611135393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Nov 93 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Report by Aleksandra Lugovskaya: "Election Campaign May Be Wrecked by Administration Heads"]

[Text] The race for the collection of signatures by political blocs and parties and individual candidates for the State Duma and the Federation Council with its "dramatic" peak—registration at the Central Electoral Commission [CIC]—has overshadowed the main problem in the election campaign: The regions' compilation of lists of the actual voters who will take part in the 12 December ballot.

No electoral district, CIC Secretary Vyacheslav Zagulyayev sounded the alarm, has submitted a precise figure for its list of voters. Just two weeks remain, but administration heads, carried away by collecting signatures and drawing up sheets of signatures, have completely forgotten about their important duty of helping district commissions draw up lists of voters. He does not rule out the possibility that this "negligence," aggravated by the lack of an organizational instrument such as an "institute of canvassers," may create a critical situation.

V. Zagulyayev made another important announcement: The CIC has authorized a number of district commissions to accept lists of signatures from Federation Council candidates throughout 15 November. This decision has been dictated by exceptional circumstances—the difficulty involved in delivering lists of signatures owing to weather conditions in Arkhangelsk, Kirov, and Amur Oblasts and Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug.

He recalled that there are 178 deputies' seats in the Federation Council (including Chechnya). To date only 93 candidates have been registered. However, the official registration date remains the same, 19 November. Requirements as to the format of the package of documents will be observed "down to the last comma," V. Zagulyayev stressed. And that is in the interests of the candidates since the Federal Assembly's Credentials Commission can address their "affairs" at any time in the future.

The official draw for the allocation of free television and radio airtime involving 13 political blocs and parties is scheduled for 16 November at the CIC, after which a precise schedule will be drawn up for their election campaigning. In addition to representatives of parties and television and radio companies, an arbitration tribunal will also take part in this draw, ratified, as you know, by special edict of the president in order to provide the candidates with equal access to the mass media.

Arbitration Tribunal Chairman Anatoliy Vengerov noted the "normal mood" of all the participants and hoped they would show political awareness in the future. In accordance with the Statute on Elections, federal election associations have the right to one hour of television and radio airtime, whereas candidates from single-seat and two-seat districts are given 20 minutes each to speak. The arbitration tribunal will also monitor compliance with this norm.

Commission Updates Registration of Candidates

LD1611141293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1224 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] The Central Electoral Commission announced on Tuesday that judging from the preliminary results of the registration of candidates, elections to the State Duma would take place in all of the 224 one-mandate electoral districts except Chechnya.

By the morning of November 16, out of the 1,541 candidates seeking election to the State Duma 145 had been registered, and out of the 490 candidates to the Federation Council 93 had been registered.

These candidates will compete for 176 Federation Council mandates (besides two mandates reserved for Chechnya).

Vice-Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission Aleksandr Ivanchenko said that reports about the number of candidates to the Federal Assembly's chambers advanced in Russia's constituent territories, will be published after the signature lists were checked and registration cards issued.

The registration of candidates is to be finished by November 20.

Election Signature Collectors Offer Inducements to Voters

PM1711123593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Nov 93 p 1

[Roundup prepared by Aleksandr Pelts: "Election News: In Other Respects Everything Is Fine..."]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Our stringer Vitaliy Strugovets reports from Novosibirsk that parliamentary candidates are, by no means, all taking the legal route to obtaining a seat. Thus, only people who signed Aman Tuleyev's signature sheet were able to buy meat in the "Veteran" store in the city of Berezovskiy. Some teachers at schools in Leninskiy Rayon (Kemerovo) have given their pupils signature sheets for their parents to sign. At Novosibirsk State University a signature in support of Yuriy Yershov was a kind of admission to the disco.

During the first half of November residents of Murmansk were able to fully sense and appreciate the advantages of the new electoral system. Travel on suburban transport was temporarily free of charge. When getting on the Murmansk-Severomorsk bus, for instance, passengers did not fumble for their purse, but produced their fountain pens. Instead of the prescribed fare of 250 rubles [R] all that was needed was a stroke of the pen on the "Civic Union" signature sheet. If you do not want to sign, look for other transport or travel on foot. Vladimir Gundarov, our Northern Fleet correspondent, reported this story. Ivan Ryabov, deputy chief of the No. 1118 motorized convoy, told your correspondent that "campaign buses" were leased by one local commercial firm for four days.

The unemployed were also able to make money out of the election campaign—the regional coordinators of the "Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin" bloc and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia paid R100 a "signature."

Campaigners from "Russia's Choice"—former RSFSR People's Deputies Vyacheslav Volkov, Leonid Gurevich, and Natalya Nechayeva—promised their voters the "sweet life." The Murmansk Oblast Union of Entrepreneurs, of which Natalya Nechayeva is the chairman, organized free distribution of sugar to pensioners at all points where signatures were collected in favor of their bloc. The "sweet choice" was not made without brawls for free sugar. There was only one thing that distressed the people of Murmansk: A cheap price was put on voters—just 300 grams of sugar "a head."

Communist Party List of Duma Candidates

PM1711090193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 7

["Federal List of Candidates" for State Duma Elections from the "Communist Party of the Russian Federation" electoral association]

[Text] The following have been nominated as candidate deputies to the State Duma from the "Communist Party of the Russian Federation" [CPRF] electoral association on the basis of the decision of the electoral association of 26 October 1993, protocol No. 1.

1. Zyuganov, Gennadiy Andreyevich, born 1944, chairman of the CPRF Central Executive Committee; Moscow
2. Sevastyanov, Vitaliy Ivanovich, born 1935, CPRF member, cosmonaut-test pilot instructor at the "Energiya" Association; Moscow.
3. Ilyukhin, Viktor Ivanovich, born 1949, CPRF member, lawyer; Moscow.
4. Pletneva, Tamara Vasilyevna, born 1947, CPRF member, teacher; Inzhavino, Tambov Oblast.
5. Chikin, Valentin Vasilyevich, born 1932, CPRF member, journalist; Moscow.
6. Martemyanov, Valentin Semenovich, born 1932, CPRF member, lawyer; Moscow.
7. Ionov, Anatoliy Vasilyevich, born 1946, CPRF member, worker; Ryazan.
8. Lukyanov, Anatoliy Ivanovich, born 1930, CPRF member, lawyer; Moscow.
9. Seleznev, Gennadiy Nikolayevich, born 1947, CPRF member, journalist; Moscow.
10. Semago, Vladimir Vladimirovich, born 1947, joint venture general director; Moscow.
11. Tsiku, Kazbek Aslanbechevich, born 1935, CPRF member, professor; Maykop, Republic of Adygea.
12. Sevenard, Yuriy Konstantinovich, born 1935, CPRF member, association general director; St. Petersburg.
13. Zorkaltsev, Viktor Ilich, born 1936, CPRF member, engineer; Tomsk.

14. Kovalev, Valentin Alekseyevich, born 1944, lawyer; Moscow.
15. Mironov, Oleg Orestovich, born 1939, CPRF member, lawyer; Saratov.
16. Krasnitskiy, Yevgeniy Sergeyevich, born 1951, CPRF member, radio repairman; St. Petersburg.
17. Zaytsev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1953, CPRF member, serviceman; Moscow.
18. Ivanov, Yuriy Pavlovich, born 1944, lawyer; Moscow.
19. Gostev, Ruslan Georgiyevich, born 1945, CPRF member, professor; Voronezh.
20. Bokov, Vladimir Anatolyevich, born 1927, CPRF member, pensioner; Novosibirsk.
21. Nikitin, Valentin Ivanovich, born 1948, CPRF member, employee; Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan.
22. Ponomarev, Aleksey Alekseyevich, born 1942, CPRF member, veterinarian; Tambov.
23. Kosterin, Yevgeniy Alekseyevich, born 1949, CPRF member, employee; Saransk, Mordovian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].
24. Shevelukha, Viktor Stepanovich, born 1939, CPRF member, academician; Moscow.
25. Filimonov, Vadim Donatovich, born 1931, lawyer; Tomsk.
26. Reshulskiy, Sergey Nikolayevich, born 1951, CPRF member, engineer; Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan.
27. Bindyukov, Nikolay Gavrilovich, born 1946, rector of Teacher Training Institute; Novgorod.
28. Leonov, Yuriy Yuryevich, born 1963, chairman of the Executive Committee of the "Protection" ["Zashchita"] republic trade union association; Moscow.
29. Petrovskiy, Leonid Nikolayevich, born 1948, CPRF member, collective enterprise chairman; Gorki village, Temkinskiy Rayon, Smolensk Oblast.
30. Frolov, Aleksandr Konstantinovich, born 1949, CPRF member, journalist; Moscow.
31. Pyatchits, Nikolay Mitrofanovich, born 1947, CPRF member, worker; Moscow.
32. Oleynik, Lyubov Vasilyevna, born 1949, CPRF member, employee; Tselinnoye village, Tselinnyy Rayon, Kurgan Oblast.
33. Zhadanova, Lyudmila Aleksandrovna, born 1950, CPRF member, pediatrician; Ulyanovsk.
34. Begov, Omar Omarovich, born 1937, CPRF member, journalist; Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan.
35. Kosenko, Viktor Grigoryevich, born 1945, CPRF member, doctor; Krasnodar.
36. Seletkova, Tatyana Semenovna, born 1949, teacher, CPRF member; Sosnova village, Bolshoy Sosnovskiy Rayon, Perm Oblast.
37. Aparina, Alevtina Viktorovna, born 1941, CPRF member, political scientist; Volgograd.
38. Gudima, Tamara Mikhaylovna, born 1936, CPRF member, lecturer; Arkhangelsk.
39. Bogdanov, Nikolay Nikolayevich, born 1944, CPRF member, machine operator; Aleksandrov, Vladimir Oblast.
40. Goncharov, Nikolay Nikolayevich, born 1952, CPRF member, worker; Kursk.
41. Frolov, Vladimir Afanasyevich, born 1946, CPRF member, performer; Orel.
42. Leonchev, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, born 1946, CPRF member, employee; Samara.
43. Astrakhankina, Tatyana Aleksandrovna, born 1960, CPRF member, journalist; Rzhev, Tver Oblast.
44. Mikhaylov, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1951, engineer; Shchigry, Kursk Oblast.
45. Osipov, Vitaliy Ivanovich, born 1943, CPRF member, journalist; Syktyvkar, Komi Republic.
46. Magometkhanov, Magomet Ibragimovich, born 1942, employee; Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkar Republic.
47. Totiyev, Sergey Aleksandrovich, born 1951, small enterprise director; Vladikavkaz, North Ossetian SSR.
48. Nikiforenko, Yuriy Vasilyevich, born 1941, CPRF member, journalist; Orenburg.
49. Gabidullin, Rinat Gindullovich, born 1942, CPRF member, journalist; Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan.
50. Salimov, Marsel Shaynurovich, born 1949, CPRF member, journalist; Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan.
51. Shakhov, Yuriy Konstantinovich, born 1947, CPRF member, foreman; Sterlitamak, Republic of Bashkortostan.
52. Bazarov, Vandan Badmayevich, born 1923, CPRF member, employee; Ulan-Ude, Republic of Buryatia.
53. Bratishchev, Igor Mikhaylovich, born 1938, CPRF member, economist; Rostov-na-Donu.
54. Mutalipova, Aleksandra Khadzhimuridovna, born 1932, economist; Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkar Republic.
55. Tabachkova, Taisiya Georgiyevna, born 1950, engineer; Prokhladnyy, Kabardino-Balkar Republic.
56. Belozertsev, Anatoliy Konstantinovich, born 1941, journalist; Chelyabinsk.
57. Tarasov, Aleksandr Sergeyevich, born 1942, director of a joint-stock association; Sasovo, Ryazan Oblast.
58. Tonkikh, Vladimir Vasilyevich, born 1934, CPRF member, engineer; Syktyvkar, Komi Republic.
59. Kartashev, Vladimir Petrovich, born 1941, CPRF member, worker; Saransk, Mordovian SSR.
60. Matyunin, Anatoliy Yegorovich, born 1951, employee; Pushkino village, Romodanovskiy Rayon, Mordovian SSR.
61. Maslov, Viktor Yegorovich, born 1941, worker; Saransk, Mordovian SSR.
62. Samarova, Valentina Nikitichna, born 1936, employee; Saransk, Mordovian SSR.
63. Kuldyrkayeva, Yelena Ivanovna, born 1940, doctor; Saransk, Mordovian SSR.
64. Sapozhnikov, Nikolay Ivanovich, born 1949, CPRF member, scientific associate; Izhevsk, Udmurt Republic.
65. Chepkasov, Vladimir Gennadiyevich, born 1972, student; Glazov, Udmurt Republic.
66. Kruglikov, Aleksandr Leonidovich, born 1951, CPRF member, lecturer; Ulyanovsk.
67. Dmitriyev, Aleksey Aleksandrovich, born 1938, machine operator; Lashch-Tayaba village, Yalchikskiy Rayon, Chuvash Republic.
68. Cherkunov, Viktor Grigoryevich, born 1952, worker; Cheboksary, Chuvash Republic.
69. Aleksandrov, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, born 1937, worker; Cheboksary, Chuvash Republic.

70. Shchedrin, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, born 1937, lecturer; Cheboksary, Chuvash Republic.
71. Osadchiy, Ivan Pavlovich, born 1927, CPRF member, historian and political scientist; Krasnodar.
72. Polyakov, Yuriy Aleksandrovich, born 1936, kolkhoz chairman; Starovelichkovskaya station, Kalininskiy Rayon, Krasnodar Kray.
73. Svechnikov, Petr Grigoryevich, born 1953, CPRF member, lecturer; Chelyabinsk.
74. Barykin, Anatoliy Petrovich, born 1952, CPRF member, political scientist; Krasnodar.
75. Smetankin, Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich, born 1935, machine operator instructor; Krasnodar.
76. Pashuto, Vladimir Rostislavovich, born 1942, trade union official; Labinsk, Krasnodar Kray.
77. Melnikov, Ivan Ivanovich, born 1945, educator; Anapa, Krasnodar Kray.
78. Osadchiy, Nikolay Ivanovich, born 1957, CPRF member, philosopher; Krasnodar.
79. Konovalov, Mikhail Eduardovich, born 1956, official of the "Protection" trade union association; Moscow.
80. Iver, Vasiliy Mikhaylovich, born 1956, engineer; Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Kray.
81. Manzhosov, Nikolay Ivanovich, born 1935, kolkhoz chairman; Novoselitskoye village, Novoselitskiy Rayon, Stavropol Kray.
82. Sushko, Galina Aleksandrovna, born 1932, pensioner; Pyatigorsk, Stavropol Kray.
83. Golub, Leonid Arkadyevich, born 1947, CPRF member, lecturer; Khabarovsk.
84. Dronchenko, Anatoliy Ivanovich, born 1949, lecturer; Komsomolsk-na-Amure.
85. Gromov, Aleksandr Pavlovich, born 1951, employee; Sovetskaya Gavan, Khabarovsk Kray.
86. Povlukhin, Oleg Yakovlevich, born 1945, senior cameraman; Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast.
87. Poldnikov, Yuriy Ivanovich, born 1947, CPRF member, political scientist; Astrakhan.
88. Arefyev, Nikolay Vasilyevich, born 1949, employee; Astrakhan.
89. Rozhkova, Lyubov Petrovna, born 1947, lawyer; Samara.
90. Sukharev, Sergey Vladimirovich, born 1954, CPRF member, employee; Belgorod.
91. Fedostsov, Leonid Filippovich, born 1955, employee; Bryansk.
92. Shenkarev, Oleg Aleksandrovich, born 1947, CPRF member, lecturer; Bryansk.
93. Obnorskiy, Nikolay Viktorovich, born 1945, worker; Vladimir.
94. Sinyagin, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, born 1949, teacher; Stavrovo settlement, Sobinskiy Rayon, Vladimir Oblast.
95. Belyayeva, Natalya Ivanovna, born 1949, worker; Volzhskiy, Volgograd Oblast.
96. Varakin, Andrey Volodaryevich, born 1963, secretary of the Russian Youth League Oblast Committee; Volgograd.
97. Pershin, Nikolay Ivanovich, born 1930, lecturer; Volgograd.
98. Podolskiy, Anatoliy Petrovich, born 1952, CPRF member, joint-stock company director; Vologda.
99. Berdnikov, Aleksandr Fedorovich, born 1949, CPRF member, journalist; Moscow.
100. Levchenko, Sergey Georgiyevich, born 1949, CPRF member, enterprise director; Angarsk, Irkutsk Oblast.
101. Dovzhenko, Yefim Aleksandrovich, born 1940, engineer; Kaliningrad.
102. Kazakovtsev, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, born 1950, CPRF member, teacher; Vyatka.
103. Kreshetov, Vladimir Vasilyevich, born 1950, employee; Kirovo-Chepetsk, Kirov Oblast.
104. Politukhin, Yuriy Alekseyevich, born 1941, CPRF member, joint-stock enterprise director; Moscow.
105. Kostenko, Vasiliy Andreyevich, born 1951, worker; Kurgan.
106. Belov, Yuriy Pavlovich, born 1938, CPRF member, scientific associate; St. Petersburg.
107. Grishkevich, Oleg Petrovich, born 1940, CPRF member, teacher; Yelets, Lipetsk Oblast.
108. Antipov, Yevgeniy Tikhonovich, born 1939, CPRF member, employee; Lipetsk.
109. Garifullina, Nadezhda Khalilovna, born 1939, journalist; Moscow.
110. Prudnikov, Mikhail Nikolayevich, born 1948, scientific associate; Moscow.
111. Yelchev, Viktor Alekseyevich, born 1941, CPRF member, deputy chairman of the "Russian Fatherland" league; Moscow.
112. Slavin, Boris Fedorovich, born 1941, CPRF member, political scientist; Moscow.
113. Saprykin, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, born 1935, CPRF member, philosopher; Moscow.
114. Seleznev, Aleksandr Zakharovich, born 1939, CPRF member, scientific associate; Moscow.
115. Rebrov, Grigoriy Kuzmich, born 1927, CPRF member, economist; Moscow.
116. Andreyev, Aleksandr Georgiyevich, born 1938, CPRF member, employee; Moscow.
117. Potapov, Sergey Aleksandrovich, born 1951, CPRF member, employee; Moscow.
118. Trushkov, Viktor Vasilyevich, born 1940, journalist; Moscow.
119. Vorobyev, Valeriy Vladimirovich, born 1946, CPRF member, philosopher; Moscow.
120. Trofimov, Vladimir Dmitriyevich, born 1947, lawyer; Moscow.
121. Demyanko, Yuriy Georgiyevich, born 1936, scientific associate; Moscow.
122. Mikhnovich, Viktor Petrovich, born 1935, CPRF member, lecturer. [no city given]
123. Osminin, Stanislav Aleksandrovich, born 1934, CPRF member, scientific associate; Moscow.
124. Lysenko, Yevgeniy Grigoryevich, born 1936, CPRF member, scientific associate; Moscow.
125. Segal, Aleksandr Petrovich, born 1957, journalist; Lipetsk.
126. Pakharev, Vyacheslav Nikitovich, born 1939, CPRF member, employee; Moscow.

127. Benov, Gennadiy Matveyevich, born 1941, CPRF member [no occupation given]; Monino, Moscow Oblast.
128. Kuznetsov, Viktor Yegorovich, born 1946, CPRF member, employee; Berdsk, Novosibirsk Oblast.
129. Gaydym, Valeriy Fedorovich, born 1948, CPRF member, employee; Novgorod.
130. Kravets, Aleksandr Alekseyevich, born 1950, CPRF member, lecturer; Omsk.
131. Mashkarin, Mikhail Ivanovich, born 1955, CPRF member, lecturer; Omsk.
132. Petrov, Igor Vladimirovich, born 1956, CPRF member, engineer; Omsk.
133. Orlov, Yevgeniy Ivanovich, born 1942, worker; Orenburg.
134. Zotikov, Aleksey Alekseyevich, born 1939, CPRF member, lecturer; Orel.
135. Nikolayev, Viktor Semenovich, born 1938, employee; Orel.
136. Orlov, Vladimir Vyacheslavovich, born 1932, CPRF member, philosopher; Perm.
137. Butov, Vasiliy Alekseyevich, born 1930, CPRF member, pensioner; Penza.
138. Povolyayev, Viktor Vasilyevich, born 1945, CPRF member, political scientist; Rostov-na-Donu.
139. Tolopchenko, Olga Vasilyevna, born 1959, lecturer; Rostov-na-Donu.
140. Fedotkin, Vladimir Nikolayevich, born 1947, CPRF member, lecturer; Ryazan.
141. Rashkin, Valeriy Fedorovich, born 1955, CPRF member, employee; Saratov.
142. Novoselov, Valeriy Pavlovich, born 1944, CPRF member, employee; Yekaterinburg.
143. Zorkin, Vyacheslav Alekseyevich, born 1949, CPRF member, journalist; Tver.
144. Lunev, Aleksandr Viktorovich, born 1952, CPRF member, employee; Tula.
145. Filshin, Mikhail Vladimirovich, born 1955, assistant machine operator; Tula.
146. Chertishchev, Vladimir Sergeyevich, born 1940, CPRF member, engineer; Tyumen.
147. Usanov, Viktor Ivanovich, born 1943, professor; Chelyabinsk.
148. Solovyev, Vadim Georgiyevich, born 1958, lawyer; Moscow.
149. Shishkarev, Vasiliy Ivanovich, born 1949, worker; Moscow.
150. Bezrukov, Valeriy Nikolayevich, born 1959, CPRF member, employee; Blagoveshchensk, Amur Oblast.
151. Chepurnov, Aleksey Ivanovich, born 1956, CPRF member, employee; Zavitinsk, Amur Oblast.

'Civic Union' List of Duma Candidates

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["Federal List of Candidates" for State Duma Elections from the "Civic Union for Stability, Justice, and Progress" electoral association]

[Text] The following have been nominated as candidate deputies to the State Duma on the basis of the decision of the "Civic Union for Stability, Justice, and Progress" electoral association of 21 October 1993.

1. Volskiy, Arkadiy Ivanovich, born 1932, president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs; Moscow.
2. Bekh, Nikolay Ivanovich, born 1946, general director of the "KamAZ" joint-stock company; Naberezhnyye Chelny.
3. Vladislavlev, Aleksandr Pavlovich, born 1936, professor and public figure; Moscow.
4. Semenenko, Petr Georgiyevich, born 1946, general director of the "Kirovskiy Zavod" joint-stock company; St. Petersburg.
5. Voldemarova, Yelena Vladimirovna, born 1948, cochairman and coordinator of the Moscow Confederation of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs; Moscow.
6. Yurgene, Igor Yuryevich, born 1952, first deputy chairman of the General Confederation of Trade Unions; Moscow.
7. Menshov, Vladimir Valentinovich, born 1939, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party, people's artist of Russia, and movie director; Moscow.
8. Piskunov, Vladimir Venidiktovich, born 1941, president of the Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Russia and vice president of the "Almazy Rossii-Sakha" joint-stock company; Moscow.
9. Rumyantsev, Oleg Germanovich, born 1961, lawyer and public figure; Moscow.
10. Novikova, Tatyana Viktorovna, born 1954, president of the "Youth for Russia" foundation and secretary of the Russian Youth League; Moscow.
11. Chernavin, Vladimir Nikolayevich, born 1928, admiral of the fleet and Hero of the Soviet Union; Moscow.
12. Lipitskiy, Vasiliy Semenovich, born 1947, deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Sociopolitical Research Institute and doctor of philosophical sciences; Moscow.
13. Kobzon, Iosif Davydovich, born 1937, people's artist of Russia and State Prize winner; Moscow.
14. Goryachev, Mark Leonidovich, born 1954, president of the "Goryachev" concern; St. Petersburg.
15. Ispravnikov, Vladimir Olegovich, born 1948, corresponding member of the Academy of Economic Sciences and Entrepreneurial Activity of Russia and doctor of economic sciences; Moscow.
16. Chichkanov, Valeriy Petrovich, born 1937, deputy general director of the "Russkoye Oruzhiye" [Russian Weapons] Corporation and academician; Moscow.
17. Tsipko, Aleksandr Sergeyevich, born 1941, doctor of philosophical sciences; Moscow.
18. Yermakov, Viktor Petrovich, born 1957, president of the Russian Agency for the Support of Small and Medium Business; Moscow.
19. Ochekurov, Valeriy Nikolayevich, born 1939, chairman of the Russian Federation Union of Workers in the Timber Sectors of Industry Central Committee; Moscow.

20. Kabanova, Valentina Viktorovna, born 1951, chairman of the Moscow Oblast Committee of the Construction and Construction Materials Industry Workers Union; Reutov, Moscow Oblast.
21. Burlatskiy, Fedor Mikhaylovich, born 1927, professor and writer; Moscow.
22. Voshchanov, Pavel Igorevich, born 1948, journalist; Moscow.
23. Rogov, Sergey Mikhaylovich, born 1948, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party and deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute; Moscow.
24. Lipman, David Natanovich, born 1935, professor and president of the Union of Timber Industry Members of Russia; Moscow.
25. Mironenko, Viktor Ivanovich, born 1953, chairman of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party Executive Committee; Moscow.
26. Panychev, Sergey Nikolayevich, born 1954, chairman of the Chuvash Republic Committee of the Construction and Construction Materials Industry Workers Union; Cheboksary.
27. Lubenchenko, Konstantin Dmitriyevich, born 1945, senior lecturer at the Moscow State University Law Faculty; Moscow.

Republic of Adyge
28. Kalchenko, Valentin Nikolayevich, born 1940, vice president of the "Rosstankoinstrument" Company; Moscow.

Republic of Bashkortostan
29. Sharipov, Yuriy Kamalovich, born 1940, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party and chairman of the board of the "Kontsern 'BETO'" joint-stock company; Ufa.
30. Mukaseyev, Vladimir Anatolyevich, born 1948, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party and general director of the "Orbita" firm; Ufa.
31. Dayanov, Rashit Gusmanovich, born 1947, entrepreneur and president of the "Dayanov i Syn" company; Ufa.
32. Abdrashitov, Yagafar Mukharyamovich, born 1949, general director of the Sterlitamak "Kaustik" Production Association; Sterlitamak.
33. Kulesha, Vadim Anatolyevich, born 1932, general director of the Beloretsk Metallurgical Combine; Beloretsk.

Republic of Buryatia
34. Yakovlev, Valeriy Ivanovich, born 1948, chairman of Ulan-Ude City Soviet of People's Deputies; Ulan-Ude.
35. Shapiro, Aron Pinevich, born 1931, chairman of the "Buryatmebel" joint-stock company; Ulan-Ude.

Republic of Dagestan
36. Kadiyev, Anvarbek Mansurovich, born 1941, president of the "Dagelektromash" joint-stock company; Makhachkala.
37. Ismailov, Sheyikh Ibragimovich, born 1941, rector of the Dagestan Teacher Training Institute; Makhachkala.

Kabardino-Balkar Republic
38. Pytov, Georgiy Konstantinovich, born 1937, deputy prime minister of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic; Nalchik.
39. Kabaloyev, Ruslan Magometovich, born 1954, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party and lawyer; Nalchik.
40. Tatuyev, Arsen Azidovich, born 1962, entrepreneur; Nalchik.

Republic of Kalmykia (Khalm-Tangch)
41. Ochirov, Valeriy Nikolayevich, born 1951, deputy commander of Russian Federation Ground Forces aviation, major general, and Hero of the Soviet Union; Moscow.

Republic of Mari-El
42. Nagibin, Yuriy Dmitriyevich, born 1937, senior lecturer at the Mari University; Yoshkar-Ola.

Republic of Karelia
43. Kester, Yalmar Matveyevich, born 1946, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party and chief economist of the Republic of Karelia State Committee for the Economy; Petrozavodsk.

Komi Republic
44. Pistsov, Anatoliy Petrovich, born 1951, chairman of Syktyvkar City Soviet of People's Deputies; Syktyvkar.
45. Rumyantsev, Aleksey Vladimirovich, born 1951, general director of a dairy combine; Pechora, Komi Republic.
46. Ilin, Sergey Nikolayevich, born 1952, chairman of the board of the "BFT" Bank; Moscow.

Mordovian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]
47. Vasilyev, Gennadiy Yevgenyevich, born 1956, director of the "ISSA" science and production firm; Saransk, Mordovian SSR.

Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)
48. Cherov, Ivan Danilovich, born 1938, minister of transport of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia); Yakutsk.
49. Yurkov, Sergey Vladimirovich, born 1965, chairman of the "Revival" independent trade union; Yakutsk.

North Ossetian SSR
50. Kairov, Vyacheslav Musayevich, born 1948, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party and political scientist; Vladikavkaz.

Republic of Tatarstan
51. Sabitov, Ravil Gumerovich, born 1948, public figure; Kazan.
52. Belyayev, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, born 1952, chairman of the "Accord" republic movement; Kazan.
53. Gukalenko, Ivan Andreyevich, born 1933, vice president of the International Union of Instrument Makers and general director of the "Prompribor" MO [expansion unknown]; Moscow.
54. Yemaletdinov, Yuner Faskhetdinovich, born 1927, general director of the "Radiopribor" Production Association and vice president of the Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Russia; Kazan.

Republic of Tuva
55. Komarov, Yuriy Trofimovich, born 1934, vice president of the Construction Materials Corporation; Moscow.

Republic of Khakassia
56. Ryzhov, Vladimir Alekseyevich, born 1948, chairman of the board of the "Gidroenergostroy" joint-stock company; Moscow.

Chuvash Republic
57. Lyapunov, Stanislav Iosifovich, born 1947, president of the Chuvash Republic Association of Industrialists and general director of the Electronics and Mechanics Plant; Cheboksary.
58. Pushnyak, Vasiliy Antonovich, born 1937, chairman of the board of the "Elektromera" Association; Moscow.

Krasnodar Kray
59. Tsey, Eduard Ismailovich, born 1939, general director of the "SIAL" joint-stock company and president of the Kuban Scientific and Industrial Union; Krasnodar.
60. Fendrikov, Aleksandr Ivanovich, born 1943, director of the Machine-Building Plant; Tikhoretsk, Krasnodar Kray.
61. Spiridonov, Vitaliy Yevgenyevich, born 1946, general director of the Krasnodar Kray Department of the Property Fund; Krasnodar.

Krasnoyarsk Kray
62. Sergiyenko, Valeriy Ivanovich, born 1946, president of the Krasnoyarsk Kray Union of Commodity Producers and Entrepreneurs; Krasnoyarsk.
63. Marshinskiy, Vyacheslav Georgiyevich, born 1945, chairman of the Agro-Industrial Complex Workers Union Kray Committee; Krasnoyarsk.
64. Bolshunov, Andrey Yakovlevich, born 1955, general director of the "AAA" Yenisey trust company; Krasnoyarsk.

Maritime Kray
65. Orlov, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, born 1947, chairman of a committee of the Maritime Kray Soviet of People's Deputies; Razdolnoye settlement, Nadezhdinskiy Rayon, Maritime Kray.
66. Litvinchuk, Aleksandr Borisovich, born 1949, entrepreneur; Vladivostok, Maritime Kray.

Stavropol Kray
67. Lebedev, Aleksandr Mefodyevich, born 1950, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party, vice president, general director of the Stavropol Region Congress of Business Circles; Stavropol.
68. Balditsyn, Vasiliy Vyacheslavovich, born 1960, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party, general director of the "Sengiley" joint-stock company, and chief editor of the newspaper 5 DNEY [5 Days]; Stavropol.
69. Sokolov, Anatoliy Ivanovich, born 1942, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party and general director of the "Avtopritsep-KamAZ" joint-stock company; Stavropol.

Amur Oblast
70. Zakharov, Andrey Aleksandrovich, born 1961, lecturer at a higher educational establishment; Blagoveshchensk.

Arkhangelsk Oblast
71. Shulgin, Sergey Nikolayevich, born 1956, banker; Arkhangelsk.

Astrakhan Oblast
72. Terskov, Sergey Konstantinovich, born 1953, director of the Cotton Products Combine; Astrakhan.

Belgorod Oblast
73. Kudryavtsev, Valentin Ivanovich, born 1939, deputy chairman of the Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies; Belgorod.
74. Polukhin, Oleg Nikolayevich, born 1955, chairman of the Gubkin City Soviet of People's Deputies; Gubkin, Belgorod Oblast.
75. Bezbenko, Anatoliy Ivanovich, born 1946, general director of the Oblast Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs; Belgorod.

Bryansk Oblast
76. Derzhavin, Valeriy Yuryevich, born 1943, director of the Oblast Chamber of Notaries; Bryansk.

Vladimir Oblast
77. Shteyn, Vladimir Fedorovich, born 1934, director of the "Kovrovmashproyekt" Institute; Kovrov, Vladimir Oblast.
78. Yeltsov, Anatoliy Ilich, born 1932, general director of the "Vladimirgrazhdanstroy" joint-stock company; Vladimir.

Volgograd Oblast
79. Mazayev, Vladimir Dmitriyevich, born 1955, lawyer; Moscow.
80. Prikhozhan, Inna Anatolyevna, born 1947, chairman of a commission of the Volgograd Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies; Volgograd.
81. Numerov, Nikolay Vladimirovich, born 1920, president of the Russian Association of Victims of Illegal Political Repressions; Moscow.

Voronezh Oblast
82. Shamardin, Dmitriy Grigoryevich, born 1945, general director of the "ENIKMASH" joint-stock company; Voronezh.
83. Zhukov, Dmitriy Mikhaylovich, born 1952, head of Leninskiy Rayon Administration in the city of Voronezh; Voronezh.
84. Ledenev, Nikolay Mikhaylovich, born 1954, lecturer; Voronezh.
85. Muravyev, Igor Vladislavovich, born 1960, engineer; Voronezh.

Ivanovo Oblast
86. Bazunov, Lev Yuryevich, born 1949, general director of the "Ivchesmash" joint-stock company; Ivanovo.
87. Zenkin, Sergey Anatolyevich, born 1960, lawyer and public figure; Ivanovo.

88. Sokolov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, born 1949, chairman of the Oblast Agrarian Union and chairman of the Michurin Kolkhoz; Yuryevets, Ivanovo Oblast.

Irkutsk Oblast

89. Samsonov, Vyacheslav Afanasyevich, born 1944, head of Leninskiy Rayon Administration; Irkutsk.

90. Krulikovskiy, Anatoliy Ippolitovich, born 1947, director of the Irkutsk "Depozit-Rezerv" Company; Irkutsk.

91. Sundukov, Anatoliy Antonovich, born 1933, chief of the River School; Ust-Kut, Irkutsk Oblast.

Kaliningrad Oblast

92. Kuzin, Yakov Grigoryevich, born 1941, chief manager of the "Baltiyskaya Promyshlennaya Kompaniya" joint-stock company; Kaliningrad.

Kaluga Oblast

93. Rozanova, Tatyana Gennadyevna, born 1948, chief of department at the Oblast Property Fund; Kaluga.

Kirov Oblast

94. Novikov, Nikolay Nikolayevich, born 1947, general director of the "Kirovstroymaterialy" Association; Kirov.

95. Rozhkin, Aleksandr Maksimovich, born 1938, director of the Murashinskiy Timber Processing Complex; Oktyabrskiy settlement, Murashinskiy Rayon, Kirov Oblast.

96. Ignatov, Vladimir Vasilyevich, born 1950, chairman of the Labor Collective Council of the "Avitek" Vyatka machine building enterprise; Kirov.

Kurgan Oblast

97. Myagkov, Vil Alekseyevich, born 1935, general director of the "Kurganpribor" Association; Kurgan.

Kursk Oblast

98. Razinkov, Yuriy Tikhonovich, born 1950, chairman of the trade union committee of the "Kurskagromash" joint-stock company; Kursk.

99. Lunev, Aleksey Yegorovich, born 1962, engineer; Kursk.

Leningrad Oblast

100. Glebov, Valeriy Nikolayevich, born 1939, general director of the "Burevestnik" plant; Gatchina, Leningrad Oblast.

101. Kolomeytsev, Stepan Pavlovich, born 1937, president of the "Nevskaya Dubrovka" joint-stock company; Nevskaya Dubrovka settlement, Vsevolozhskiy Rayon, Leningrad Oblast.

102. Klimov, Vitaliy Nikolayevich, born 1952, deputy chairman of Leningrad Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies; St. Petersburg.

Lipetsk Oblast

103. Stepanov, Sergey Ivanovich, born 1947, chairman of the City Soviet of People's Deputies; Lipetsk.

104. Dmitrevskiy, Valentin Ivanovich, born 1943, deputy chief of the Gostekhnadzor [precise expansion unknown; possibly State Committee for the Supervision of Safe Working Practices in Industry] administration; Lipetsk.

Moscow Oblast

105. Plekhanov, Sergey Nikolayevich, born 1949, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party and writer; Dzerzhinskiy, Moscow Oblast.

106. Tikhonov, Georgiy Ivanovich, born 1934, chief of an administration of the Russian Federation State Committee for Economic Cooperation With Commonwealth Member States; Moscow.

107. Adrov, Aleksey Nikolayevich, born 1946, consultant for the Russian Political Agency; Kaliningrad, Moscow Oblast.

108. Tomachev, Sergey Nikolayevich, born 1950, president of the Russian Industrial Investment Fund; Gorodishchenskoye Forest settlement, Orekhovo-Zuyevskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast.

109. Ivantsov, German Sergeyevich, born 1962, cochairman of the Society To Protect the Interests of Bank Depositors and Holders of Securities; Moscow.

110. Tsyplakov, Sergey Sergeyevich, born 1958, department chief in the Russian Federation Council of Ministers apparatus; Moscow.

Murmansk Oblast

111. Luzin, Gennadiy Pavlovich, born 1936, director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Kola Scientific Center Institute for Economic Problems; Apatity.

112. Makarevich, Aleksandr Gennadyevich, born 1962, first secretary of Murmansk Youth League; Murmansk.

Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast

113. Mitin, Sergey Gerasimovich, born 1951, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party and general director of the "Termal" joint-stock company; Nizhniy Novgorod.

114. Makov, Sergey Kimovich, born 1951, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party and first deputy head of administration; Nizhniy Novgorod.

115. Likhachev, Aleksey Yevgenyevich, born 1962, manager of the "Aval" insurance company; Nizhniy Novgorod.

116. Obolyayev, Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich, born 1940, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party and director of the G.I. Petrovskiy Plant; Nizhniy Novgorod.

117. Sevryugin, Boris Nikolayevich, born 1940, chairman of a commission of the Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies; Nizhniy Novgorod.

118. Polozkov, Sergey Alekseyevich, born 1959, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party and public figure; Nizhniy Novgorod.

Novgorod Oblast

119. Degtyarev, Aleksandr Yakimovich, born 1946, doctor of historical sciences and chief scientific associate of the Russian Academy of Sciences Analysis Center; Moscow.

Novosibirsk Oblast

120. Bushuyev, Vitaliy Vasilyevich, born 1939, Russian Federation deputy minister of fuel and power; Novosibirsk.
121. Seryeznov, Aleksey Nikolayevich, born 1934, director of the Aviation Scientific Research Institute and president of the Siberian Department of the League To Assist Defense Enterprises; Novosibirsk.
122. Bernadskiy, Yuriy Ivanovich, born 1960, chairman of the City Soviet of People's Deputies; Novosibirsk.
123. Frantsev, Afanasiy Stepanovich, born 1940, general director of the "Glavnovosibirskstroy" joint-stock company; Novosibirsk.

Omsk Oblast
124. Diskin, Iosif Yevgenyevich, born 1948, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party, professor, and deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Population Institute; Moscow.
125. Tarasevich, Dmitriy Nikolayevich, born 1932, professor and chief of department at the Medical Institute; Omsk.

Orenburg Oblast
126. Nefedov, Viktor Leonidovich, born 1959, general director of the Orenburg Union of Commodity Producers and Entrepreneurs; Orenburg.
127. Shcherbakov, Viktor Vladimirovich, born 1959, general director of the "Orenburg-ASKO" joint-stock insurance company; Orenburg.
128. Lukonin, Aleksandr Vasilyevich, born 1960, president of the Buguruslan Regional Union of Entrepreneurs; Buguruslan, Orenburg Oblast.

Orel Oblast
129. Vasilkovskiy, Aleksandr Yefremovich, born 1935, deputy head of Orel Oblast Administration; Orel.

Penza Oblast
130. Bezborodov, Yevgeniy Dmitriyevich, born 1938, general director of the "Kontrolpribor" joint-stock company; Penza.
131. Antsev, Leonid Yuryevich, born 1950, chairman of the board of the "Progress" Association of Industrial Enterprises; Penza.

Perm Oblast
132. Reshetnikov, Aleksandr Yakovlevich, born 1949, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party and general director of the "Permskiy Elektromekhanicheskiy Zavod" joint-stock company; Perm.
133. Kapin, Vladimir Ivanovich, born 1940, director of the "Tochmash" Plant; Chaykovskiy, Perm Oblast.
134. Putilov, Mikhail Alekseyevich, born 1935, chairman of the "Rossiya" Kolkhoz; Perm.

Pskov Oblast
135. Laptev, Vadim Yevgenyevich, born 1960, secretary of the Russian Youth League's Pskov Oblast Committee; Pskov.

Rostov Oblast
136. Gatashov, Vasiliy Vasilyevich, born 1946, deputy director of the Rostov State University Institute for Improving Qualifications; Rostov-na-Donu.

Ryazan Oblast
137. Laykam, Konstantin Emilyevich, born 1957, director of the "Agro-R" private firm; Ryazan.
138. Agibalov, Nikolay Nikolayevich, born 1958, leader of the "Trud" construction company and vice president of the Union of Construction Complex Entrepreneurs of Russia; Ryazan.

Saratov Oblast
139. Fedotov, Viktor Ivanovich, born 1949, general director of the "Volzhanka" joint-stock company; Saratov.
140. Vladimirov, Nikolay Vasilyevich, born 1950, chairman of Saratov City Soviet of People's Deputies; Saratov.

Sakhalin Oblast
141. Grishko, Aleksandr Ivanovich, born 1961, chairman of the Sakhalin Coal Industry Workers Union Territorial Committee; Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.

Sverdlovsk Oblast
142. Lobok, Vladimir Mikhaylovich, born 1954, executive director of Sverdlovsk Oblast Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs; Yekaterinburg.
143. Tarabanchik, Leonid Semenovich, born 1949, chairman of the Oblast Innovations Committee; Yekaterinburg.

Smolensk Oblast
144. Prokhorov, Vladimir Nikolayevich, born 1947, deputy head of Smolensk Oblast Administration; Smolensk.
145. Anisimov, Vladimir Ivanovich, born 1948, chairman of Smolensk City Soviet of People's Deputies; Smolensk.
146. Semkin, Sergey Ivanovich, born 1944, chief engineer of the Smolensk Branch of the Moscow Railroad; Smolensk.

Tambov Oblast
147. Kondratyev, Gennadiy Vasilyevich, born 1934, director of the "Revtrud" Plant; Tambov.

Tver Oblast
148. Titov, Aleksandr Ivanovich, born 1936, president of the "Informpechat" editorial and publishing firm; Moscow.
149. Ivanov, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1959, chief forestry officer at the Kalyazin Forestry Station; Kalyazin, Tver Oblast.

Tyumen Oblast
150. Katerushin, Anatoliy Filippovich, born 1938, chairman of the Timber Sector Workers Union Tyumen Oblast Committee; Tyumen.
151. Korevitskiy, Vladimir Zdzislavovich, born 1948, vice president of the Tyumen Commodity Stock Exchange; Tyumen.

Ulyanovsk Oblast
152. Klementyev, Vladimir Romanovich, born 1938, general director of the "Ulyanovskenergo" joint-stock company; Ulyanovsk.

153. Maksimov, Vyacheslav Viktorovich, born 1937, chairman of the board of directors of the "Ulyanovskstroy" joint-stock company; Ulyanovsk.

Chelyabinsk Oblast
154. Utkin, Vladimir Petrovich, born 1950, head of Kopeysk City Administration; Kopeysk, Chelyabinsk Oblast.

Chita Oblast
155. Korovin, Aleksandr Viktorovich, born 1957, chairman of the "SOPR na TEKH" Business Cooperation Association; Chita.
156. Khristich, Mikhail Borisovich, born 1939, general director of the "Litos" firm; Chita.
157. Kamnev, Sergey Ivanovich, born 1947, director of the "Amalgama" mining and extracting enterprise; Chita.

Yaroslavl Oblast
158. Dubrovin, Viktor Georgiyevich, born 1942, general director of the "Domostroitel" joint-stock company; Yaroslavl.
159. Tamarov, Viktor Vasilyevich, born 1936, chairman of the board of the "Gorshikha" Kolkhoz; Kuznechikha settlement, Yaroslavskiy Rayon, Yaroslavl Oblast.

City of Moscow
160. Savitskaya, Svetlana Yevgenyevna, born 1948, pilot-cosmonaut and twice Hero of the Soviet Union; Moscow.
161. Fuga, Nikolay Georgiyevich, born 1953, president of the "DeKo" concern and cochairman of the Federation of Commodity Producers of Russia Council; Moscow.
162. Senchagov, Vyacheslav Konstantinovich, born 1940, rector of the Economics Academy; Moscow.
163. Kulishov, Sergey Vladimirovich, born 1952, director of the Moscow City Union of Enterprises and lawyer; Moscow.
164. Nemirovchenko, Nikolay Makarovich, born 1935, general director of the "Mosshveya" Production Association; Moscow.
165. Smirnov, Igor Pavlovich, born 1941, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party and director of the Institute of Vocational Education; Moscow.
166. Yurkov, Anatoliy Petrovich, born 1935, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party and chief editor of the newspaper RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA; Moscow.
167. Yakovlev, Albert Mikhaylovich, born 1938, first vice president of the Russian Union of Construction Workers; Moscow.
168. Milovidov, Yuriy Nikolayevich, born 1955, director of the Center for the Study of the Workers and Trade Union Movement; Moscow.
169. Pleshakov, Aleksandr Petrovich, born 1964, president of the "Transaero" aviation company; Moscow.
170. Kuzmin, Boris Aleksandrovich, born 1937, chairman of the board of the Association of Printing Industry Enterprises of Russia; Moscow.
171. Lagunov, Andrey Petrovich, born 1960, chairman of the Moscow Association of Afghanistan War Veterans' Organizations; Moscow.
172. Vladimirov, Sergey Yevgenyevich, born 1951, general director of the "Morskoye Priborostroyeniye" joint-stock company; Moscow.

City of St. Petersburg
173. Zanin, Valentin Petrovich, born 1937, general director of the "Signal" Science and Production Association; St. Petersburg.
174. Koveshnikov, Vakhtang Pavlovich, born 1934, general director of the "Avangard" Science and Production Association; St. Petersburg.
175. Larionov, Yevgeniy Nikolayevich, born 1948, general director of the "Krasnyy Treugolnik" joint-stock copmany; St. Petersburg.
176. Tereshchenko, Gennadiy Fedorovich, born 1941, general director of the "Applied Chemistry" Scientific Center; St. Petersburg.
177. Gorelov, Mikhail Ivanovich, born 1953, general director of the "Eksperimentalnyy Zavod" joint-stock company and "Kholding-Leninets"; St. Petersburg.
178. Seregin, Valentin Aleksandrovich, born 1937, general director of the St. Petersburg Association of Shipbuilders and chief designer of the "Malakhit" Design Bureau; St. Petersburg.
179. Gapanovich, Oleg Ivanovich, born 1934, chairman of a St. Petersburg Soviet commission; St. Petersburg.
180. Shcherbakov, Vladislav Grigoryevich, born 1938, deputy chairman of a Leningrad City Soviet commission; St. Petersburg.
181. Surikov, Viktor Leonidovich, born 1945, head of Kronshtadt City Administration; Kronshtadt.

Nenets Autonomous Okrug
182. Chilingarov, Artur Nikolayevich, born 1939, member of the All-Russia "Renewal" Union party, president of the Association of Polar Explorers, and Hero of the Soviet Union; Moscow.

Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug
183. Usmanov, Alisher Burkhanovich, born 1953, president of the "Interkross" enterprise; Moscow.

Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug
184. Michurin, Sergey Andreyevich, born 1947, president of the "Telebank" international commercial bank; Moscow.

RMDR List of Duma Candidates

PM1611171993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Nov 93 pp 6-7

["Federal List of Candidates" for State Duma Elections from the "Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms" electoral association]

[Text] The following have been nominated as candidate deputies to the State Duma from the "Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms" electoral association on the basis of the decree of the Political Council of 6 November 1993, protocol No. 15:

1. Sobchak, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, born 10 August 1937, jurist, mayor of St. Petersburg; St. Petersburg.
2. Fedorov, Svyatoslav Nikolayevich, born 8 August 1927, physician, general director of the "Mikrokhirurgiya glaza" interbranch scientific technical complex; Moscow.
3. Basilashvili, Oleg Valerianovich, born 26 September 1934, people's artist of Russia; St. Petersburg.
4. Kivelidi, Ivan Kharlampiyevich, born 18 March 1949, entrepreneur, chairman of the Free Labor Party, chairman of the Council for the Development of Entrepreneurship under the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government; Moscow.
5. Sharipov, Saygali Gayanovich, born 10 September 1957, deputy chairman of the Independent Miners Union of Russia; Kemerovo.
6. Braginskiy, Aleksandr Pavlovich, born 12 September 1948, deputy premier of Moscow for public and political relations; Moscow.
7. Yakovlev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 2 December 1923, academician, chairman of the Commission under the Russian Federation President for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression; Moscow.
8. Krasavchenko, Sergey Nikolayevich, born 19 December 1940, economist, first deputy leader of the Russian Federation President's Administration; Moscow.
9. Shaposhnikov, Yevgeniy Ivanovich, born 3 February 1942, serviceman, marshal of aviation; Moscow.
10. Shmelev, Nikolay Petrovich, born 18 June 1936, economist, writer, professor; Moscow.
11. Kozhonin, Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich, born 9 April 1954, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Federation and Nationalities Affairs; Moscow.
12. Gazmanov, Oleg Mikhaylovich, born 22 July 1951, composer, singer; Moscow.
13. Kiselev, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, born 9 February 1959, scientist; Volzhskiy.
14. Kulish, Savva Yakovlevich, born 17 October 1936, movie director, Russian Federation honored figure of the arts; Moscow.
15. Karyakin, Yuriy Fedorovich, born 22 August 1930, writer, member of the Presidential Council; Moscow.
16. Kondrashov, Boris Petrovich, born 24 March 1957, jurist, deputy chief of Moscow City Internal Affairs Main Administration; Moscow.
17. Lavrov, Kirill Yuryevich, born 15 September 1925, actor, people's artist; St. Petersburg.
18. Tsereteli, Zurab Konstantinovich, born 4 January 1934, sculptor, secretary-academician of the Russian Academy of Arts; Moscow.
19. Nekrasov, Viktor Romenovich, born 3 May 1954, chairman of the Russian Seamen's Trade Union; Sochi.
20. Medvedkova, Yelena Markovna, born 25 March 1950, general director of the International Association of Trading Companies of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Moscow.
21. Trube, Sergey Yevgenyevich, born 7 December 1949, deputy chief editor of the international journal MEGAPOLIS; Moscow.
22. Kapterev, Sergey Yevgenyevich, born 28 April 1952, chairman of the Confederation of Trade Union Associations of Russia; Moscow.
23. Roytman, Ilya Borisovich, born 9 August 1955, historian, president of the Institute of Politics and International Relations; Moscow.
24. Moguchev, Arkadiy Semenovich, born 29 September 1952, jurist, serviceman; Mamonovo, Kaliningrad Oblast.
25. Lebedev, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, born 8 January 1946, historian, chairman of the Committee on the Mass Media and Relations with Public Associations of the oblast administration; Kemerovo.
26. Kuznetsov, Mikhail Ivanovich, born 23 February 1947, lecturer, chairman of the Moscow Oblast Soviet Standing Commission on Education, Science, and Culture; Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast.
27. Belousov, Vladimir Ilich, born 1 December 1948, economist-entrepreneur; Samara.
28. German, Aleksey Yuryevich, born 20 June 1938, movie director, Russian Federation honored figure of the arts; Moscow.
29. Kutafin, Oleg Yemelyanovich, born 26 June 1937, jurist, rector of Moscow Juridical Institute; Moscow.
30. Kutsenok, Gennadiy Vasilyevich, born 2 December 1948, jurist, director of a joint-stock company; Nizhniy Tagil.
31. Mironova, Nina Yakovlevna, born 6 April 1937, entrepreneur; Moscow.
32. Alekseyev, Aleksandr Sergeyevich, born 29 January 1954, trade union worker; Bologoye.
33. Pain, Emil Abramovich, born 6 December 1948, director of the Ethnopolitical Studies Center of the Foreign Policy Association; Moscow.
34. Galustyan, Oskian Arshakovich, born 13 October 1939, deputy chief of a department of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs; Moscow.
35. Dontsov, Yuriy Vasilyevich, born 15 March 1948, entrepreneur, president of the investment fund; Tver.
36. Plotnikov, Aleksandr Georgiyevich, born 20 December 1954, economist, scientific leader of the Novosibirsk Social Protection Fund; Novosibirsk.
37. Mironenko, Vladimir Ivanovich, born 21 January 1965, chairman of an oblast soviet commission; Volgograd.
38. Lyubarskiy, Kronid Arkadyevich, born 4 April 1934, journalist, first deputy chief editor of a weekly; Moscow.
39. Fedorov, Yevgeniy Alekseyevich, born 11 May 1963, serviceman, deputy chairman of an oblast soviet commission; St. Petersburg.
40. Kharichev, Igor Aleksandrovich, born 25 March 1947, assistant leader of the Russian Federation President's Administration; Moscow.
41. Melanifidi, Georgiy Fedorovich, born 13 December 1931, scientific associate, deputy chairman of the Greek Societies of Russia; Razvilka Settlement, Leninskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast.
42. Dzoblayev, Shmidt Davydovich, born 5 September 1932, general secretary of the Assembly of Democratic Forces of the North Caucasus; Krasnogorsk, Moscow Oblast.

43. Antonov, Andrey Borisovich, born 16 April 1958, political scientist; Moscow.
44. Stupar, Sergey Kuzmich, born 27 January 1961, expert in the Russian Federation President's Administration; Moscow.
45. Terekhov, Aleksandr Borisovich, born 12 May 1950, independent expert; Moscow.
46. Aliyev, Ismail Ibragimovich, born 1 September 1946, adviser to the president of the KRN [expansion unknown—?Committee for Repressed Peoples], deputy chief of the Department for the Affairs of Repressed Peoples of the Russian State Committee for Federation and Nationalities Affairs; Moscow.
47. Zamaletdinov, Kayman Suleymanovich, born 4 November 1944, entrepreneur, executive director of the "Yurga-servis" closed-type joint-stock company; Nizhnevartovsk.
48. Semernin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, born 29 November 1949, jurist, deputy director of the Center of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Management; Moscow.
49. Yemelyanov, Vladimir Konstantinovich, born 4 March 1954, adviser on ecology to the administration head; Samara.
50. Masalkov, Vadim Vadimovich, born 7 November 1966, lecturer; Moscow.
51. Butov, Arnold Georgiyevich, born 29 June 1937, chairman of the Union of Voluntary Societies of Beekeepers; Moscow.
52. Sorbuchev, Sergey Ivanovich, born 16 July 1951, trade union figure; Tula.
53. Sergeyev, Aleksandr Andreyevich, born 5 August 1960, chairman of the Independent Miners Trade Unions of Russia; Mezhdurechensk.
54. Vostrukhov, Oleg Vasilyevich, born 18 April 1958, entrepreneur, deputy executive director of the Russian Investors Union; Pechora.
55. Mokhov, Yevgeniy Petrovich, born 14 January 1956, engineer; Cherepovets.
56. Goncharova, Irina Yevgenyevna, born 20 October 1960, philosopher, expert in the apparatus of the Russian Federation president's representative; Chita.
57. Kislitsin, Vyacheslav Ivanovich, born 3 January 1950, chairman of the property fund; Chelyabinsk.
58. Kozlov, Sergey Dmitriyevich, born 28 April 1951, doctor of political sciences, academician of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences of National Progress; Kaliningrad (Oblast).
59. Sarychev, Aleksey Nikolayevich, born 28 March 1956, jurist, deputy chief of the kray administration's justice department; Barnaul.
60. Shelekhov, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, born 30 October 1942, scientist, head of department at Tver State University; Tver.
61. Begin, Anatoliy Yegorovich, born 18 April 1953, engineer; Voronezh.
62. Strugov, Yuriy Valentinovich, born 25 January 1939, institute director; Khabarovsk.
63. Petrosyan, Ovanes Petrovich, born 5 February 1950, scientist, vice president of the Union of Entrepreneurs in the Production Sphere; Kaluga.
64. Rodionov, Aleksandr Alekseyevich, born 18 January 1943, first deputy chairman of the State Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry; Penza.
65. Kirillova, Nataliya Borisovna, born 30 August 1949, scientist, prorector of Yekaterinburg State Theater Institute; Yekaterinburg.
66. Parra, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, born 16 October 1943, actor, theater producer and movie director; Moscow.
67. Bortko, Vladimir Vladimirovich, born 7 May 1946, movie director; St. Petersburg.
68. Tsyba, Tatyana Fedorovna, born 16 December 1952, journalist; Moscow.
69. Antonov, Anatoliy Nikolayevich, born 29 November 1953, scientist-philosopher, general director of the Social and Strategic Studies Center; Moscow.
70. Zadvornov, Igor Anatolyevich, born 3 September 1968, entrepreneur, commercial director of a joint-stock company; Mytishchi.
71. Zhirov, Nikolay Vasilyevich, born 28 August 1945, entrepreneur, general director of a medical insurance society [place of residence not given].
72. Glinka, Igor Vadimovich, born 8 February 1958, deputy prefect of the Central District; Moscow.
73. Spitsyn, Yevgeniy Yuryevich, born 9 March 1966, lecturer; Moscow.
74. Sokolov, Aleksey Vasilyevich, born 30 January 1954, scientist-philosopher; Moscow.
75. Tatarinov, Andrey Petrovich, born 31 May 1948, entrepreneur, commercial director of the IKTs [expansion unknown]; Volzhskiy.
76. Sayenko, Valeriy Nikiforovich, born 11 September 1943, chairman of the property fund; Kursk.
77. Simonov, Alfred Nikolayevich, born 19 February 1947, chairman of the city soviet; Yaroslavl.
78. Yemishin, Konstantin Nikolayevich, born 19 June 1945, director of a state enterprise; Barnaul.
79. Kudryashov, Vladimir Stepanovich, born 21 March 1956, entrepreneur; Nizhniy Novgorod.
80. Moderau, Pavel Vladimirovich, born 5 October 1938, senior scientific associate of the Institute of Machine Science of the Urals Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Chelyabinsk.
81. Yershov, Vladimir Nikolayevich, born 21 June 1950, scientist; Nizhniy Novgorod.
82. Farushev, Gennadiy Ivanovich, born 1 May 1955, lecturer; Yaroslavl.
83. Bulychev, Aleksandr Fedorovich, born 30 April 1954, journalist; Tver.
84. Tabachnikov, Bronislav Yakovlevich, born 5 August 1936, scientist-historian, head of an institute department; Voronezh.
85. Shuklin, Gennadiy Ivanovich, born 19 May 1947, group leader at a scientific research institute; St. Petersburg.
86. Veremyev, Vladimir Ivanovich, born 1 March 1933, museum employee; Bryansk.
87. Kadmenskiy, Stanislav Georgiyevich, born 30 September 1937, head of the Nuclear Physics Department of Voronezh State University; Voronezh.

88. Murashov, Andrey Vyacheslavovich, born 13 March 1963, engineer-economist; St. Petersburg.
89. Ignatov, Vladimir Sergeyevich, born 30 April 1946, director of the scientific-educational center; Penza.
90. Kostrov, Renat Alekseyevich, born 2 August 1942, lecturer; Blagoveshchensk.
91. Fedotov, Valeriy Pavlovich, born 26 July 1951, lecturer; Ivanovo.
92. Vetrov, Aleksandr Antonovich, born 27 June 1936, scientist-economist; Nakhabino Settlement, Moscow Oblast.
93. Platov, Vladimir Ignatovich, born 23 October 1946, administration head; Bezhetsk.
94. Voyevoda, Yuriy Yevgenyevich, born 23 May 1951, jurist, colonel of justice; Kaliningrad (Oblast).
95. Mararitsa, Valeriy Fedorovich, born 13 August 1955, sociologist; Murmansk.
96. Danilin, Vadim Anatolyevich, born 16 April 1946, entrepreneur; Obninsk.
97. Baladzhants, Nikolay Semenovich, born 14 March 1943, journalist, chief of the Press and Information Administration of the kray administration; Stavropol.
98. Kudimov, Yuriy Alekseyevich, born 20 February 1943, head of the city administration's Antimonopoly Policy Department; Arzamas, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast.
99. Sergeyev, Vladimir Gavrilovich, born 13 March 1950, deputy chairman of the property fund; Chelyabinsk.
100. Zharkovskiy, Vladimir Ilich, born 14 January 1948, chairman of the city soviet; Rybinsk.
101. Tortsev, Yevgeniy Vasilyevich, born 17 June 1946, director of a forestry establishment; Lomonosov.
102. Bulokhov, Aleksey Danilovich, born 2 November 1939, scientist; Bryansk.
103. Samotes, Lyudmila Aleksandrovna, born 22 May 1950, engineer; Kursk.
104. Zaytsev, Sergey Valentinovich, born 14 January 1943, physician; Yaroslavl.
105. Golovin, Rudolf Mikhaylovich, born 22 January 1940, journalist; Ivanovo.
106. Bedenko, Yuriy Semenovich, born 5 August 1950, chairman of an oblast administration committee; Kaliningrad (Oblast).
107. Babashov, Nazim Shadmanovich, born 26 July 1964, representative of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Murmansk.
108. Kolesnikov, Sergey Petrovich, born 18 July 1951, trade union worker; Yekaterinburg.
109. Shobrik, Aleksandr Sergeyevich, born 3 December 1949, senior assistant captain; St. Petersburg.
110. Pisanov, Vladislav Leonidovich, born 13 January 1961, journalist; Chelyabinsk.
111. Tretyak, Vladimir Yevgenyevich, born 26 July 1950, economist; Samara.
112. Filimonov, Aleksandr Sergeyevich, born 24 December 1963, serviceman; Pesochnyy post office, Vyborgskiy Rayon, Leningrad Oblast.
113. Ipatov, Vasiliy Petrovich, born 24 April 1939, entrepreneur; Murmansk.
114. Grachev, Aleksandr Alekseyevich, born 13 January 1950, jurist; Kursk.
115. Plakhotnikov, Dmitriy Vasilyevich, born 3 November 1945, chairman of the State Property Committee; Pavlovsk, Voronezh Oblast.
116. Paraskevopulo, Aristotel Anastasovich, born 19 May 1944, member of the KRN [expansion unknown—?Committee for Repressed Peoples] Presidium; Moscow.
117. Vasyukov, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 8 October 1958, entrepreneur; Moscow.
118. Alyabyev, Yuriy Dmitriyevich, born 9 July 1954, economist; Kursk.
119. Bessonov, Valeriy Viktorovich, born 29 March 1952, entrepreneur; Moscow.
120. Kharenko, Aleksandr Petrovich, born 14 November 1946, entrepreneur; Novosibirsk.
121. Alekseyev, Yevgeniy Nikolayevich, born 10 July 1949, deputy chairman of the soviet of people's deputies; Kursk.
122. Remchukov, Konstantin Vadimovich, born 21 November 1954, scientist; Moscow.
123. Bondar, Sergey Yevgenyevich, born 14 July 1957, entrepreneur; Moscow.
124. Dudkin, Anatoliy Yakovlevich, born 27 April 1942, entrepreneur; Vyborg.
125. Iliadi, Ilya Kharlampiyevich, born 2 January 1946, economist; Pyatigorsk.
126. Lokhov, Georgiy Mikhaylovich, born 23 January 1945, scientist; Moscow.
127. Arutyunov, Garigin Leonovich, born 20 February 1948, entrepreneur; St. Petersburg.
128. Shevchuk, Yevgeniy Vladimirovich, born 28 August 1947, scientist-medic; Novosibirsk.
129. Balakireva, Vera Ivanovna, born 10 June 1954, entrepreneur; Moscow.
130. Lyutarevich, Valeriy Nikolayevich, born 25 April 1958, entrepreneur; Rodniki, Ivanovo Oblast.
131. Kuznetsova, Nataliya Ivanovna, born 30 August 1947, journalist; Moscow.
132. Raytsin, Viloriy Yakovlevich, born 27 March 1935, scientist-economist; Moscow.
133. Kiselev, Viktor Andreyevich, born 12 August 1940, engineer; Komsomolsk-na-Amure.
134. Shiryayev, Mikhail Yakovlevich, born 20 November 1936, entrepreneur; Perm.
135. Kutenev, Aleksandr Pavlovich, born 6 June 1951, entrepreneur; St. Petersburg.
136. Gomer, Viktor Davydovich, born 24 December 1966, priest; Moscow.
137. Mayorov, Boris Ivanovich, born 17 December 1950, serviceman; Odintsovo.
138. Bobkova, Natalya Viktorovna, born 10 January 1948, scientist-biophysicist; Pushchino.
139. Tsvelikhovskiy, Genrikh Isayevich, born 20 August 1938, senior scientific associate; Moscow.
140. Avdeyev, Viktor Mikhaylovich, born 9 July 1950, entrepreneur; Moscow.
141. Masalovich, Sergey Vasilyevich, born 12 March 1957, trade union worker; Vorgashor.
142. Potishnyy, Vladimir Vasilyevich, born 15 May 1956, public figure; Vorkuta.
143. Samoylovich, Vadim Viktorovich, born 12 October 1940, entrepreneur; Cherepovets.

144. Tedeyev, Valeriy Lavrentyevich, born 20 May 1954, entrepreneur; Moscow.
145. Smirnov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich, born 2 August 1953, entrepreneur; Samara.
146. Vostrikov, Anatoliy Sergeyevich, born 28 May 1941, doctor of technical sciences, professor; Novosibirsk.
147. Kim, Igor Vladimirovich, born 12 January 1966, chairman of the Board of Directors of the "Unikom" Firm; Novosibirsk.
148. Pollyyeva, Dzhakhan Radzhepovna, born 15 April 1960, adviser to a vice premier of Russia; Moscow.
149. Smirnov, Anatoliy Vasilyevich, born 4 December 1957, journalist-political scientist; Moscow.
150. Mukhutdinova, Kadriya Vagapovna, born 4 August 1948, leading engineer; Moscow.
151. Tabunshchikov, Yuriy Mikhaylovich, born 18 February 1947, scientific associate; Moscow.
152. Bolshova, Svetlana Arnoldovna, born 11 July 1957, engineer; Moscow.
153. Zharkova, Larisa Lvovna, born 12 August 1958, engineer; Moscow.

Economic Issues

Shokhin, Volskiy Address Industrialists Meeting

Shokhin Urges Protectionism

LD1611160693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1339 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Russian Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin said that "sensible protectionism and support for" domestic producers would be one of the government's key priorities. He was speaking at the Congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Manufacturers [Entrepreneurs] in Moscow on Tuesday [16 November].

He says such support will be provided through implementing tangible financial and crediting policies. The government will be prepared to make use of "the mechanisms of export policy" to prop up and provide credits to Russian export producers both in the civilian and military sector.

"We must not allow our competitors to fill in the gap forming after the break up of the former Soviet Union," the Russian official said. The government, which is working hard to try to get trade barriers to Russian exports lifted, has made some progress, he said. Shokhin stressed that he and Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray had both stayed away from Russia's Choice Alliance to try to prevent Communists from staging a comeback. In his view, if the reforms are carried out with abandon and in an abrupt way, the leftist groups are likely to come in office in a democratic way as they recently did elsewhere.

He named Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin among those who support the Party of Russian Unity and Concord.

Shokhin hopes for a democratic majority to be formed in the new parliament so as to ensure the continuity of the government's economic policy.

Shokhin Urges Continuing Reform

LD1611161793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1342 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow November 16 TASS—The reforms underway in Russia should be continued, but it is important not to surpass some parameters, one of them unemployment level, Aleksandr Shokhin, the Russian deputy premier, told a congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.

He said the level of hidden unemployment in Russia has now reached six to seven million people. If it assumes an undisguised state, some regions of the country will turn into social disaster area, he said.

Shokhin also noted that a stable democratic majority should form in the future government, and that extreme viewpoints should be discarded. In addition, Shokhin believes that when the parliament begins working, the present government should raise the question of the vote of confidence in itself and thus define its social base. Shokhin expressed the hope the government will continue to function with some adjustment of the course and changes in its composition.

Regarding cooperation of the election bloc the Civic Union for Stability, Justice and Progress and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, Shokhin said this cooperation is based on the similarity of the economic platforms of the two associations.

Volskiy Criticizes Government

LD1611135293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1123 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] The Russian economy "has become hostage to politics" and, "what is most dangerous, the whole country is becoming a hostage to political ambitions," Arkadiy Volskiy, leader of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE) said in opening the congress of that organization Tuesday.

He said that starting with 1991 the key positions in the Russian government were occupied by "monetaristically trained senior researchers while those who have real knowledge of production have been kept out of it." Things improved somewhat when Viktor Chernomyrdin became prime minister but "monetarists are still trying to take over."

He said that the gross domestic product of Russia from January to October 1993 fell by 15 percent and the industrial production by 17 percent in the same period of last year, processing industries being worst affected.

RUIE experts believe that the 1993 production will not exceed 53 to 55 percent of the 1189 level.

Volskiy criticized the government for giving top priority to the setting up of a market economy while neglecting the social protection of the population. As a result, according to RUIE statistics, every fourth Russian lives below the poverty line and 10 Mn "are in a critical situation."

Volskiy said that industrialists and entrepreneurs should take part in the elections for they "cannot afford losing the political lobbying channel." The federal list of the Civic Union bloc included 184 candidates and 86 candidates of the bloc will run in single-mandate districts. Only 19 percent of the federal list are Muscovites, which is much lower than in federal lists of other blocs.

He described participation of numerous government ministers in the Russia's Choice bloc as the return to the "Stalin-Brezhnev practices" when "the same people wrote legislation, chose to abide by it or otherwise, and supervised compliance with the law."

Results Viewed

MK1711103093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 17 Nov 93 p 3

[Nikolay Podlipskiy, Sergey Viktorov report: "Congress of the Union of Industrialists. Arkadiy Volskiy Tries To Prolong the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs' Political Life"]

[Text] Judging from the results of the Fifth Congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs [RUIE], which took place yesterday, the desire of members of Russia's industrial establishment to find its niche in the political spectrum of the electoral campaign was not crowned with success. Analysis of a program presented by Arkadiy Volskiy showed that its essence boiled down to economic rhetoric with which RUIE leaders are trying to postpone the date of the organization's final departure from the political scene. Although the program contains pointedly harsh criticisms of the government's economic policy, the document does not call for an actual change of course—for instance for dropping the goal of financial stabilization.

According to the program authors' claims, it differs fairly substantially from the current government course. Whereas the government, by pursuing its monetarist financial policy, has effectively contributed to "turning Russia into a raw-materials appendix of the developed countries," the union is emphasizing on the "revival of the domestic industry" and the stimulation of investment activity. Such statements give grounds to expect from the program drastically new measures that are essentially different from everything currently being done by the government. But, paradoxically, the document contains few such measures. What can be counted among them are, first, the union's intention "to increase that share of the market controlled by domestic enterprises" by artificially maintaining low prices (compared with world prices) of energy resources and some raw materials. Second, it calls for a wide use of beneficial credits, which were recently abolished by the Chernomyrdin cabinet, to be allocated by the Central Bank (in another section, however, the program says that this will be done by the government). Third, it proposes that a price ceiling be established by negotiating agreements between commodity producers and the state (this proposal is only relatively new, however—it has also been considered by the current government). As for the rest, the program is virtually similar to policies pursued by the government of which Arkadiy Volskiy has been so critical. In similar fashion, it proposes that financial backing given to enterprises be confined to priority sectors, to which food, consumer goods, and services production should be assigned. In addition, it was proposed to promote the circulation of promissory notes, enterprise bankruptcies [as published], and export liberalization.

Arkadiy Volskiy also shares the government's orientation toward financial stabilization—he proposes to achieve it by strengthening the ruble's exchange rate and taking consistent monetary measures. "Tentative figures" for the struggle against inflation virtually do not differ from what has been announced by the government. For instance, the program announces the intention "to bring the inflation rate down to 10 percent in the near future and later to 4 to 7 percent." On a number of points, ironically, in his program Arkadiy Volskiy went even further than Boris Fedorov. The program calls for financing the entire budget deficit by issuing government securities (whereas Boris Fedorov was forced to limit himself to proposing that only 800 billion rubles out of the 5.2-trillion budget deficit be covered this way in the fourth quarter of this year). Another fact worth noting is the promise to impose "tight restrictions should the real threat of an explosive increase in inflation rates emerge."

Hence, an analysis of Arkadiy Volskiy's economic program makes it possible to conclude that its authors intended not so much to work out an actual economic reform strategy (the document effectively fails to explain how financial stabilization can be combined with "the revival of industry"), but rather to declare the RUIE's willingness to heed the interests of all those who are disgruntled with the government. In other words, the document's economic essence is secondary to purely political purposes. From this point of view, what may at first sight seem a paradoxical alliance between the Agrarian Union and the RUIE should not come as a surprise. The Scientific-Industrial Union, which was set up in 1990 (renamed the RUIE), originally represented Russia's industrial establishment, whose interests have always been opposed to those of the agro-industrial sector. This is why the alliance between the recent opponents may only be interpreted as the RUIE's desire to jump on a powerful "locomotive" in the form of an Agrarian Union that would be capable of bringing RUIE deputies into the parliament. In a way, the Agrarian Union also stands to benefit from creating this bloc—it has procured Arkadiy Volskiy's charisma for a song (something Agrarian Union leaders have so far failed to

produce on their own) and an economic program that is at least compiled within a single document, which should appeal to the voters.

[Article includes the following boxed passage]

Commentary by Policy Department

The Fifth Congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs is noteworthy for the fact that, unlike previous congresses, it was not attended by the Russian president or the prime minister. Arkadiy Volskiy, the union's president, said that this happened "because of purely protocol-related matters"—due to Boris Yeltsin's departure for Tula. It seems, however, that this is not quite so—apparently, the top Russian leaders consider the RUIE a force that has little prospects for the future, as does Civic Union as a whole. The government was represented at the congress by Aleksandr Shokhin, who addressed the audience also as a leader of the Party for Russian Unity and Accord. He said that his party's views were close to those of the Civic Union for Stability, Justice, and Progress (which was founded by the RUIE). The deputy prime minister's presence is attributable rather to the fact that the Party for Russian Unity and Accord, which claims to be at the center of the political spectrum, has been trying to win Civic Union's support, although the latter's authority has sagged, particularly after Nikolay Travkin's party left it and Aleksandr Rutskoy was arrested.

The Civic Union for Stability, Justice, and Progress' chances in the upcoming parliamentary elections are fairly slim, among other things because of the incoherence of its economic program. If the bloc manages to forge cooperation with the Russian Agrarian Party and the Party for Russian Unity and Accord, however, the chances of its candidates will improve.

Arkadiy Volskiy himself is apparently also aware of Civic Union's weakness. It is too early to bury the union, however—given Arkadiy Volskiy's skills in behind-the-scenes maneuvering and organizing. Known for his adroitness in creating or transforming various political associations, he is intent on converting a number of existing organizations into an Industrial Party. Evidently, it will be a better structured and less amorphous organization than Civic Union. Yesterday, the congress elected Volskiy chairman of the organizing committee tasked with making preparations for a "unification and constituent congress," scheduled for the second half of December.

Cabinet Issues Decree on Economic Stabilization

PM1711112793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Nov 93 First Edition p 4

[Decree No. 1152 of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government, dated Moscow, 6 November 1993 and signed by V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government: "On the Socioeconomic Situation in the Russian Federation and Measures To Implement the First Stage of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government Program for 1993-1995 'Developing Reforms and Stabilizing the Russian Economy'"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government notes that, in the prevailing sociopolitical situation, opportunities have emerged to further democratize society, preserve and strengthen statehood, secure civil accord, and accelerate the implementation of reforms. In these conditions, the responsibility of the federal government and of organs of executive power in components of the Russian Federation for resolving economic and social questions is considerably enhanced.

The Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government confirms the immutability of its course of transformations outlined in the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government program for 1993-1995 "Developing Reforms and Stabilizing the Russian Economy" (hereinafter "the government program") in the sphere of budgetary, money-credit, pricing, and structural policy, in the sphere of social and labor relations, the agrarian sector, and in foreign economic activity.

The measures envisaged by the government program are designed to overcome the negative trends in the socioeconomic sphere evident in the results of work in January-September 1993. Compared with the same period last year, produced national income has dropped 15 percent, while industrial production has fallen 16.5 percent, industrial enterprises' and construction organizations' debts have risen to total 11.3 trillion rubles, the pace of privatization at major and medium enterprises has slowed down, and it has not proved possible to raise the population's standard of living.

With a view to creating the requisite conditions to accelerate economic and social reforms this year and begin work in an organized fashion in 1994, the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government decrees that:

1. Central organs of federal executive power and organs of executive power in components of the Russian Federation, guided by the proposals made by Russian President B.N. Yeltsin at the 2 November 1993 session of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government, must concentrate their efforts on the consistent implementation of reform, primarily paying attention to ensuring citizens' rights and social guarantees, developing market methods of economic regulation, securing financial stabilization, and implementing a more flexible regional policy.

2. The basic provisions of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government action plan for 1993-1994 to implement the first stage of the program "Developing Reform and Stabilizing the Economy" (hereinafter "the action plan"), approved at the 2 November 1993 session of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government, should be adopted.

The Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy (Ye.T. Gaydar) and the Working Center for Economic Reforms under the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government (S.A. Vasilyev) must update the action plan taking into consideration the comments and proposals received and submit it to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government by 15 November 1993.

3. Organs of executive power in republics within the Russian Federation, krays, oblasts, autonomous formations, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg are instructed, when formulating regional socioeconomic development programs, to take the action plan as guidance.

4. The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance and the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy must formulate the Russian Federation republic budget for 1994 taking the government program into consideration.

5. Ye.T. Gaydar, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government, and B.G. Fedorov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government, must set up within one week a working group to formulate the normative base and adopt the measures necessary to implement the Russian president's edict No. 1662 of 19 October 1993 "On Improving Settlements in the Economy and Enhancing Responsibility for Their Timely Implementation."

6. During the fourth quarter of 1993 the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance must repay as much as possible of the Russian republic budget's indebtedness to enterprises and organizations in the atomic industry as well as arrears in the funding of the state defense order.

7. The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy, the Russian Federation State Taxation Service, and the Russian Federation Tax Police Department must formulate, with the participation of interested ministries and departments, and submit within two weeks to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government proposals for amendments to the Russian Federation tax system, which envisage reducing the level of inflation, creating incentives for investment activity, changing the allocation of revenue from taxes, payments, and duties between the Russian Federation and components of the Federation, and ensuring full payments of taxes and other payments.

8. The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, jointly with the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy, must submit to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government proposals to intensify monitoring of the targeted use of centralized credit resources and their repayment within the prescribed timeframes.

9. The Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property must submit to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government by 1 December 1993 a draft state program for the privatization of state and municipal enterprises within the Russian Federation, coordinated with the interested ministries and departments, and organs of executive power in components of the Russian Federation.

10. The Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property, the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance must draft, jointly with interested ministries and departments and organs of executive power in components of the Russian Federation, and submit to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government a list of enterprises that will be under direct state management in 1994-1995.

11. The Russian Federation Ministry of Justice, the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance must formulate, jointly with interested ministries and departments and organs of executive power in components of the Russian Federation, and submit to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government by 1 January 1994 a list of legislative and other normative acts needed for the implementation of socioeconomic transformations in 1994.

12. The Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy and the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance must prepare, with the involvement of the Russian Academy of Sciences and other scientific establishments, and submit to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government by 15 December 1993 proposals to improve the system of central organs of federal executive power, with a view to reducing the size of the government apparatus and transferring some functions to organs of executive power in components of the Russian Federation.

13. The Russian Federation Federal Employment Service, the Russian Federation Ministry of Labor, and the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy, jointly with interested ministries, departments, and organs of executive power in components of the Russian Federation, must comprehensively study issues pertaining to the employment of the population, including the preparation of forecasts regarding changes in the labor market in connection with measures for the structural reorganization of the economy and financial stabilization and with investment and conversion programs.

The Russian Federation Federal Employment Service, the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Labor, jointly with interested ministries and departments and with the participation of organs of executive power in components of the Russian Federation, must prepare by 1 January 1994 a draft Russian federal employment program for 1994.

14. The Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy, the Russian Federation State Committee for Industrial Policy, the Russian Federation State Committee for Anti-Monopoly Policy and Support of the New Economic Structures, the Russian Federation Ministry of

Finance, the Working Center for Economic Reforms under the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government, and the Council for the Development of Enterprise under the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government must submit to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government by 1 February 1994 a program for the development of and state support for small enterprises, formulated jointly with interested ministries and departments.

15. The Russian Federation Ministry of Social Protection of the Population, the Russian Federation Ministry of Labor, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance must submit to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government proposals on increasing social support for specific population groups, including higher social subsidies and compensatory payments to families with children.

16. The Russian Federation Ministry of Labor, the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, and the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy must submit to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government proposals on raising the minimum wage and monthly wage rate (salary) of Category I of the Unified Wages Network for the Remuneration of Workers in the Budget-Funded Sphere.

17. The Russian Federation Ministry of Justice, jointly with the Russian Federation Ministry of the Social Protection of the Population, the Russian Federation Ministry of Labor, the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy, and the Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property, must expedite the submission to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government of draft normative acts on questions pertaining to the activity of nonstate pension funds.

18. The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, jointly with ministries and departments, must submit to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government proposals regarding the size of insurance contributions to the Russian Federation Pension Fund, the Russian Federation Social Insurance Fund, and the Russian Federation State Employment Fund and mandatory medical insurance in the first half-year of 1994.

19. The Russian Federation State Committee on Issues of Architecture and Construction, the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy, the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice, with the participation of interested ministries and departments, must expedite the submission to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government of normative documents designed to ensure the implementation of the "Housing" State Targeted Program.

20. Organs of executive power of republics within the Russian Federation, krays, oblasts, autonomous formations, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg must urgently take the requisite steps to eliminate obstacles to the movement of goods and services between regions.

21. The Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources, the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, with the participation of interested ministries and departments, must conduct a detailed analysis of the prevailing situation with regard to the implementation of urgent measures to improve the environment in areas of environmental crisis and submit to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government by 15 December 1993 proposals regarding the procedure for funding nature conservation measures in 1994.

22. The Central Bank of the Russian Federation, jointly with the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance and the Russian Federation State Committee for Economic Cooperation with the Commonwealth Member States, must accelerate the preparation of draft intergovernmental agreements on the procedure for carrying out payment-settlement operations between Commonwealth state enterprises.

23. The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy, the Russian Federation State Customs Committee, and the Russian Federation State Committee for Industrial Policy must submit to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government within two months proposals regarding the procedure for regulating foreign trade operations implemented within the framework of agreements on international production sharing, including with CIS member states.

24. The Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy, the Russian Federation State Committee for Statistics, the Russian Federation State Taxation Service, the Russian Federation State Committee for Computer Technology and Information Science, the Economic Conditions Center under the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government, jointly with interested ministries and departments, must submit to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government within two months draft normative acts designed to improve information backup for the economic reforms being implemented.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government.

Yeltsin Takes Economic Control of 'Power Bodies'

MK1711102093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 17 Nov 93 p 1

[Leonid Brodskiy report under "Presidential Business Management Directorate Set Up" rubric: "Parliamentary Affairs Will Be Managed by President's Man"]

[Text] In contrast to the continuing separation of political powers, as of yesterday the economically diverse power branches in Russia have been merged. Under a

presidential order, a precedent has been set for consolidating the economic services of the supreme state power bodies: his administration's Main Socio-Production Directorate has been reorganized as the president's Business Management Directorate [BMD], whose tasks include financial, technical, and social maintenance of the Russian political Olympus. A state body has thereby been created whose annual budget approximates 1 trillion rubles.

The directorate has been made responsible for the entire economic sphere of activity by the president's administration, the Council of Ministers, the future Federal Assembly, the Constitutional Court, and the Supreme and the Higher Arbitration Courts of Russia. The relevant economic structures of these state institutions have been placed under the control of Pavel Borodin, the president's business manager [upravlyayushchiy delami].

Pavel Borodin, 47, before being elected Russian people's deputy in 1990, was chairman of the Yakutsk City Executive Committee. Until 1993 he was mayor of Yakutsk and was later appointed acting chief of the Main Socio-Production Directorate in the president's administration. Since 15 November he has been the president's business manager.

From an economic point of view, the Presidential Business Management Directorate emerges as an effective actor in the market for financial, construction, and other services because its functions include the placement of various economic orders. All contracts on construction and maintenance of real estate under the jurisdiction of the supreme power bodies and the leasing of their premises as of now are to be executed only in coordination with the new directorate.

It is more interesting to analyze the presidential order from a political point of view. Quite obviously, placing the financial and economic services of all the supreme state bodies under a person appointed by the president and formally remaining a member of the president's administration—although with the status of an independent entity—sharply limits the economic independence of the nonpresidential structures. Although formally no logical conclusion can be made from this that the political boundary between them has been obliterated, nonetheless, it is not ruled out that in the very near future Russian society will have to provide an answer to the question about the possibility of economic pressure being exerted on state institutions with the aim of forcing a change in their political position—in other words, to put to yet another test Vladimir Ulyanov's thesis that "politics is a concentrated expression of economics."

[Article is accompanied by following boxed passage]

From the regulations on the Russian President's Business Management Directorate

The Business Management Directorate is an independent structural subdivision of the president's administration.

The BMD provides services for the presidential administration, the Council of Ministers-the government, the Federal Assembly, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the Higher Arbitration Court, and also the personnel of these bodies' apparatuses.

The directorate provides financial, material, technical, social, and everyday services to the bodies in question; public catering in official premises; conditions for recreation in sanitariums in its charge, and the construction of residential housing.

The directorate provides the personnel of the bodies in question with motor transportation facilities and housing and supplies of foodstuffs and basic consumer goods.

The directorate is headed by the business manager appointed by the Russian president.

Reorganization and abolition of the directorate is effected by the Russian president.

Yeltsin Amends Earlier 'Freedom of Trade' Edict

PM1711125993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Nov 93 First Edition p 4

[Edict No. 1851 of the Russian Federation president "On Additional Measures To Implement the Russian Federation President's Edict 'On Freedom of Trade,'" signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin and dated Moscow, The Kremlin, 8 November 1993]

[Text] With a view to strengthening the protection of citizens' rights, I decree:

1. The following amendments are made to the Russian Federation president's edict No. 65 of 29 January 1992 "On Freedom of Trade" (Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Gazette 1992, No. 6, Article 290; No. 26, Article 1509):

In Paragraph 1, after the words "medicinal remedies", include the words "travel tickets;"

In Paragraph 4, after the words "subway stations", include the words "airports, passenger ships and trains, and stations."

2. The Russian Federation Ministry of Transport, the Russian Federation Ministry of Railways, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs are to take additional measures to eliminate the existing shortcomings in the organization of the sale of tickets to passengers and to terminate abuses during their sale.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin
[Dated] Moscow, The Kremlin, 8 November 1993

Government Meeting on Budget Canceled Again

LD1711091793 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 16 Nov 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Today, for the second time, discussion of the draft budget for 1993, put forward for consideration by the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, was canceled. The draft outlined a proportional reduction of all expenditure by 20 percent. It seems that the budget discussion is being protracted deliberately, because, as Chernomyrdin put it, the issue might detonate the country.

It is a well-known problem: How is one to take account of everyone's interests and prevent hyperinflation; how is one to hang on to a minimal budget deficit? The former Supreme Soviet failed to adopt a budget for this year on more than one occasion, citing the fact that the government had not taken account of the interests of all strata in society. To all appearances, the struggle today is taking place inside the government itself. There is no parliament, but the different interests have remained.

In short, the budget session of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers will be tense. It ought to show the balance of forces within the government and reveal the political weight of the sectoral lobbies.

State-Run Export Agencies To Be Privatized

LD1611220193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1908 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] The State Property Committee and the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations are drawing up plans to privatize the ministry's export agencies, whose share in the country's total foreign revenues of $38 Bn ran at $12.3 Bn in 1992. Their imports reached $14.3 Bn out of Russia's total of $35 Bn. However, no word is given of when the scheme is to be implemented.

Ministry experts say that agencies which have run routine debts will be privatized first. These include Tekhnostroiexport, Soyuztranzit, Rostekhexport, Roskomagentsvo, Vneshintorg, Stroikomplektexport and regional associations.

The government is expected to hold back to the controlling package of and approve separate resolutions on export companies such as Nafta-Moskva and Raznoimport engaged in exports of crude oil and aluminium respectively. However, the arms exporters will remain under complete government control if converted into share-holding companies.

Senior ministry expert Sergey Golubyev says that large financial-industrial groups formed on the basis of industrial plants with a complete production cycle must play a higher role in privatizing the export agencies. Ministry experts say state-run export agencies must become part of the financial and mining conglomerates to cover anything from production to exports.

The ministry says that four out of 38 foreign trade agencies have now begun to convert themselves into share-holding companies. In the meantime, many of the import and export agencies are in arrears which experts say must be cleared by the state. The ministry puts the agencies' combined debt to foreign partners at $4.5 Bn.

Central Bank President on Inflation, Deficit

LD1611191093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1705 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] The country's annual inflation rate may run at 900-1000% this year, President of the Central Bank of Russia Viktor Gerashenko told the Congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Manufacturers in Moscow on Tuesday.

He said the Finance Ministry went wrong by about Rbs 1 Tn in its final estimate of the 1993 budget deficit by putting it at Rbs 17.6 Tn. But the deficit will run at more than Rbs 18 Tn if all government spending is reckoned, Gerashenko said.

In his words, the ministry is also Rbs 7 Tn short in revenues because of planning profits for the final quarter of the year at the same amount as for the past six months which put together brings the deficit to more than Rbs 20 Tn.

Such a deficit must be due to poor accounting rather than the former parliament, Gerashenko said. The CBR President says that in the absence of funds, no investment can be raised from the budget. But there will be no money without higher output and an increase in the budget's revenue part.

On foreign borrowing to raise investment funds, Gerashenko said that with the economic situation and internal legislation such as they were now, foreign investors would be reluctant to take risks unless the government "comes up with a well-conceived policy aimed at investment incentives."

On public borrowing, the CBR president said that personal savings were far too low while resource-rich commercial structures would be reluctant to invest in the absence of investment guidelines or restructuring the government's investment policy.

"The choice is yours and that of your workers' bodies," Gerashenko said addressing the country's managerial corps. The CBR President spoke of being averse to being sucked into any political gambling though he said in passing: "God forbid if Russia follows Russia's Choice."

Savings Bank Denies Plan To Tax Interest

PM1711100393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Report by Vladimir Kucherenko: "Russian Savings Bank Denies 'Vesti' Report"]

[Text] The report in "Vesti's" 14 November program that the revenue of savings bank investors will be subject to a 15-percent tax has caused real confusion among citizens. Here television cited Russian Federation Savings Bank President Oleg Yashin.

In a talk with your ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent, a bank spokesman stated that Yashin had made no such statements. He said that the notorious tax on the interest on savings is an initiative from the

Ministry of Finance and the Savings Bank has an extremely negative attitude toward this. He refrained from comment, noting that this question should be examined at a session of the Council of Ministers devoted to questions of the budget for 1994. That is today, 16 November.

In turn "Vesti" cites the fact that it got the information from INTERFAX.

It must be noted that today the Savings Bank is the country's largest credit and finance institution working with the money of ordinary investors. In contrast to other commercial banks, the Savings Bank retains the semblance of state status. It is through this bank that the government has implemented and intends to implement the indexing of the population's savings using centralized financing from the budget. Other banks anxious to attract citizens' money do not have this support. So it is not out of the question that the "Vesti" report could in that way play into the hands of some financial circles eager to take custom from the Savings Bank.

Documents Required To Exchange Old Bank Notes

PM1711120193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

["Own information" report: "Old Bank Notes: Anyone Who Has Not Had Time Is Too Late"]

[Text] Considering that all Bank of Russia bank notes of the 1992 model with a face value of 5,000-10,000 rubles issued on the territory of the Russian Federation have all reached Russian Federation Central Bank institutions in the course of exchange, as of 16 November these bank notes are not being exchanged.

In connection with continuing attempts to exchange large sums in old bank notes, the Central Bank main administration for Moscow City considers it essential to issue a reminder that they can be exchanged only by individuals who have not managed to do so before 31 August this year. The Central Bank has established a clear procedure for exchange wit a view to ruling out machinations.

Russian Federation citizens anxious to exchange old bank notes from 1961-1992 must without fail submit documents to prove the objective reasons why they were unable to exchange the money within the allotted period. The Central Bank demands that documents be submitted without fail to confirm the dates these sums were acquired. If there is any doubt as to the authenticity of the documents, they are checked locally with the participation of law enforcement organs.

Citizens of the states of nearby foreign parts who come to the Russian Federation to take up permanent residence, for business trips, leisure, medical treatment, study, and so forth must have with them currency which is exchanged by banking institutions within the established procedure. In this case rubles in cash cannot be exchanged except for people with refugee status.

Paper Reports Shortfall in Grain Harvest

PM1711104393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Valeriy Konovalov report: "Peasants Get Opportunity To Sell Grain Abroad"]

[Text] Even the most modest forecasts concerning this year's grain harvest have proved, in the end, overoptimistic. Not 125 million tonnes, as the deputy prime minister for agrarian affairs promised, nor even 105 million tonnes, as his opponents were predicting, but just 95.7 million tonnes of grain have been harvested from Russian fields, the yield stands at 18.9 quintals per hectare, and reaping is already practically over.

The final official figures will hardly differ greatly from the aforementioned. A tiny bit extra is possible from the fields which still have to be harvested. But, on the other hand, the statistical so-called barn weight of the harvest is always some 5-7 percent less than that originally entered, which is the figure at present. In either event, it is obvious that the present harvest is considerably below last year's and below all forecasts.

This difference is so considerable that some commentators have even assumed the possibility of a mass understating of the gross grain yield indicators by local authorities so as to avoid taxes. But Aleksandr Klepikov, chief of a "Roskhleboprodukt" department, believes that such assumptions are hardly well founded. It is not just that it is very difficult to conceal millions of tonnes of grain to prevent their being recorded and that, according to all reckonings, the advantage of such operations is extremely dubious; it is above all else a fact that, unfortunately, a specialists' analysis confirms the scale of the harvest losses, which is precisely comparable with the gap between the forecasts and the actual grain yield.

Not that even this result is catastrophic or threatens serious trouble in the food supply. Thus, grain purchases for state resources are shaping up quite successfully. In all, approximately 26 million tonnes of grain have already been bought into the federal fund and the regional funds, including approximately 12 million tonnes into the federal fund, as planned. The delivery of grain into state resources is continuing, despite the fact that the peasants are not getting any money for the grain. "Roskhleboprodukt's" debt to the grain producers has already reached 900 billion rubles, but the procurement corporation is not getting the promised loans and is unable to settle up with the country folk. The grain producers either still hope that the debt will be repaid or else do not have suitable grain storage and processing facilities and have been forced to supply grain on credit.

It is proposed to liberalize the grain trade and to free it from monopolism by means of a presidential edict, which, so we have learned, has already been prepared and will be signed by Yeltsin in two or three days' time.

It is proposed to carry out a complete flotation of the "Roskhleboprodukt" corporation, which, incidentally, will remain the state's main contractor. The possibility of selling grain abroad is also opening up for Russian peasants now.

Agrarian Scientists 'Worried' by 'Crisis'

PM1711114993 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 2

[ITAR-TASS report: "Academicians Worried About Future of Countryside"]

[Text] A group of agricultural economists has sent a letter to Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin and Government Chairman Viktor Chernomyrdin which, in particular, draws attention to the "catastrophic deterioration of the economic and social situation in the agrarian sector." The letter was signed by six academicians of the Russian Academy of Agricultural Scientists and by six corresponding members.

"The ongoing reform of agriculture and of the agro-industrial complex as a whole is not resulting in any positive changes," the group of scientists believes. Moreover, they claim, the "agrarian sector is in very deep crisis." According to the writers of the letter, a fundamental review is needed of the state's attitude toward the agro-industrial complex. "It is time we realized," the document says, "that without the steady development of the agrarian sphere the normal functioning of the national economy cannot be ensured and the growing social tension in the country cannot be relieved."

Economic Ministry Releases Import, Export Data

LD1611231293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1334 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow, 16 Nov (BUSINESS-TASS)—The volume of Russia's exports is more than double its imports. In January-October 1993 the Russian Federation's exports amounted to $31,409,700,000, which was very slightly less than last year's level. Russia's imports at $15,508,800,000 were almost half the level in the corresponding period of 1992. The BUSINESS-TASS correspondent learned this in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Links (MVES) of the Russian Federation.

The industrially developed countries remain the major purchasers of Russian goods, with a volume of $23,253,100,000, which is six percent higher than in the first 10 months of 1992. The most dynamic growth was in exports to the developing countries, which amounted to $4,427,300,000, an increase of 33 percent.

The overall reduction in imports affected almost all groups of states. The exceptions were imports from China, DPRK, Laos and Yugoslavia, which increased overall by three percent ($2,119,500,000). Imports from the industrially developed countries fell by 49 percent and amounted to $9,432,000,000. Imports from the developing countries fell by 42 percent ($2,156,600,000). Exports to the former countries of the CEMA, China, Laos, DPRK, Yugoslavia and the Baltic countries declined by comparison with the same period last year. Exports to the former countries of the CEMA amounted to $5,348,500,000; exports to China, DPRK, Laos and Yugoslavia amounted to $2,565,600,000; exports to the Baltic countries amounted to $242,500,000.

Purchases by the Russian side from the former CEMA countries in the January-October period amounted to $1,718,200,000 (the decline in the first 10 months of 1992 was in excess of 60 percent); purchases from the Baltic countries fell by $82,500,000 (a fall of 69 percent).

Military & Space Issues

Most of Military Doctrine Declassified

MK1711112093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 17 Nov p 4

[Report by Ilya Bulavinov: "Russian Military Doctrine Documents Declassified. Priority Given to Military Cooperation With CIS Countries"]

[Text] In a news briefing at Russia's Security Council yesterday, journalists, not only asked questions that interested them, but also received what is practically the complete text of "The Main Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation." Earlier, it was proposed to make public only separate provisions of the document, which was resented by both Russian publications and Russia's foreign partners. The document declassified yesterday lacked one and a half pages of the original text in order, as a Security Council staffer put it, "not to excite the public."

The safeguarding of the military security of Russia and of its vital interests in the internal political sphere has been made directly conditional on the solution of economic, political, and social problems, as well as on a successful implementation of reforms. Security, in the foreign policy aspect, according to the document, depends first and foremost on the state of relations with the immediate neighbors and the leading powers.

Included in the list of the main sources of outside threat are attempts to interfere in the internal affairs and destabilization of the internal political situation in Russia, attacks on Russian Army military installations on the territory of foreign states, and the suppression of the rights and legitimate interests of citizens of Russia abroad. Such classification of these provisions attests to the seriousness of Russia's intentions in the matter of protecting its national interests.

Cooperation with CIS member countries in questions of coordination of military policy and organizational development of defense has been proclaimed as a priority with the objective of maintaining peace and security. The doctrine proposes participation of the Russian Army in international peacekeeping operations. Acting in them, the armed forces shall separate the conflicting sides, facilitate humanitarian aid supplies and evacuation of

the population, as well as blockade the conflict region to insure the fulfillment of international sanctions.

The main principles of military organizational development are the observance of universal civil rights and freedoms of servicemen, centralization of military leadership and unity of command, and amenability of the organs of military leadership to government control. Priority importance is attached to the development of mobile and other forces capable of being transferred on short notice, of deployment and conduct of mobile operations in any sector. The armed forces are also assigned the task of preparing themselves for redeployment to threatened sectors in the minimum time possible. The conduct of both defensive and offensive operations is called for. They shall select the forms, methods, and means of warfare that are most conducive for seizing the initiative and defeating the aggressor.

Thus, the Russian Armed Forces have at long last received a document in accordance with which they can shape their policy in various spheres. The military has succeeded in including in the doctrine provisions which should, in their opinion, make for a more effective employment of the army. The earlier doctrinal principles on the nonuse of nuclear weapons and on nonconduct of offensive operations on enemy territory have been excluded; the numerical strength of the army shall depend on the concrete situation rather than to be artificially restrained by its correlation in percentage points with the population. Taking center stage now is the problem of implementation of the principles incorporated in the doctrine, which depends on more than the military.

Aspects of New Military Doctrine Questioned

PM1711103793 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 2

[Article by Igor Saltykov under the rubric "Confidential": "Doctrine or Dictatorship?"]

[Text] Two highway signs have appeared in the way of Russia's election movements. One of them prohibits a number of public organizations from participating in the race for deputies' seats and requires no explanation. The other prevents attempts to cause conflicts and pressure by forces both without and within. It is the military doctrine. Its objective is defensive, but it incorporates essentially global tasks not only for the Armed Forces, but also for the internal troops and even special-purpose militia detachments.

I would point out that it is difficult to make an objective judgment of the full content of the doctrine. The 23 and ½ page document is not for publication. There have been only two press conferences, which, unfortuantely, have given rise to some contradictory interpretations of the doctrine in the press. But since Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev has not only described the doctrine, but has also read out some of its articles, we will rely on his comments.

Minister Pavel Grachev stressed that the military doctrine is based on a new concept of the country's security and stems from the state's actual political, economic, and military potential. The document is structured accordingly. Even the concise account shows that the volume of specific questions is very large. So we will dwell on the problems that affect national interests.

Nuclear Forces: Shield or Sword? [subhead]

A number of publications at home and abroad have posited nuclear threats on Russia's part. But the political part of the doctrine states: "The aim of Russian policy is to eliminate the dangers of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons by deterring people from unleashing aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies. The Russian Federation will not use its nuclear weapons against any state that is party to the 1 July 1968 nuclear nonproliferation treaty and that does not possess nuclear weapons."

The position is absolutely clear, seemingly. But the minister went on to read out two exceptions, cases where Russia might resort to nuclear defense. First, if attacked by a state that is linked by an agreement to the possessors of a nuclear sword. And, in particular, in the event of a joint invasion by them.

It was these reservations that caused if not panic, then at least doubts. The press audience remembered that in the "red" doctrine a nuclear counterstrike was merely a response to an enemy's attempt to use such weapons. Is Russia not threatening now to unsheathe this sword? Pavel Grachev had to explain three times. The gist of the explanations was as follows.

No one followed the Soviet Union's example. None of the nuclear powers' doctrines has a clear stance on the nonuse of superweapons until forced to retaliate. So the essential idea behind the Russian doctrine is that of preventing danger, turning nuclear weapons into weapons of deterrence. And the unsanctioned use of nulear weapons by Russia is so securely blocked that no one, not even the president, would be able deliver a crushing strike alone, off his own bat.

Unfortunately, there was no mention of the fact that a preemptive [operezhayushchiy] nuclear strike is tantamount to suicide. But, sad to say, there is an argument for preemption [preduprezhdeniye]. Indeed, the Soviet Union had the Warsaw Pact to rely on when it was upholding peace on earth. But Russia is alone in its love of peace at the moment. So the reminder about nuclear retribution for attempting to impose battles on earth provides a great deal of food for thought: Attack or refrain from attacking. Well, it is time we had a clearer idea about who we are and where we are, who is for us and who is against us.

Going Over Old Ground

In his account of the doctrine's theses the minister described the use of the Armed Forces in local and regional conflicts as their main purpose. They are rather

new and unusual terms. He was asked to clarify. Do you mean disorder on a grand scale or civil war?

By way of explanation Pavel Grachev read out the doctrine's interpretations: "In order to prevent or stop internal conflicts or other actions involving the use of means of armed violence on the territory of the Russian Federation that threaten its territorial integrity and society's and Russian citizens' other interests (?!) internal affairs organs and Russian Federation Internal Affairs Ministry internal troops are given the following tasks:

...providing protection, localizing, blocking, and stopping armed clashes, carrying out disarmament measures, intensifying the protection of public order, conducting searches and investigations." Further on it says: "Certain formations of the Armed Forces and other Russian Federation forces can be drafted in to assist internal affairs organs and Russian Federation Internal Affairs Ministry internal troops..." The minister explained that the president now gives approval for the "use of certain subunits," and once the State Duma is elected these functions will fall to it.

Read it again. Dumbfounded? For the first time in the history of Russia, no matter what guise it has appeared in: empire, Soviet Union, or young Federation—I repeat, for the first time militia forces have been incorporated in the military doctrine. The police did not participate even at the front in World War I, even in the civil war battles. But that is not what the doctrine envisages. The Army is being turned into a militia reserve. Remember now, soldier: You will be ordered to localize, block, stop. Don't believe it? Listen to the defense minister's comments:

"The events of 3-4 October made it possible to define a new task for certain units and subunits of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, in the sphere of using them, including on the territory of Russia, in conjunction with subunits of the internal troops and militia...to tackle tasks that can be described not in terms of stopping disorder on a grand scale, but in terms of immediately localizing potential armed conflicts within the state."

The sentence is a complicated one, but the meaning is crystal clear: The idea of a "certain unit" means "any," consequently, "every" unit. Moreover, the minister went on to say that the doctrine provides for the creation of mobile forces. This will involve airborne assault troops, and the top subunits of other categories will also be assigned to them. In particular, the 27th motorized rifle division from Volgograd and an airborne assault regiment have already been transferred. In fact, external threats are not anticipated at the moment, let alone behind a nuclear shield. Do they sense internal threats, then? Do the authorities fear a revolution? The people remain silent...

Aspects of Defense

The doctrine does not identify the numerical strength of the Armed Forces. The Law on Defense set it at one percent of the total population, Pavel Grachev said. He stressed that this would be right for a compact country. But our state has thousands of kilometers of borders alone to protect. So although army cuts will continue, they will be within reasonable limits.

"Anyway, the military laws that were adopted by the Supreme Soviet at the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993 are riddled with defects," the minister lamented. "They were adopted on the basis of pseudopopulism. They were proposed and approved in the Supreme Soviet by people who were formerly involved with the Army, but had then been discharged, mainly former political officers, political deputy commanders. So we are reviewing all the laws and will be submitting proposed amendments to the new parliament."

So one assumes that the numerical strength of the Armed Forces has not been determined yet, although in most other countries it is clearly declared. On the other hand, data about the size of the military-industrial potential are not mentioned, in accordance with our tradition of secrecy. The only thing that is clearly stated in the doctrine is that the potential is formed by the Council of Ministers, not by the Defense Ministry. Although the whole world knows what number of tanks, aircraft, and other military hardware we must not exceed.

Nothing To Sum Up

This can be judged by two facts. First, a whole group of sections of the doctrine has not been mentioned. It was explained to us that they are not secret, but they are confidential (?!). Second, the minister stressed that the president had approved the document on page one. Yet, in accordance with past traditions and in accordance with world practice, each page is usually ratified. One concludes that many of them can be amended, if necessary.

Let us also consider the fact that the doctrine was under "discussion" for a year, but it was adopted as quick as a flash after the Supreme Soviet was dissolved. Failure to mention a very large number of articles coupled with the provision on the Army's militia duties gives rise to many hypotheses. I heard one of them from various sources:, "Doctrine or dictatorship?"

Space Shuttle Buran Not To Be Used

LD1611215893 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 2000 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] The reusable space ship Buran is to be mothballed and will not be sent into space any more. This was announced today by Yuriy Koptev, the Russian Space Agency director. He said one launch of the similar U.S. space ship shuttle cost $800 million. The expenditure on the launch of a Buran is no less and we cannot afford such expenditure, Yuriy Koptev pointed out.

Space Chief Discusses Use of Cosmodrome

LD1711130993 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0800 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Russia will lose up to 80 percent of the volume of its space program if it loses the possibility of using the

Baykonur Cosmodrome. This statement was made to journalists by Yuriy Koptev, director of the Russian Space Agency. According to him, with the loss of Baykonur Russia will be unable to launch its main rocket Proton which places satellites in orbit.

Regional Affairs

Yeltsin Visits Tula, Discusses Military Conversion

Says Conversion Must Not Weaken Defense

LD1611155993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1532 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Anna Melnikova, Vladimir Gondusov and Valery Rudenko]

[Text] Tula, November 16 (TASS)—"Conversion must not run counter to the interests of the country's defence capability," Russian President Boris Yeltsin Said in Tula today, when addressing a conference of the heads of administration of the Russian Federation's regions on the subject of conversion of defence industries to peaceful pursuits.

The president said that the Tula region was a graphic example of "how fast, within a year or two, the industry can switch to the production of consumer goods". This year the share of peaceful production will amount to two-thirds of the total amount of products manufactured by the defence industries. The president noted that the progress of conversion in Russia, its level and pace cannot be viewed as satisfactory in full measure—about 400 enterprises in the country have been unable to start the realizations of their conversion programmes.

As concerns perspectives of work of the defence sector enterprises, budget allocations for research, development and design projects is due to be nearly doubles soon.

Participants also spoke about arms trade. In this respect, Boris Yeltsin said "one of the central tasks is to gain a firm footing on the world arms market". According to the president, it is expedient to make foreign economic activity of the defence enterprises profitable in economic terms. "The enterprises should have resources to fund their own development and conversion. For this purpose the procedure of sharing the hard currency receipts must be reviewed".

As concerns complaints that too many agencies are now involved in Russia's arms exports, Yeltsin, citing the U.S. experience said "the president must take this up".

"We must think about defence. It is necessary to work out guidelines and stick to them so as not to fall behind the United States and other countries", the president said.

Speaks on Conversion of Plants

LD1611181893 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1700 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Tula Oblast continues. Over to our correspondent Sergey Novikov:

[Novikov] Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin desribed the program of his working visit to Tula Oblast as follows:

[Begin Yeltsin recording] First, Yasnaya Polyana. I have not been here before, and so as a Russian, as president, I am obliged to come here. Second, heads of administration of all republics, krays and oblasts of Russia are gathered to have a look, to get to know each other, and to discuss experience, which there is in Tula Oblast, good experience, in conversion of defense enterprises, as 50 percent of all enterprises which are of a defense nature are now undergoing conversion.

Third, tomorrow, there are military exercises, and the heads of administration will be there. Let them see what our military men are capable of in defending us, Russians. [end recording] [passage omitted]

[Novikov] Later in the day a briefing was given by the president's press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov. The outcome of the conference can be summed up as follows: It is necessary to expand the rights of the enterprises and regions in carrying out economic reforms, in particular, conversion. The granting of the right of direct access to the world market will give the defense plants the opportunity to earn funds by themselves and to spend them on rejigging their plants and output of consumer goods. The state will pay the debt to enterprises of the defense complex and state orders for military output are being kept for 1994.

On 17 November Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin and the heads of administration of all regions of Russia will visit Tula Guards Airborne Division.

Further Yeltsin Comments

LD1611192993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1705 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] During debates on conversion at the factory Shtamp in Tula (a regional center 200 kilometers to the south of Moscow), Russian President Boris Yeltsin emphasized: "We should think about the country's future. We cannot let Russia stay far behind from most advanced countries in the sphere of scientific research and design works."

He asked heads of local administrations and the mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg to personally "follow this process." "We must support the country's defense with the help of brains," said the president. As far as number of armaments is concerned, we need conversion in this sphere, he continued.

Yeltsin specially stressed the necessity to preserve high requirements with respect to civil products produced at

the defense complex enterprises under conversion now. He also proposed to pay special attention to the need to rapidly change the assortment of civilian consumer goods now of restricted demand among consumers. "We cannot go far with samovars," Yeltsin said to this effect.

According to the president, while visiting the Tula air landing forces division he will be dressed in uniform of the commander-in-chief of the Russian armed forces.

During the discussion at the factory Shtamp Yeltsin also drew attention of the heads of the local administrations "to inadequate situation regarding preparation to the elections for the Federal Assembly and referendum scheduled for December 12." He asked the leaders of local administrations to personally monitor these issues." "Everything goes on smoothly in those regions where the control is rather serious," said Yeltsin. "This issue should always remain under control."

St. Petersburg Council Rejects Dissolution

LD1611145693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1315 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Fomicheva]

[Text] St. Petersburg November 16 TASS—The 20th extraodinary session of St. Petersburg municipal council that opened on Tuesday voted against its dissolution. The session was called on the initiative of St. Petersburg mayor Anatoliy Sobchak to terminate the council's activity before its term expires, but it has changed the agenda. As many as 230 deputies out of the 292 present voted against the council's dissolution. It was for the first time in over three years of the council's existence that so many deputies showed up for a session.

Altering the agenda, the deputies of the council decided to discuss the reform of the organs of state authority and the holding simultaneously with election to the Federal Assembly of the population's poll on the merging of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region. After discussing the provisions on the organs of state authority and election to the municipal assembly, the session intends to announce an adjournment till the holding of a referendum on the draft new constitution on December 12.

The extraodinary session of the Leningrad district council lacked 14 votes for the quorum on Tuesday. Under President Yeltsin's decree of October 9, 1993 "on the reform of representative authorities and local government authorities in the Russian Federation", head of the regional administration Aleksandr Belyakov stripped deputies of powers and dissolved the regional council as of November 16. The regional administration will discharge the functions of the representative authorities until the regional duma is elected.

Belyakov decreed that the elections to the regional duma be held on Sunday, March 20, 1994.

Further on Vote

AU1611181893 Paris AFP in English 1759 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By Alexandra Troubnikoff]

[Text] Saint Petersburg, Russia, Nov 16 (AFP)—The St. Petersburg city council, including many supporters of President Boris Yeltsin, voted overwhelmingly Tuesday to defy a month-old Yeltsin decree ordering the dissolution of all municipal councils.

The "Petrosoviet," as the council is known, voted 230 to 14 against dissolving itself and decided to remain in office until elections to a new council, which they decided would be held March 20.

Ther new council will be called a Duma, the pre-revolutionary term that was replaced by the soviet (literally council) under communist rule.

The move was a defeat for Mayor Anatoliy Sobshak, one of the country's foremost reformist politicians, who had backed Yeltsin's decision and expected the council to self-dissolve when he called a special session.

"We were afraid to leave the city in the hands of Sobshak, without supervision," explained one councilman.

Yeltsin still has the possibility of dissolving the council by a specific decree.

But the president of the council, Alexandr Belyayev, said such a decree would be unwarranted.

"We have violated no law, we just want to prepare the workings of the new Duma and the election of the 60 councilmen" who will replace the larger Petrosoviet.

"In addition to working to create the new council," Belyayev said, "the councilmen believe it is their duty to continue to oversee the administration of the city."

Most of the 120 members of the pro-Yeltsin Democratic Russia party voted against the dissolution.

"This is simply a local problem," said one of them, Sergey Berezinskiy.

"If we leave," he said, "no one knows who will decide the city budget and who will watch over the activities of the mayor's office, which as everyone knows has been secretly selling or renting city- owned buildings, to the detriment of the people of Saint Petersburg."

Grachev at Airborne Command School Celebration

PM1711101793 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Nov 93

[Video report by Valeriy Borisov from Ryazan; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School is marking its 75th anniversary today. Russian Defense Minister Grachev, who graduated from

here in 1969, described the airborne assault troops as the "nation's military hope" and their professional skills as "of the highest order."

[Borisov] [video shows march-past, band playing] Building on the military traditions of the Ryazan Infantry Courses, which were established during the Civil War, officers of the Armed Forces elite—the airborne assault troops—have trained here since 1959. Many of the school's graduates have received high government awards—29 became Heroes of the Soviet Union or Heroes of the Russian Federation. They include Russia's Defense Minister Pavel Grachev who arrived in Ryazan to attend the festivities. He congratulated those present on behalf of Russia's president.

[Grachev] The importance of the airborne assault troops within Russia's defense potential will increase considerably during the next few years. They are the nation's military hope.

[Borisov] [video shows training display] The airborne assault troops are equipped with the most modern weapons. All the school's departments are fitted with state-of-the-art military equipment. The virtues of personal courage, loyalty to an officer's duty, and high skill remain unchanged, and this was demonstrated by the cadets during the jubilee festivities. [video shows march-past, Grachev addressing officer cadets, training display]

Luzhkov's Order for Non-Muscovites Criticized

MK1611145193 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 4

[Oleg Medvedev report: "Special Regime for Staying in Moscow. Yuriy Luzhkov Expels Chechnya From Russia"]

[Text] Under Yuriy Luzhkov's directive, "a special order" for visiting citizens permanently residing outside Russia was introduced in Moscow yesterday. This directive also applies to the Chechens, because the mayor, unlike the Foreign Ministry or the Central Electoral Commission, sees Chechnya as a foreign country. KOMMERSANT-DAILY analyst Oleg Medvedev comments:

The mayor attempted to introduce a paid system of registering non-Muscovites, including the pinpointing and punishment of those who fail to register, back in February and March. At that time, the Moscow City Council stood in his way. Now there is no soviet power, so nothing prevents the mayor from turning Moscow into a model city. The city chief said that this decision was prompted first by his care for Muscovites' interests, and to make it even more tangible he gave instructions that 70 percent of the fines collected in the process be spent on the protection of holders of Moscow residence permits. This confirms that the introduction of "a special regime" is not a product of Yuriy Luzhkov's revolutionary legal views, as some people thought, but an elementary manifestation of populism.

The directive will make happy those Muscovites who have been holding visitors, particularly "persons of Caucasus origin," for all the drawbacks in the city. The Caucasus residents will apparently be the first and main "victims" of Mr. Luzhkov's directive, which will boost the mayor's popularity among xenophobes. By insisting that the "special regime" applies to the Chechens also, however, the mayor has made an unconventional move: to deflect accusations of being xenophobic, he said that he considers Chechnya a foreign state. As a matter of fact, the statement was applauded in Groznyy.

Fuad Gadzhiyev, press attache at the Azerbaijani official mission in Moscow, said to me in his comments on the Moscow mayor's decision that it effectively undermines the visa-free regime of travel between the Commonwealth countries and runs counter to a number of the CIS' fundamental documents.

Sergey Kovalev, chairman of the Russian president's Human Rights Committee, gave a negative assessment of Mr. Luzhkov's directive. Not a single country in the world has anything like this, he acknowledged. There is no indication, however, that the president is going to rescind the directive. Maybe Yeltsin chose not to notice it in appreciation of the mayor's unfailing support in the hour of need.

But it is well known that everything must have a limit. The mayor has already imposed economic sanctions on foreign states—Latvia and Estonia; defied the fundamental provisions of CIS agreements; "expelled" Chechnya from the Russian Federation. What if things go so far that matters of war and peace will be decided by Moscow city hall?

There remains a hope that, traditionally, the directive will not be observed. All the more so because its absurdity, lawfulness, and legal ignorance are entirely evident.

[Article includes the following boxed passage]

Commentary by the International Affairs Department

The Moscow mayor, playing on the populist sentiments of those who believe that Moscow "without visitors" still could be turned into what was formerly called "a model communist city," has sponsored an action that does not square with any market reform. Not only has Mr. Luzhkov expelled Chechnya from Russia and defied all agreements on the travel of citizens within the CIS. The "special order" directive threatens to turn Moscow fairly quickly into a city extremely unattractive for business (including international business). City hall's claims that the "special order" is similar to a residence permit as it exists in foreign countries is deliberate misinformation. First, Moscow is not an independent state that is entitled to introduce its own visas (except for Russian entry visas); second, no civilized country has a system of residence permit registration, which Mr. Luzhkov is actually strengthening; and third, if we need more or less close international analogues, they should be looked for in the Cold War period when citizens of the USSR and the United States were mutually prohibited from visiting

certain areas. Now that at the interstate level most of these restriction have been removed after hard diplomatic work, there you go again—the city hall is introducing new ones of its own. It did so without consulting the Russian Foreign Ministry, whose consular administration told KOMMERSANT-DAILY yesterday that they did not have any explanations by city hall whatsoever and described the actions as "strange." The "special order" was introduced without taking into account possible complications in Russia's consular relations and the enormous damage that may be done to the country as a whole from the point of view of a business and investment environment.

As for Mr. Luzhkov's promises to cut crime in the city by 40 percent with this measure, which was borrowed from medieval practice, it would be apt to recall that the tightest order is in prison. The only thing is that it is incompatible with freedom.

Yeltsin Aides Seek Moscow Federation Council Seats

MK1711100093 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 17 Nov 93 p 1

[Lidiya Lukyanova report under the "Those We Elect" rubric: "An Almost Wall-To-Wall Independence"]

[Text] Five people have submitted papers for registration as Federation Council candidates for Moscow electoral district No. 77. Here are the candidates' names:

Tolkachev, Oleg Mikhaylovich—independent, Yuzhniy Okrug prefect.

Chernichenko, Yuriy Dmitriyevich—the Russia's Choice bloc candidate.

Gonchar, Nikolay Nikolayevich—independent, candidate of economic sciences, temporarily unemployed.

Krasavchenko, Sergey Nikolayevich—Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms, and Russia's Choice candidate, Russian presidential first deputy chief of staff.

Komchatov, Vladimir Fedorovich—independent candidate, oceanologist, economist, president's representative in Moscow.

The Electoral Commission is verifying the lists of signatures in support of the would-be candidates.

300 Nominees for Moscow Duma Apply for Registration

MK1711101093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 3

[Yekaterina Achalova report: "Elections for Moscow City Duma. Nomination of Candidates Ends"]

[Text] The registration of nominees for Moscow City Duma ended the evening of 15 November with nine electoral blocs having submitted to the city electoral commission documents to register candidates. The final results of the registration of candidates for the City Duma will be known on 18 November.

Five electoral associations have nominated their candidates in all 35 city districts. They are the Moscow branch of "Civic Union" (it brings together the Moscow branch of the "Free Russia" party, and the youth branch in support of this party), the associations "Ecology and Self-Government," "Citizens for Sovereignty of the People," the "Russia's Choice" bloc, the "Party of Russian Unity and Accord."

The Islamic Democratic Party has nominated candidates in 25 districts, the People's-Patriotic Party in 21 districts, the Russian Movement of Democratic Reforms in 26, and the Social Democratic Party of Russia in 23 districts.

Officially, the Moscow electoral commission has not made the lists of candidates public but, according to preliminary information, prevalent among the Party of Russian Unity and Accord deputies are jurists and economic managers experienced in both the state and private sectors. This same party has also nominated some former Mossovet deputies, for example, Kirill Bukharin and Aleksandr Zholkov, ex-chairman of the standing commission on economic policy and entrepreneurship.

All in all nearly 300 candidates have been nominated for the Moscow City Duma. Observers think, however, that many will not be able to be registered because not all of them have secured the requisite 5,000 signatures.

Regional Reaction to Draft Constitution Viewed

PM1611160593 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 3

[Andrey Podkopalov article: "Rebellion of the Regions, Stage Two"]

[Text] The scandalous character of the squabbles on the Moscow-Yekaterinburg line is simply shocking. Apparently it was only the inadequacies of the equipment which stopped a silk thread from being attached for E. Rossel [allusion obscure] to B. Yeltsin's faxed edicts abolishing the Ural Republic and dismissing Rossel himself. Yeltsin's "fellow countryman" Rossel reacted with equal irritation: "...This is an unparalleled example of lawlessness." He is supported by V. Yelagin, head of the Orenburg administration, who noted that no one in Moscow considers it necessary discuss contentious issues with the oblast's leaders but instead confine themselves to faxing dismissal notices...

What is going on here? It would seem that after the publication of the Russian Federation draft Constitution, the main source of irritation to the oblast leaders was removed: All the components of the Federation are given equal rights, "sovereignties" are abolished, and to cap it all, the leaders of the regions have been given an

extra sweetener—a guaranteed "ex officio" place in the Federation Council of the next convocation of parliament (in two years' time).

Thus B. Yeltsin's ire is quite understandable: What more do they want? After all, the president and virtually all the experts believed, not without reason, that the oblasts' playing at republics was just a bluff in the struggle to equalize the status of the components of the Russian Federation. Moreover, at a certain stage this separatism was useful to the president in reducing the "sovereign" Russian republics to a single common denominator: I am all in favor, you see, but the oblasts object...

Then, it seemed, the deadlock was broken—all the components are equal. But no, another set of contradictions emerged between the regions and the center: A separation (or rather, an upholding) of powers is beginning in which all the components of the Russian Federation act as a single formation (it is no coincidence that representatives of Bashkortostan and Udmurtia are coming to Yekaterinburg for a conference in response to a call from the ousted Rossel).

The regions are afraid (and not without reason) that this is the beginning of a return to the old days when everything was ordered through Moscow down to the last nail bound for Kaluga. But the regions have acquired a taste for self-management and do not want to give it up. The interests are undoubtedly purely economic: The possibility of disposing of their own raw materials, resources, and so forth is worth a lot. It is no coincidence, therefore, that it is primarily the "wealthy" who are in revolt because they have everything to lose here. Crushing this potential mutiny of the regions will be far more difficult than crushing the White House mutiny.

If that were not enough, there are influential political forces (such as S. Shakhray) who advocate the creation of economic territorial associations of the "Great Volga" or "Siberian Accord" type. In principle, this kind of economic confederalism holds no terrors so long as it does not turn into economic separatism with all the attendant political consequences...

...The American civil war, generally explained as the defense of the rights of poor negroes, actually took place because the South, rich in raw materials, refused to sell its output cheaply to the North but wanted to trade with the "civilized world" of the day—Europe—instead.

About 1,500 Tatars Reportedly Desert Army Units

PM1611155993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 16

[Report by Major Aleksandr Kholod of Volga Military District Press Center under the "From Our News Bureau" rubric: "'Roundtable'...of Tatarstan's Deserters"]

[Text] The beginning of the Russian Armed Forces' recruitment campaign in Tatarstan was marked by a very unusual event—a meeting and rally attended by draftees and servicemen who had left their units, as well as by their parents and representatives of the public, took place in Naberezhnyye Chelny.

It was reported at the rally that about 1,500 servicemen drafted for compulsory service from the republic have deserted from Russian Federation military units since 1992 and through September 1993. A significant proportion of the deserters have turned up in Tatarstan, having succumbed to the effect of provocative leaflets and appeals form the Tatar Public Center, the "Azatlyk" Tatar Youth League, and the leadership of the National Guard. But now these young men have ended up without legal and social protection and cannot earn their living legally.

Parliamentarian: Tatarstan Will Remain Sovereign

LD1611205293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1908 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] "Irrespective of the outcome of the referendum on the draft of the Russian Constitution, Tatarstan will remain a sovereign state," Chairman of Tatarstan's Supreme Soviet Farid Mukhametshin declared in an exclusive interview with INTERFAX on Tuesday. He reminded that according to Tatarstan's acting Basic Law, Tatarstan is a sovereign state and the republic's population had supported this provision at the referendum.

Mukhametshin believes that possible contradictions between constitutions of Tatarstan and Russian Federation can be removed in the course of negotiations between Moscow and Kazan and a compromise can be fixed in a bilateral agreement.

Chechen Opposition Leader May Replace Dudayev

LD1611221393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1908 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Yusup Soslanbekov, ex-chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the parliament of the Russian Federation Republic of Chechnya, said he might soon replace Dzhokhar Dudayev as the republic's president.

Soslanbekov, who today heads the Parliament of the Confederation of Caucasian Peoples, told Interfax on Tuesday that he rejected an armed coup d'etat, however, as a means of taking power.

He said three factors were essential today for Chechnya: a carefully developed economic program, a material basis for its implementation, and a team of leaders who "will not confuse their own pockets with those of the nation."

"Today I am unable to see enough politicians in Chechnya to form such a team," Soslanbekov said. For that reason, he does not expect to come to power in the immediate future.

"I'm not one of the revanchists who want to seize power by force of arms, nor am I one of the supporters of President Dudayev, who plunged the republic into a

state of economic devastation and drowned his own nation in blood," Soslanbekov said. He said an honest person was unable to survive in Chechnya, for "one has to steal in order to live."

Asked whether the opposition is powerful enough to seize power by force, Soslanbekov said: "You don't have to be too smart for that. Isolated opposition detachments are now coming together, so in November or December Dudayev will apparently cease to be president. Although I don't think he should be driven out by force. He'll go by himself. That's a matter of the near future, which he's bringing forward by each decree he issues."

Sakhalin Governor on Economy, Elections

OW1611123193 Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Teleradiokompaniya Sakhalin Television Network in Russian 1905 GMT 28 Oct 93

[Studio interview with Yevgeniy Alekseyevich Krasnoyarov, head of Sakhalin Oblast Administration, by Lyudmila Latysheva; date not given; from the "Morning Cruise" program—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Krasnoyarov] Having sifted through all the Sakhalin Oblast questions and issues of the past half year, I became deeply convinced that the first thing that we should do is strengthen the fuel and energy complex on Sakhalin. Everything stems and begins from this complex. To do that, we have to examine the effectiveness of handling the mines and the opencut deposits. By the way, you might like to know that there are about 14 billion tonnes of coal on Sakhalin. This is one of the greatest deposits in Russia.

[Latysheva] This is what can still be mined.

[Krasnoyarov] Yes, this is what is possible to mine. The next questions is as follows: The mines are expensive and the opencut method is cheaper. The Solnetskoye deposit in the Uglegorsk region has a confirmed volume of 100 million tonnes as of today, and an additional 250 million tonnes are being developed. We think that it has 350 million tonnes of coal. The open method is the cheapest and the most promising one for Sakhalin today. I think that the Solnetskoye and the Lermontovskoye deposits... [pauses] we have another five or six deposits which are being developed by enthusiasts, businessmen and entrepreneurs through their own efforts in Nevelskiy, Poronayskiy, Smirnykhovskiy, Tymovskiy, and Tamarinskiy rayons. The earnings from this development are fairly good, and the coal, mined by the opencut method, helps nearby towns. I would like to say for the first time on television that I am deeply convinced that our main purpose today is building a railroad connecting Poronaysk and Uglegorsk. First estimates put it at 60 or 70 kilometers. According to world standards, one kilometer costs one million dollars. Therefore, we should procure about $60 or 70 million, allowing an estimated development period of three to four years. I think that we will need three to four years to build this railroad.

[Latysheva] Investments will probably be...

[Krasnoyarov, interrupting] An interesting question that surfaces is how we are going to finance this railroad. I have gathered the leaders of large enterprises today, and we agreed in principle that we should create a joint stock company provisionally named Sakhalin, create the directorship of an administration at the oblast level for the building of this railroad, and begin preparatory work for drafting, research, financing, and market survey. If we build this railroad—as you know, delivery from the so-called marine mines is seasonal—we will be able to supply the Lermontov and the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk heating and electrical stations throughout the year. We will be able to deliver coal to Kamchatka and Magadan at anytime. This coal is of the long-flame sort, it is used for boilers and for energy production. If we want to sell it, then of course we can sell our Sakhalin coal only within the Russian borders because it will not sell abroad. Neither hard coal nor anthracite sell abroad; they have places where they mine coal of higher caloric value, and it is very difficult to sell it abroad, because today its price in Russia is higher than world prices. See for yourself: the price of some mines is 32,000 rubles [R] per tonne, which is about $32, while the world market price is $25-30.

So if we connect the east and the west coasts by a railroad, we will solve practically all the questions of energy supply in the oblast. The most difficult issue facing us today is the money wasted on the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk heating and electrical station. We invested about R4 billion last year, and a little less this year because there must be a reasonable limit to these affairs.

Next, we are solving the problems of early gas. As you know, we have demanded in the Sakhalin-2 agreement that early gas had to go through Sakhalin so as to start the (Vakhrushev) and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk electrical stations, and supply some gas to cottages associated with the infrastructure. But I object to this. If gas is connected... [pauses] the first stage of this has already happened, and there were already plans to kill all of our coal industry. What then shall we do with the coal? What shall we do with the miners? The most reasonable approach is that we shift from mines to open cuts so that we will be able to solve the problem of internal coal consumption with the cheap coal from all these deposits. As for gas, we should simply liquefy it and sell it, with the oblast as the beneficiary. We will surely be able to sell the gas, but not the coal. This is where our reserves are. In other words, the sold gas will be used to further improve the well being of Sakhalin residents. We are also likely to save some capital because we will not be forced to start building the gas infrastructure—especially the infrastructure for early gas.

The U.S. MMMM [expansion not given] consortium has agreed to partially finance other alternatives instead of the early gas we have insisted upon. In other words, we might agree on reequipping our heating stations. As of today, the efficiency factor is 16 percent, which is very low. The world level is 40 or 50 percent. Of course, we will have to consider the environment. Coal burning produces environmental problems, while gas is of course

more environmentally sound. But we will have to think of a way to burn coal in such a way that would not produce major pollution, like ash. By the way, Sakhalin coal contains very little ash—80 percent as compared to the 30 or 40 percent ash in the mainland coal [as heard]. This is what produces all the environmental problems.

This is the rationale for investing in this railroad. [passage omitted] The program for Kurils has been established—you probably know about it—and it will finally be signed in the near future since the term runs out on 23 October. The plan includes decent investment and development, with the state allocating about $300 million, or about R200 billion. The question of utilization is somewhat complex, but I think that we will find...

[Latysheva, interrupting] This is the point. It is probably very important what people will use these funds for, and how rationally they do so.

[Krasnoyarov] This is very simply done. We are creating the administration of the Kuril Islands, which will sit, or rather reside, here in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. Naturally, it must regulate the use of these allocations in a discerning manner. Of course, the construction will have to be carried out in shifts. We have this capacity on Sakhalin. For example, the Sakhalinneftegaz Company has three powerful construction departments in the north of island which are not fully engaged today. We could transfer these people to the Kurils in shifts and begin construction of the facilities planned in the Kuril subzone program.

In future, I suppose that once we have completed the decree agreed on during Chernomyrdin's trip, the decree on the Kurils subzone, we will be facing a more practical utilization of the details previously worked out on the Sakhalin free economic zone. There are many opinions on free economic zones. I know that Gaydar is against it.

[Latysheva] What is your opinion?

[Krasnoyarov] I... [pauses] to be frank, I have already stated my position on this. I do not believe it is possible to create a separate kingdom in a separate region of the country. This is absurd, economic nonsense to a certain extent. Nevertheless, as a patriot of Sakhalin, I think that we should try it. The contradictions here are quite...

[Latysheva, interrupting] But you have said that there were some positive ideas?

[Krasnoyarov] There are positive ideas. I think that, being a province, we are doomed to develop later than the central parts of Russia.

[Latysheva] But we are a province where Russia begins.

[Krasnoyarov] Let us talk in a concrete way. Due to the present situation of economic reform, the revival of Russia will go through the central regions, where the infrastructure is better developed, cadres are better trained, and where strong potential exists—for example, the Urals, central Russia, agriculture. [sentence as heard]

[Latysheva] Where products are being manufactured.

[Krasnoyarov] Of course. We are doomed to a late revival. But as to using these methods, using the free economic zone and some privileges—it is probably God's will that we use them. And now, for your last question?

[Latysheva] Let us make it the last question. It concerns the elections. I know that you are planning to present your candidacy for the Federation Council.

[Krasnoyarov] Yes, the elections; 12 November makes scheduling too tight. The election procedure for the Lower Chamber of the State Duma forces all political parties to step up their activities...

[Latysheva, interrupting] We have already felt it.

[Krasnoyarov, continuing] ...here in Sakhalin, to form blocs, and think what and where... [pauses] Everyone should realize that the parliamentary struggle will be a tough one. [passage omitted] I have to admit to a mistake of mine. There was a time when I doubted and hesitated, and stated that if I fail to force the government to sign these two decrees on the Kuril sub- zone and [word indistinct] during Chernomyrdin's visit, I would leave to start work on creating the Sakhalin Far East republic. I have though a lot about this statement recently, and have come to the conclusion that this is the wrong direction.

[Latysheva] Life itself pointed this out.

[Krasnoyarov] Yes, life itself pointed this out. Our task is to create a single indivisible Russia, with strong state power—political power, of course. Thus my participation in the Federation Council is, in a sense, predetermined. I am not saying that Krasnoyarov must be there. I think that the head of administration should go for elections. Whether Krasnoyarov is elected or not is a different story. But such an effort must be made, and I think that the head of administration will represent the interests of a federation member at the Federation Council better that anyone else. He will fight for this member. [passage omitted]

Electoral Commission Registers Sakhalin Candidates

OW1711112593 Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Teleradiokompaniya Sakhalin Television Network in Russian 2005 GMT 15 Nov 93

[From "As of This Hour" newscast]

[Text] The oblast administration press center advises that to date, the following have registered as Federal Council candidates for Sakhalin: Nikolay Dolgikh, mayor of Kholmsk and the rayon; Yevgeniy Krasnoyarov, governor of the oblast; and Igor Farkhudinov, mayor of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.

The district electoral commission on Sunday received nomination lists from three more aspiring candidates to the Federal Council. They are, Mikhail Romanovskiy, head of the Sakhalin Steamship Company; Anatoliy

Torchenov, head of the Far East off-shore drilling exploration department; and Sergey Mikhaylov, engineer from the privately owned (Otkach) enterprise.

Nomination lists were also received from four aspirants for the candidacies to the State Duma: Aleksandr Greshko, chairman of Aterkom, the coal industry workers' trade union; Boris Tretyak, director of the Sakhalingeofizrazvedka Trust; Valentina Fedorova, Deputy Minister for Economics; and Viktor Sirenko, chief of (Glavpeo) of the oblast administration.

The district electoral commission is planning to hold its regular session on Wednesday. Members of the commission will continue working on the nomination lists which must be completed in the short period of time between now and 20 November.

Consultative Public Chamber Formed in Sakhalin Oblast

OW1711123093 Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Teleradiokompaniya Sakhalin Television Network in Russian 2005 GMT 15 Nov 93

[From the "As of This Hour" newscast]

[Text] An Oblast Consultative Public Chamber responsible to the oblast governor has been formed by special directive. We asked Fedor Volokhov, its coordinator, to tell us about the tasks assigned to this new organizational subdivision.

[Begin Volokhov recording] Of course the final decision will be made by the governor. However, this conference will carry out the main work in preparing the draft documents, and perhaps as far as possible lead the broadest possible discussion of them. That is why the conference consists of two chambers: the State Chamber comprised of officials and representatives of local government departments, and the Public Chamber to which are invited representatives from all conceivable social organizations, associations, and structures in the oblast.

They will work simultaneously, in parallel and jointly, and their final product will be the constitution and the statute on elections. Today is the first time we are publicly discussing this, and I would really like to appeal to all social groupings in the oblast by asking them to start thinking about this and begin selecting representatives to this Public Chamber. Here is an opportunity being offered to the community to participate not only in the formation of the new organs of power, but also in forming a perception about these organs. Perhaps public participation in this work will contribute to a special change in our perception of these organs, and we will create something different from what we had before which will be perhaps closer, more necessary, more useful, and more answerable to the people for what will happen in the future. [end recording]

The first meeting of the Public Chamber, concerned with the preparation of Oblast Rules [ustav], will be held on Tuesday 16 November at 1700 [0600 GMT] in the small hall of the oblast administration building. Representatives of political parties, popular movements, youth and other public organizations, trade union associations, religious bodies, local self government organs, and businessmen are invited to attend.

Deputy Prime Minister Zaveryukha Visits Stavropol

LD1611180193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1502 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Styazhkin]

[Text] Stavropol November 16 TASS—The introduction of private property on land will not result in economic anomalies since the factor of free land sales will not be dominant in agricultural production, Russian Vice-Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha, who was nominated candidate for State Duma deputy by the Agrarian Party, told a meeting with the electors here today when commenting on the party's election program.

The meeting was attended by heads and specialists of the Stavropol territorial agricultural complex, city and regional administrations, chairmen of collective farms, directors of state farms, individual farmers and representatives of agricultural scientific-research institutes and educational establishments.

As for the agrarian policy fundamentals, Zaveryukha stressed Russia has plenty of vacant land lots whose sales could increase the responsibility of state, collective and private farmers for the use of land.

Commenting on reforms of the countryside economy, the candidate said agricultural privatization needs corrections. For instance, meat and milk factories and grain elevators should be privatized in such a way to make producers the priority share holders. Then it will be easier to settle price formation problems, upgrade technological processes and sell finished goods. Now privatized agricultural enterprises get rid of state monopolism but suffer from egoism of processors.

When comparing the Agrarian Party election program with those of its rivals, Zaveryukha said his party calls against "mechanical and thoughtless application of market doctrines". In his words, the opponents often try to present the agrarian movement as an opposition to the president. It is not really so and the more electors support the Agrarian Party the more real is a possibility to form a parliament factions that will achieve the adoption of laws to consolidate the economic priority of agricultural production with a solid legal basis.

Comments on Grain Imports

LD1711130193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0829 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Styazhkin]

[Text] Stavropol, November 24 (TASS)—The Russian Government will not import grain this year, Russia's

vice premier and the chairman of the Council on Agro-Industrial Policy under the Council of Ministers, Aleksandr Zaveryukha announced on Wednesday as he finished up a trip to Stavropol.

Zaveryukha, who is also running for the State Duma on the Agrarian Party's ticket, said that Russia can afford to not buy grain from abroad because Russian grain-growers were able to maintain this year's harvest level. Their achievement came despite their difficult economic position, in particular the lack of finances for fertilizer purchases or plant renewal.

Zaveryukha noted that not importing grain will strengthen the willingness of state and collective farms, agro-industrial enterprises and farmers to trust the internal Russian bread market, and they will become more interested in the further increase of grain production.

During the vice premier's meetings with Stavropol residents, he mentioned that Russia should also be able to avoid importing wool and flax. Imports of meat, milk and other products will probably be decreased.

Zaveryukha said the government is discussing changing the duty system with the aim of raising duties on imported food products and lowering them on exported products. This would also greatly contribute to the agro-industrial complex's financial recovery. Only barriers to the export of grain, wool and wool products would be left in place, since these goods are especially needed by the Russians themselves.

The vice premier justified the necessity of perfecting the duty system by saying that the state will continue to guarantee Russians food and other vital products, and such a step would increase the hard currency earnings of agricultural producers, thereby increasing their desire to further develop their agricultural potential.

Former Sverdlovsk Governor To Stand for Parliament

LD1611163693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1339 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Eduard Rossel, last week fired as head of administration of Sverdlovsk Region, has been registered as a candidate to the Federation Council, one of the chambers of the future Russian parliament, having managed to collect 65,000 signatures in favor his candidacy. He will stand in one of the constituencies of the Sverdlovsk Region.

Galina Karelova, deputy chairwoman of the Sverdlovsk Regional Council, dissolved by President Boris Yeltsin, has been nominated candidate for the same constituency.

Rossel was dismissed by Yeltsin for being one of the founders of the Ural Republic, unilaterally proclaimed on the territory of Sverdlovsk Region and abolished by presidential decree last week.

'Russia's Choice' Most Popular Bloc in Sverdlovsk

LD1611205893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1908 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Up to 78 percent of residents in Sverdlovsk region are unfamiliar with the draft of the new Russian constitution. The parties and candidates running for the Federal Assembly are practically unknown to 87 percent. These are the results of the latest public opinion poll conducted in the area.

Two thirds of those polled have made their choice with regard to their election preferences: 20 percent favor Russia's Choice, 11 percent - the Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc, 7 percent - Shakhray's party, 6 percent - the Movement for Democratic Reforms, 7 percent - the Democratic Party, 4 percent - the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and 2.5 percent - the Liberal-Democratic Party.

As many as 39 percent are determined to vote for candidates supporting Boris Yeltsin, 15 percent for candidates opposed to the president.

During the past three months the readiness of residents in Sverdlovsk region to take part in elections has been shifting between 42 percent and 54 percent. Over half of the polled support democratic parties.

Tver Oblast Election Candidates Viewed

PM1611143193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Tamara Karyakina: "Opposition Parties Have Gone to Fish for Votes in Camouflage Smocks and With Smoke Pots"]

[Text] Tver Oblast—The election bandwagon is moving through Tver Oblast in the motley spectrum of public opinion. The interparty election struggle is so far being waged behind the scenes, all its possible participants have not yet been named or registered at the commissions, but...

But the political events which preceded the president's edict on early elections of the new parliament have determined many of the participants' behavior tactics. Thus, the procommunist leaders of the soviets of all levels prefer to join the election marathon with their visors lowered without identifying party symbols and slogans. At least for the time being. At least V. Borisov, a former oblast soviet deputy chairman, and A. Kozlov, also a former leader but in this case a former Staritsa party leader, both known for their nostalgic political natures, intend to run for the Federal Assembly from the "citizens' group" (almost like a group of comrades). Yet, many of their political opponents believe, they could have run for the Russian Communist Workers Party.

The tactics of the Communists, who are well organized in Tver Oblast, come down now to keeping quiet for the time being about their party allegiance. That is why the

"citizens' group" is brought into play and the word "farmer" or "businessman" is modestly inserted under the "profession" heading. Kushnarev, leader of the oblast's largest state farm and a staunch Supreme Soviet deputy (who in the defunct parliament would unfailingly vote against any of the president's proposals submitted for discussion in the Supreme Soviet) is joining the campaign as a farmer. Perhaps he is more likely to slip through that way.

That is why it is very hard for the voter now to dig down to the true positions of some contenders for a deputy's seat—a large number of smoke pots and camouflage smocks have already been laid in for future use. In that sense some of the movements and formations with new names are a good trap for voters. For instance, the Tver "union of support for the president" may seem very attractive and trustworthy to some people. To some people who have not troubled to look for the thrust behind the name. And the whole thrust is which president this union intends to support, when it is very sympathetic toward Aleksandr Rutskoy. The union does not want to change its name, the name is a bait.

A similar bait, and one with quite a lot of money, is the Tver fund for the support of reforms, which has now nominated as its candidates people who are quite far removed from reforms. A local businessman fond of the word "reform" will open his purse in the hope that these reformers will defend his interests in the Duma or Federal Assembly, that they will cope with the role of well paid attorneys. According to B. Ziskind, a member of the "Russia's Choice" coordination council, this fund does not intend to give a brass farthing to help the main reformers in the shape of Gaydar's "Russia's Choice."

Good material and organizational support can be detected in the oblast behind the figures of Limonov, Vladislavlev, and Volskiy. Fine boys have already arrived at the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondents center bearing lists of signatures for Limonov, who promises "to be neither left-wing nor right-wing." One of the best auditoriums in Tver and auditoriums in other cities in the oblast are always ready for meetings with him. Someone is doing a good job of getting an audience. Who is this someone who is such a reliable financial backer and organizer for a candidate who shows off his image as "an ordinary man who has nothing, who does not own a dacha or an automobile?"

And the seats are being allocated in the democratic Tver sleigh harnessed for the elections. From somewhere there has suddenly appeared an undergrowth of vainglorious leaders who have seen an opportunity to come to power on the shoulders of blocs and parties. No one can get through when he is essentially unknown without the difficult ordeal of presenting himself to the voters. When they are refused a place on the lists these latter-day little napoleons do an about-turn in their career-seeking and seek another opening. Often an opening from someone hostile to the bloc to which this seat-seeker used to belong. Thus a local democrat, Larin, took offense at the "Russia's Choice" bloc's lack of understanding and is now a member of different ranks. Unfortunately Larin is not alone in the oblast in choosing this ploy, which is eroding the general democratic stratum of voters and dividing their votes. Incidentally, the Communists are using the same ploy very successfully.

But nothing is accidental, as they say. The Tver "Russia's Choice" bloc which suffered a split in the first days of the election campaign has suddenly grouped itself together well (obviously by discarding ballast) and has collected on its lists the signatures of over 5,000 people—more than in any oblast in Central Russia. But "Russia's Choice" has serious ordeals ahead in the struggle for votes against the agrarian movements which so far (to judge by the signatories' lists) have the most support in the oblast.

It remains only for voters to find their bearings in the screen produced by the propaganda smoke pots of the parties which have gone to catch their votes. And there is already plenty of smoke.

International Affairs

Zlenko, Kozyrev Discuss Bilateral Problems

AU1611185093 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 10 Nov 93 p 5

[Heorhiy Vorotnyuk report from Odessa]

[Text] As already reported, on 5 and 6 November, a two-day working session was held in Odessa between Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. A wide range of questions of further relations between the two neighboring states was discussed.

Due to the fact that the meeting was a strictly working one and was held behind closed doors and that the summarizing news conference for journalists was too short, far from all details of the agreements have become known. It is only possible to speak definitely about the general atmosphere and the general result. Andrey Kosyrev put it in the following way: "We have managed to achieve a cautious success." His Ukrainian colleague Anatoliy Zlenko, having assessed the meeting positively, stressed that new elements of the Ukrainian-Russian relations had been elaborated in its course. This, as both ministers agreed, makes it possible to recommend the presidents of Ukraine and Russia a new approach to resolving a number problems of bilateral relations.

Even though, by agreement between the ministers, the discussion had the character of "quiet diplomacy" and the participants in the meeting did not so much try to overwhelm each other with arguments as to fulfill those tasks that the presidents had given to the ministers. Still, one wouldn't say that the negotiations proceeded smoothly. For example, when problems of nuclear disarmament were discussed, A. Kozyrev stressed, in particular, that Moscow was very concerned about the state of nuclear safety in Ukraine, because the [nuclear] warheads on its territory are, allegedly, in a critical state. A. Zlenko responded to this latent pressure: "There is no need to dramatize the situation, it is not so critical...." Whereas for Moscow there are no questions regarding problems of withdrawing nuclear warheads from Ukraine—its position is exclusively based upon the protocol signed in Massandra, the attitude toward them in Kiev is not so explicit. As is known, previous agreements at the highest level were later amended and supplemented—all of this cannot be overlooked, emphasized A. Zlenko, and must be taken into account. Nor does Kiev consider the problem of the Black Sea Fleet ultimately dissolved: For Ukraine, the sale to Russia of its part of the fleet is only one of possible variants, whereas for Russia it is as though a finally resolved question. However, there still remains much to be resolved: The cost of that part of the fleet, what debts will be covered by selling it, and so on.

Those who follow the Ukrainian-Russian dialogue and analyze it could not fail to notice a certain crisis in the negotiations. On the one hand, accords appear at the highest level and, on the other hand, specialists who are supposed to implement these accords are unable to overcome the existing differences. That is why the implementation of the accords is delayed or fails. For that reason, during the meeting in Odessa, the ministers, without avoiding acute issues, strived to find ways for emerging from such a situation. It was agreed, in particular, to create special working groups for dealing with the most important problems under discussion. They will elaborate specific recommendations for moving forward.

It was stressed that presidents of Ukraine and Russia will be informed about the results of the meeting in Odessa. This may be followed by new political decisions at the highest level.

A. Kozyrev handed, through A. Zlenko, a personal message from Russian President B. Yeltsin to Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk.

A. Zlenko and A. Kozyrev did not forget to say that the place for holding the meeting—hospitable Odessa—also had a favorable influence upon the results of the meeting. Precisely this must have enabled the ministers to meet at the tennis court during the short breaks. A. Zlenko was more lucky in the duel between the two ministers. Even though the game of lawn tennis is not a simple thing, diplomacy, especially when it deals with resolving painful problems of mutual relations between two states, is undoubtedly much more complex. As in tennis, diplomatic success cannot be achieved through confrontation.

Kravchuk Aide Wary of START I Implementation

MK1611141593 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 79, 16 Nov 93 (Signed to press 15 Nov) p 1

[Unattributed report: "Ukraine Will Determine the Number of Missiles To Be Cut"]

[Text] Anton Buteyko, the Ukraine president's adviser on foreign policy matters, stated in an interview to national television on Sunday that "the successor countries to the former USSR are supposed to determine independently how many missiles each of them is going to cut." Mr. Buteyko accused Russia of "wanting to carry out" START I at Ukraine's expense. He voiced the fear that Ukraine would not be able to ratify this treaty owing to technical difficulties.

Parliament: Nation 'Not Bound' by Nuclear Treaty

AU1611173793 Paris AFP in English 1722 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev, Nov 16 (AFP)—Ukraine does not consider itself bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and remains a nuclear state, according to a draft resolution drawn up by parliament, a senior parliamentary official said here Tuesday.

The resolution, drawn up Tuesday and due to be discussed in the coming days, said Ukraine "does not consider itself bound by clause 5 of the (1992) Lisbon Protocol", which stipulates the total denuclearisation of

Ukraine and its adhesion to the NPT, Vladimir Kalinyets, a member of the parliamentary working group, told AFP.

However the resolution would ratify the START I treaty, which would involve scrapping 36 percent of the long-range missiles inherited by Ukraine from the former Soviet Union and 41.6 percent of their warheads.

Party Protests Involvement in Georgian Civil War

AU1611184893 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 10 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Volodymyr Prytula, MOLOD UKRAYINY special correspondent: "Georgia—Another Afghanistan?"]

[Text] As reported by the Press Center of the Black Sea Fleet, on 4 November, in the "Golden Lake" mountain sports complex in the town of Poti, a meeting was held between Admiral Eduard Baltin, Black Sea Fleet commander and his namesake Eduard Shevardnadze—leader of Georgia. According to the same report, in the course of the talks, the sides specified joint measures for guarding and ensuring the normal activity of the port of Poti. Following the negotiations, an armored assault force, supported by marines, was launched from the large amphibious warfare ships "Tsezar Kunnikov" and "Konstantin Olshevskiy." As maintained by the Press Center, it was done to guard communications in the area of the port of Poti. Let me remind you that a squadron of Black Sea Fleet ships sailed, on 2 November, to the eastern part of the Black Sea at the decision adopted by the Russian Ministry of Defense and coordinated with the Ukrainian leadership. As of 9 November, 750 Black Sea Fleet marines and 40 units of armored technology landed. They assumed control of the port, the center of town, the main railroads and automobile highways, and also major bridges. According to the fleet's Press Center, three warships of the Black Sea Fleet are guarding Poti port from the sea. As reported by the UNIAN Agency, which refers to well-informed sources, the ships of the Black Sea Fleet have been repeatedly fired on by forces opposed to Shevardnadze, and during the landing and later, the marines became engaged in a battle against Zviadists, and there are wounded among the Black Sea sailors. However, a representative of the Press Center has refuted information on casualties among the Black Sea Fleet servicemen.

However, whatever the case might be, local observers indicate that, as a result of the involvement of the Black Sea Fleet in combat actions on the territory of Georgia, Ukraine may be drawn into the internal Georgian conflict. It must be said that up to 70 percent of the Black Sea Fleet personnel in regular service are Ukrainian citizens; they constitute more than 90 percent among the officers and warrant officers. Let us recall that Armenia refused to send its troops to Georgia because of such a threat. In this connection, the Crimean regional organization of Ukraine's Republican Party issued a statement of protest against the participation of those Black Sea Fleet servicemen, who are Ukrainian citizens, in the fratricidal civil war in Georgia. The Republicans demanded that the president and the Supreme Council immediately withdraw all Ukrainian citizens from the zone of combat actions. Meanwhile, as reported by the Press Center of the Black Sea Fleet, Eduard Shevardnadze had stated that the peace-keeping mission of the Black Sea Fleet ships is a very important step in strengthening relations between Russia and Georgia. It only remains to express surprise.

Kiev Confirms Agreement With Foreign Laws Accord

LD1611215693 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry has sent a note to the Council of Europe member states. In it, our participation in the European convention on the exchange of information on foreign law is confirmed. This has been done in connection with misunderstanding on the issue of Ukraine's legal succession in respect of international agreements concluded by the former Soviet Union.

Regional Affairs

Kravchuk Reacts To Parliamentary Veto of Edict

LD1611224493 Kiev Ukrayinske Telebachennya Network in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] As is well known, the Supreme Council imposed a veto [on 12 November] on the edict of the president on issuing state commodity bonds of Ukraine's national resources. In connection with this, numerous requests to explain the president's attitude to this decision by the Supreme Council are arriving at the press service of the president of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers from domestic and foreign journalists, representatives of business circles and the public, and employees of foreign diplomatic missions. Charged by the president, the press service made a statement today. My colleague Svitlana Hanska will read it out.

[Hanska] Good evening. The economic expediency of such an action as issuing state commodity bonds has been argued in a Finance Ministry report at a plenary session of the Supreme Council. Corresponding explanations were also given in the mass media.

The main object of this financial plan is to attract serious capital via external economic loans and its efficient investment in Ukraine's economy. This will allow the introduction of modern technology and the progressive experience of government to be speeded up considerably, and will facilitate the speedier integration of our economy into the world economic system.

Insurance back-up mechanisms, which guarantee the success of the plan and would not put our state in an awkward position, are envisaged. Regarding the assertions that the edict supposedly places a taboo on privatization and pledges all state property as security, no serious grounds for the assertions exist. Only basic funds and the goods of those state and nonstate enterprises needing hard currency crediting can be pledged, and only on their initiative.

The form of ownership on pledged property does not have any significance whatsoever for the creditor, the authorized entity of emitter, which the Finance Ministry of Ukraine acts as.

The form of ownership can also change while the credit is in operation, too. Therefore, not a single obstacle to the privatization process exists. Making use of authorized entities and nonstate institutions acting under the supervision of the Finance Ministry of Ukraine allows, firstly, the administrative and bureaucratic utilization of external bond loans to be avoided, and secondly allows them to be freed from the status of foreign state debt.

The experience of post-war Europe countries, like the experience of the present post-Communist states too, shows that structural reconstruction of the economy can only be carried out by attracting sizable foreign investment. Why not make use of this experience in Ukraine?

By its veto on the edict of the president, the Supreme Council blocked foreign capital coming into Ukraine. Economic expediency was replaced by political considerations. This shows that a significant number of people's deputies, protecting themselves behind populist slogans and declarations, are guided not by the economic interests of the country, but by their own narrow political calculations.

Both the extreme left and the extreme right, having scared others by the spurious slogan: Ukraine (?is being) sold off, showed the people of Ukraine and the whole world that in their deeds they act as opponents of reforms and do not wish for a transition to a market economy. Their actions do not in any way coincide with the interests of the people and damage our state's image in the world community. The left and the right have the same aim—to block reforms and to bring the situation to an explosion in order to make use of this in their political aims, and then to put all of the blame on the president. But this is a road to confrontation, and the people, on behalf of whom the people's deputies are defending Ukraine, will be hostages.

As a lawful entity, the president bears responsibility before the people for his decisions. Having imposed a veto on his edict, the Supreme Council is refusing him the right to such a responsibility. At the same time, it is not assuming this responsibility itself. Moreover, having obviously exceeded its authority in relation to the president, the Supreme Council appointed a commission to clarify the circumstances connected with the preparation of the edict, that is, it assumed the right to interfere in the process of preparing documents of the president.

The president of Ukraine, acting within his authority, will do everything dependent on him to strengthen the economy of Ukraine, and by means of attracting foreign investments, too. One would very much like for the election campaign, that has essentially already been started both by individual people's deputies and certain parliamentary groups, not to boil down to a struggle of personal or corporate interests, and for it not to start on the path of cardinal economic transformations, thus doing serious harm to Ukraine.

The president of Ukraine has charged his services with continuing work on the said plan, at the same time taking into account the constructive observations and proposals expressed at sessions of standing commissions, and at the plenary session of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, and bringing a wider circle of specialists into the work on it.

This was a statement from the press service of the president of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

Parliamentary Body Insists on Future Nuclear Status

LD1711112993 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0907 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] On 16 November, a working group on the ratification of the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol continued its session at the Ukrainian Supreme Council. People's Deputy Stepan Khmara told a UNIAN correspondent that the final draft is almost ready now. The working group has already excluded Article 5 from the Lisbon Protocol, which would have obligated Ukraine to become a non-nuclear state within the shortest possible time. "This makes the document acceptable to us," Stepan Khmara said. It is planned that a resolution on ratification issues will be adopted at the session's closed session on 18 November.

Radetskyy Urges Military-Industrial Complex

WS1611145293 Kiev KIEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 6 Nov 93 p 2

[Report by Anatoliy Smetanin: "Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetskyy: 'Ukraine Must Have Its Own Military-Industrial Complex'"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Defense Ministry press center has reported that a three-hour-long meeting has taken place between Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetskyy and leading designers and directors of research and production enterprises of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex [VPK]. The meeting discussed the issue of joint efforts of the Defense Ministry and the VPK to be directed toward the development of modern and promising designs of new arms and technologies.

Expounding on this idea, General Radetskyy stated a need for Ukraine to create its own military-industrial complex in the current period, in accordance with the future nuclear-free status of our state.

Noting the difficult situation in which the VPK has found itself today, the participants of the meeting arrived at the same conclusion—only immediate financial support of the state will save the situation, and the experience of the military industry [oboronka] accumulated over decades will be directed to the strengthening of the country's defense capacity. Defense Deputy Minister General-Lieutenant Ivan Oleynik familiarized the audience with definite proposals of the ministry.

The meeting was attended by Valentin Lemish, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and National Security.

Belarus

Kebich Supporters Said Ready for Coup d'Etat

WS1611154493 Minsk BELAPAN in Russian 1541 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Nikolay Statkevich, chairman of the Belarusian Association of Servicemen, has stated in an interview to a BELAPAN correspondent that, according to his body of evidence, a threat of a coup d'etat came about on 9 November, the opening day of the 13th Supreme Soviet session. Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich's people were preparing to introduce his authoritarian regime to maintain themselves in power, said Nikolay Statkevich. They are involved in corruption and are afraid to lose their freedom along with their authority.

Defense Minister on Results of U.S. Visit

LD1511184593 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1100 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Our, so to speak, military-industrial delegation headed by Colonel General Pavel Kazlovskiy, the Belarusian defense minister, was greeted with unexpected amicability and respect in the United States at the end of October.

[Begin Kazlovskiy recording, in Russian] [passage omitted] What programs are outlined for interaction between the ministries? There is the so-called program, Military to the Military. This program is due to be carried out between the Defense Ministries. This program envisages meetings of delegations of various levels, of experts of various levels to study the situation both here at home, for instance, in what areas can help be really provided by the Defense Ministries, and our group of experts, for them to see the structure, teaching, and training in the U.S. Armed Forces. In that program, Military to the Military, it sets out the study of training servicemen, recruiting servicemen, younger command personnel training, and officer corps training. In all these areas—and this is defined by a memorandum that was signed in the Pentagon between the Defense Ministries, signed by the U.S. defense secretary and myself—in these areas we are to examine and tackle questions on the program Military to the Military.

The second area where work was done and where we decided matters, was on the Nunn-Lugar program—the senators who tabled this program—was considered. For the previous year a specific sum of money, and you know that in July, when I was part of a government delegation with the Supreme Soviet chairman, agreements were signed between the defense ministers, and according to that agreement, the republic was allocated $65 million for various programs. [passage omitted]

For the latest financial year $400 million was allocated, and we presented our programs on which we would like to receive [money] in the latest financial year. A new agreement was signed on the Nunn-Lugar program. Now preparations are under way for studying the proposals that we presented. [passage omitted]

We proposed a program in the area of getting rid of conventional weapons in the Republic of Belarus, utilization of rocket fuel as one program. The second program was conversion—this was the biggest program—conversion of the defense industry. The third program was retraining of servicemen, and the fourth program was one of housing for servicemen.

The third area of the Military for the Military program was an international education program. [end recording]

[Announcer] In discussion of this area of possible Belarusian- U.S. cooperation, the U.S. side proposed training, at its expense, six of our officer cadets at West Point military college, four at an air force college, and one at a U.S. infantry college.

Clinton Plan Deemed 'Gross Interference'

WS1711104293 Minsk VECHERNIY MINSK in Russian 8 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Valeriy Stepanov: "DSPS Against Partnership With NATO]

[Text] The Republican and Minsk Councils of the Movement for Democracy, Social Progress, and Justice [DSPS] have issued a statement, in which they explain their position on the results of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's visit to Belarus.

The DSPS leadership is alarmed by signs of a conspiracy between certain top Belarusian officials and the U.S. Administration, which is designed against the interests of the Belarusian people.

The document claims that U.S. President Bill Clinton "Partnership for Peace" initiative is aimed at further weakening the Republic, facilitating its unilateral disarmament, as well as undermining its participation in the agreement on collective security with brotherly republics and exchanging it with "cooperation" with NATO.

In their opinion, the unanimity between U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Stanislav Shushkevich on holding early Supreme Soviet elections in 1994 and the United States' promise to help conduct them was not accidental. This represents gross interference in the affairs of a sovereign republic, which has been made possible by the head of our state. The early elections are aimed at a quick exchange of the Belarusian Constitution with another basic law, which would liquidate social and political achievements of the working people and comfort interests of the West, pro-Western capital in the Republic, and the corrupted Mafia-led minority of society. Promises of U.S. investment are being made to impose the above-mentioned course upon the Republic.

The DSPS believes that this conspiracy foretells the continued impoverishment of the working people, poses a threat of confrontation, and will lead to a national

disaster. The party hopes that Belarusian people's deputies "will wipe out the anti-popular policies of betraying national interests" during the upcoming Supreme Soviet session.

Kebich Offers Post to Party Leader Karpenko

LD1511163893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1356 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Belarusian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich has proposed that leader of the Party of People's Accord Gennadiy Karpenko become his deputy for economic reforms. Karpenko is also Mayor of Molodechno, an administrative center not far from Minsk.

In an interview with INTERFAX, Karpenko said his area of responsibility provides for monitoring the key directives of government economic policy, including privatization. He spoke of being still undecided about the offer after consultations with party activists.

"The Prime Minister was advised to make the offer as a way of neutralizing a potentially dangerous rival," one of the activists of the People's Front faction in parliament Sergey Naumchik said. And so he did to try to get an influential deputy on his own team, Naumchik told INTERFAX. He believes Kebich will thereby deprive disgruntled deputies of possibly the only real candidate able to throw a gauntlet to the Premier if given a chance. Naumchik said the offer was not a concession to the opposition but a carrot to try to get Karpenko out of the game.

Although Karpenko does not belong to opposition ranks, he is often at odds with the cabinet, Naumchik said. In the meantime, the opposition is considering the option of Karpenko's premiership if Kebich resigns, he said. Naumchik said he would vote for Karpenko if conditions emerged for new democratic elections following his appointment.

Moldova

Party Leaders on Solving Transdniestrian Crisis

LD1611202193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1824 GMT 16 Nov 93

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] President Mircea Snegur in a speech in Chisinau on Monday said there existed all that was necessary to bring a final solution to the Transdniestrian conflict providing Tiraspol accepted the sensible compromise offered by the Moldovan government.

Snegur said Russian observers must attend negotiations between Chisinau and Tiraspol if progress is to be made. Moldova will never cede Transdniestria, which is "part of our territory," he said.

In the meantime, leaders of the large Agrarian-Democratic and Social-Democratic Parties [SDP] which support the president and look set to win the forthcoming general election say that their victory will provide good chances for a final solution to the regional conflict.

Leader of the Agrarian Democrats Aureliu Talmatskiy blamed extremists in Moldova itself for the crisis rather than local pro- communists or nationalists in Tiraspol. He said it was Moldovan hardliners who sowed the seeds of distrust between Tiraspol and Chisinau.

IF [INTERFAX] Note: Independent experts say the Transdniestrian conflict was largely provoked by the nationalists of the Christian-Democratic People's Front, a large opposition party calling for unification of Moldova and Romania.

Talmatskiy is appealing for Moldovan laws affecting Transdniestria in one way or other to be amended. "It is necessary that the draft constitution's concept of a national state be abandoned, a special status for Transdniestria worked out the focus shifted from the words 'federation' or 'confederation'", he said. What matters is the substance of relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol rather than the name, Talmatskiy says.

His view is echoed by SDP leader Oazu Nantoy, though he does not believe that a quick solution to the conflict can be achieved at the moment. Nantoy says the regaining of Tiraspol's trust in Chisinau is not possible until all opposition parties and movements which are in favor of uniting with Romania and against Moldovan independence have been outlawed. Nantoy, who formerly acted as the president's political aide, suggests that the Front-sponsored Tsara newspaper be closed as a way of drawing the carpet from under the Front's feet and regaining Transdniestria's trust.

The SDP leader says following measures must be taken to help improve ethnic relations and the overall political situation in the country:

- a nationwide referendum must be held to clarify the people's position on Moldovan independence.

- a legal groundwork be set up to help resolve the Gagauz problem and give an impetus to solution-finding in Transdniestria.

Nantoy said "the SDP has drawn up a bill on a special status to Transdniestria which provides for common citizenship, constitution, monetary and banking systems and foreign policy."

Kazakhstan

Russian Foreign Minister Visits

Talks With Nazarbayev Postponed

LD1611171093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1538 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Voskoboynikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] The talks between the Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev scheduled for Tuesday evening in Almaty have been postponed until Wednesday morning. The major reason for Kozyrev's delay in Tashkent was "difficult negotiations" with Uzbek President Islam Karimov, a high ranking Russian diplomat close to Kozyrev told INTERFAX.

According to the diplomat, Karimov was "perplexed" by the fact that the Russian minister had raised the issue on conditions for the Russian-speaking population in Uzbekistan. The Uzbek president believes that was no problem in the republic, but at the level of individuals. "It is wrong to speak of any discrimination with respect to the Russian-speaking population at state level," declared Karimov.

The diplomat said that reaction of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev may be identical. As he said, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry Andrey Kozyrev intends to discuss the issue of the Russian-speaking population living in Kazakhstan at the talks in Almaty.

The situation in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan's participation in CIS coalition forces stationed on the Tajik-Afghan border are among other important issues to be discussed in the Kazakh capital. "In contrast to Uzbekistan Kazakhstan has not fulfilled its obligations to send its servicemen to the Tajik-Afghan border until now," said the Russian diplomat. He also reported that Kozyrev intends to discuss the situation which arose due to Kazakhstan's decision to leave the ruble zone and the future of the space launch center Baykonur.

Kozyrev Arrives

LD1611163893 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in Kazakh 1500 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] A Russian Federation delegation arrived in the capital of our republic on the evening of 16 November. The delegation, led by Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, is visiting a number of Central Asia republics. It is expected that tomorrow they will meet leaders of Kazakhstan. Andrey Kozyrev might be received by President Nursultan Nazarbayev.

These meetings will examine the situation that has developed in the CIS countries with the introduction of national currencies by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as well as issues of deepening and intensifying integration processes in the economic sphere. It is anticipated that both countries will discuss the situation in Tajikistan and ways of tackling it. They will also coordinate the activities of the multilateral peace-keeping forces on the Tajik- Afghan border. The delegation will leave for the capital of Tajikistan on 17 November.

Meets With Suleymenov

LD1611185393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1754 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Almaty, 16 Nov—Immediately after he arrived in the capital of Kazakhstan from Tashkent this afternoon, Andrey Kozyrev, head of the foreign political department of the Russian Federation, met his Kazakh counterpart Tuleutay Suleymenov.

Andrey Kozyrev's talks in Uzbekistan took more time than planned, and therefore his arrival in Almaty was delayed by two hours, which in its turn brought about certain changes in the program of his stay in Kazakhstan.

The main events in the program of the Russian minister were moved to Wednesday [17 November]. Tomorrow morning he will have a conversation with Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev, and there will be working meetings at the Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministries.

Taking part in the talks during the four-day working visit of Andrey Kozyrev's trip to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan is Boris Gromov, Russian Federation first deputy minister of defense.

At the end of the meeting with the president of Kazakhstan, Andrey Kozyrev plans to fly to Dushanbe for the concluding stage in his working trip round the countries of the Central Asian region.

Cancels Nazarbayev Talks, Meets Tereshchenko

LD1711120393 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] [Announcer] Talks were held in Almaty today between Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Sergey Tereshchenko. Here is a report by our correspondent Andrey Kondrashov

[Kondrashov] The talks took place behind closed doors and the content of the conversation was not made known to journalists by the participants right up to the end. After the talks, however, at an improvised news conference, Andrey Kozyrev and Sergey Tereshchenko replied to a number of questions. According to the head of Russia's foreign policy department, questions of the strengthening of the legal base in relations with Kazakhstan were decided at the talks. They had discussed the possibility of concluding a whole series of agreements that had been envisaged in the comprehensive treaties

already signed by Boris Yeltsin and Nursultan Nazarbayev. These agreements include such important elements as a consulate convention, agreements on the legal protection of and assistance to Russian citizens in Kazakhstan and on setting up a commission on human rights, and others.

Also discussed at the talks was the highly topical question for Russian-speaking people in Kazakhstan—the question of dual citizenship. Replying to a question from Radio Rossii about the results of this discussion, Andrey Kozyrev remarked: Evidently later we will find a solution that will be in the interests of both states, and what is most important, in the interests of people themselves. Kazakhstan has its own legislation and its own procedures in this field. However, the position of Russia continues to be, Kozyrev emphasized, that we consider it advisable everywhere and in all republics to use the institution of dual citizenship.

Also raised at the talks was a large block of questions connected with the Tajik-Afghan border. These included the questions of its joint defense, collectively bringing troops up to strength, the material contribution of Kazakhstan, and other matters. After the expiry of the period of the treaty between Russia and Kazakhstan on the joint defense of the common border of the CIS, Kazakhstan has agreed to continue cooperation in a new form.

Andrey Kozyrev and Sergey Tereshchenko also announced that preparations for a meeting between the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan were, in the same way, proceeding normally.

At the end of the improvised news conference in Almaty, the foreign minister of the Russian Federation left for Dushanbe at 0900 [0600 GMT].

[Almaty KAZTAG in Russian at 1100 GMT on 17 November transmits the following information: "The conversation scheduled for the morning of 17 November between Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Nursultan Nazarbayev did not take place. It was canceled because the head of Kazakhstan felt poorly."]

Government Introduces Tenge as National Currency

PM1711114393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Vladimir Ardayev report: "Kazakhstan: The Ruble Is Dead? Long Live Live the Tenge!"]

[Excerpts] On Friday evening Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev spoke on republic television. He announced that he had signed an edict introducing as of Monday 15 November a new monetary unit—the tenge—which is to become the sole unit of payment in the state at 0800 hours. [passage omitted]

As of 0800 on Monday 1,000-, 5,000-, and 10,000-ruble banknotes ceased to be legal tender, while all the rest are in circulation until Thursday. At the weekend people rushed to get rid of their "surplus" money, and in large denominations what is more.

Here too the commercial sector displayed fearless indifference to the government's innovations—it took money, and how! On Saturday a dozen chicken eggs were being offered at Almaty market for 15,000 rubles [R] and the chicken itself for R50,000, and the same price for luxury goods in the shape of a bottle of champagne. The tension manifested itself in the reaction caused by the publication in IZVESTIYA (No. 215) of a commentary entitled "Almaty Implements Monetary Reform. Panic in the Republic." Yanvarbek Tlevlesov, director of the "Daur" Republic Newspaper-Journal Publishing House, familiarized me with the minutes of a meeting of the printing house's labor collective. It emerges from this document and from the director's explanations that there was indeed a long delay in publishing newspapers on the night of 8-9 November, but by no means because print personnel refused to turn up for work demanding increased wages and social guarantees, as the report said. But solely for good reasons.

It emerges from the minutes that printing house personnel considered their collective to have been insulted and demanded that the leadership get the newspaper to publish a rebuttal or otherwise stop printing IZVESTIYA in Kazakhstan. Incidentally, print personnel's wages were nonetheless increased, and that is a very good thing.

Yanvarbek Sagimbayevich also spoke of the numerous social privileges that "Daur" Publishing House personnel enjoy. I hope that this detailed resume of our conversation (far more detailed than the seven and a half lines of newsprint in issue No. 215) will satisfy him and the collective and that IZVESTIYA will still be published in Kazakhstan.

Exchange Rate To Be Set at 250 Rubles

LD1611221793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1908 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Kazakh First Vice Prime Minister Daulet Sembayev [name as received] today said the rate of Kazakhstan's national currency, the tenge, will be set at about 250 Russian rubles, or 4.74 tenge for one dollar. He made this statement in an interview with the republican television in Almaty today. He said the National Bank of Kazakhstan will announce the tenge's official rate against the Russian ruble and the U.S. dollar on November 17.

Sembayev also said Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev had decided to restructure the republic's gold and currency reserves by exchanging some of them into Russian rubles. The hard currency will be sold at an auction in Almaty on November 19, while a ruble auction will be held on November 23. The means derived will be used to back the tenge, Sembayev said.

He said the National Bank Currency Exchange will be transformed into a Kazakh Interbank Currency

Exchange. Sembayev said owners of cash Russian rubles will be able to exchange them at special offices starting November 25.

U.S. Vice President Gore To Visit Mid-December

LD1611183493 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in Kazakh 1500 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] President Nursultan Nazarbayev today received William Courtney, the U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, at his request. The diplomat conveyed a personal message from Bill Clinton to President Nazarbayev. It proposes to hold a number of summit meetings in the near future with the aim of establishing close and stable relations between Kazakhstan and the United States. Clinton invited Nazarbayev to visit the United States at the beginning of 1994. Before that U.S. Vice President Albert Gore is expected to visit Kazakhstan in the middle of December.

William Courtney reported that the United States welcomes Kazakhstan's decision on introducing the national currency, and is ready to render it comprehensive assistance by pooling the efforts of international financial organizations. They are talking about a sum of more than $2 billion which could be granted to the republic within a period of two years. In the near future Kazakhstan will receive $400 million in accordance with an agreement on guaranteed loans with the IMF.

The ambassador reaffirmed that rendering assistance to Kazakhstan in its creation of a powerful market economy is one of the priorities in United States policy. President Nursultan Nazarbayev expressed gratitude to President Bill Clinton for the message and support on the part of the United States at this difficult time connected with the introduction of the national currency. Also under discussion were some other topical issues related to U.S.-Kazakhstani cooperation in different spheres.

National Bank Chairman Becomes Cabinet Member

LD1611191293 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in Kazakh 1500 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] The president of the Republic of Kazakhstan has issued a decree on changes in the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Galym Baynazarov, the chairman of the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, became a member of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan so as to ensure internal and external stabilty of the national currency and implement efficient state monetary and credit policy.

Tajikistan

Rakhmanov Discusses Current Issues

LD1611182393 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 1525 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Dear compatriots, tonight we will present a live discussion program on the occasion of the first anniversary of the 16th session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan. This program is being attended by esteemed Imamali Sharifovich Rakhmanov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan. Your host is journalist Ibrahim Ismatov.

[Ismatov] Dear viewers, peace be upon you. Today is the eve of the first anniversary of the 16th session of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan. It was a session which saved our government system from drowning. The main path to saving us from drowning was the election of the legitimate government headed by Imamali Sharifovich Rakhmanov.

Dear friends, as you know, we have promised that on the eve of the first anniversary of this session we will hold a live and open discussion with Imamali Sharifovich Rakhmonov, head of state and chairman of the Supreme Soviet. At the beginning we ask the head of state to speak briefly on the main (?achievements) during this period, and then we will begin asking him questions raised by you. Our telephone lines are still open, the numbers are 278926, 223259, 231538, and 226291.

[Rakhmanov] Dear compatriots, peace be upon you. One year has passed since the opening of the 16th session of the Supreme Soviet of the republic. This session will be remembered in the history of the Tajik people as an epoch-making event, because the session brought about a full turning point in the life of the country. Recalling any historical event is an opportunity to look back to the past and to examine our achievements and failures. Today the people of Tajikistan have the right to ask the leadership of the republic what they have done during the past year and what are their plans for the future.

Of course, every one of you dear compatriots knows what the leadership of the country has done during this period. However, in any case I wanted to briefly talk about the successes and failures and achievements and shortcomings of the past year. As you are aware, parallel to my election as chairman of the Supreme Soviet I pledged, as the head of state, to direct all available powers and resources toward resolving the following issues:

To end the fratricidal war as soon as possible and restore a tranquil life to the people.

To eliminate disunity and achieve national unity.

To resolve all the current problems through peaceful means and negotiations.

To establish fruitful international relations by fully utilizing political means.

To fully return the refugees and to save the compatriots from poverty and wandering.

Today, on the eve of the first anniversary of the 16th session of the Supreme Soviet, I can tell my people that although people's lives might not have improved, although great economic crisis may be facing us, we have carried out our important duty as far as ending the

fratricidal wars, preserving the unity of the beloved homeland, and ensuring peace and tranquillity for the citizens are concerned. Today the paralyzed state apparatus and the ruined administrative bodies have been restored and the situation in the republic is under the control of the center.

In order to stabilize the political situation, general amnesties were declared in the 16th session of the Supreme Soviet and then twice more. The armed forces of the republic were organized with the disinterested assistance of friendly countries. The law enforcement bodies, the forces of the Internal Affairs Ministry and of the National Security Committee were reinforced in the center and all the oblasts and rayons. The people trusted that they had a firm government and that this government is able to ensure its security. Crime which reached its peak on the eve of the 16th session and during the first couple of months after the session decreased considerably. Movement of people in the streets of the towns and villages is taking place without any fear. The absolute majority of refugees residing in Afghanistan, in the rayons of the republic, and in the republics of the CIS were repatriated to their original places of residence. The danger of the spread of cholera and other contagious diseases, which was the result of the cruel and barbaric wars of fratricide, was overcome. The economic and political blockade of the republic and the danger of famine were eliminated.

Dear viewers, of course how these plans were implemented and with whose efforts and strivings does not require much explanation. I only would like to note with particular satisfaction that in this difficult road which we have chosen all the people have supported us, and today we are all thankful that our persecuted people in all corners of the republic are breathing freely and are living in tranquillity.

Truly, today no one in the republic has the right to forget the memory of those heroes who have sacrificed their lives for the restoration of righteousness and justice. Looking after the families who have lost their breadwinners in this struggle or those who have lost their ability to work is one of our top duties. As far as orphaned children are concerned I would like to say that beginning with the new year, education and training will start for 2,000 children in the schools in the areas which have suffered, and all their provisions will be met by the government.

Similarly, as far as the relocation of the returning refugees are concerned, instructions have been issued for their homes to be vacated by those who have illegally occupied them and to return them to their owners by the winter.

The employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the National Security Committee, and the Procuracy of the republic, the 201st Division, the border guards of the Russian Federation, as well as the peace-keeping forces which have recently arrived in Tajikistan from the five CIS member countries—Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan [as heard]—have played a significant role in ensuring peace and tranquillity in the republic.

Today I can say with full confidence that the abovementioned forces can fully ensure peace and security in our country in the future. The role of the friendly and fraternal states and of their leaders in our achievements is extremely significant. In our difficult moments they have provided us with much needed material and moral support. We are expressing our sincere gratitude to the people of Russia and their president, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin; the Uzbek people and their president, Islam Karimov; the Kazakh people and their president, Nursultan Nazarbayev; the Kyrgyz people and their president, Askar Akayev; and other peoples of the CIS as well as other foreign countries such as the United States of America, the Peoples Republic of China, Turkey, India and so on.

The people of Tajikistan will never forget their attention and humanitarian assistance. Similarly, in our most difficult moments international organizations, and first of all the United Nations, extended their assistance to our nation. The people of Tajikistan will eternaly remain thankful to them.

Following the 16th session of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, serious changes have taken place in the foreign policy of Tajikistan. A new phase has begun. The newly independent Tajikistan bases its foreign policy on respect and recognition of international norms and standards, defending the lofty interests of Tajikistan in the international arena, territorial integrity, mutual noninterference in internal affairs, and mutually beneficial cooperation. Taking into account the interests of Tajikistan we intend to establish strong diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with all countries of the international community.

In this respect we have achieved some successes. For example we have signed treaties of friendship and cooperation with the Russian Federation and the republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

In our foreign policy we will give priority to the countries of the CIS because Tajikistan is a full member of the Commonwealth. On the other hand all spheres of our life are strongly linked with these countries. Of course, this does not mean that we will not have relations with other countries. We will cooperate with all countries of the world on the basis of mutual interests. It is in the interests of Tajikistan to cooperate on the basis of good-neighborly relations and beneficial economic cooperation with the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Saudi Arabia [as heard], the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and other Islamic countries.

We are making efforts to have good relations with the countries of Europe, America, Asia and Africa, and to make use of their political and economic experiences. During the past one year the Republic of Tajikistan

joined a number of international and regional organizations. Today our independent state has been recognized by 114 countries of the world.

The participation of the Tajik head of state in the 48th session of the UN General Assembly opened a new page in the destiny of the Tajik people. It was made possible for me to tell the world public from this tribune about the problems facing Tajikistan today. Although the majority of countries have recognized us, not all of them had sufficient information about the pains and sufferings, the aims and objectives and the calamity which have befallen our people as a result of the fratricidal war. Today the majority of the world public have changed their opinions about Tajikistan and they have expressed a readiness to render all-round cooperation with us. We will continue beneficial cooperation with international organizations because we have undertaken to implement their charters.

I am fully confident that Tajikistan as a newly independent country will join the ranks of the countries of the world community and will find its deserved position. Meetings held with leaders of a number of countries have achieved good results.

I am not going to talk in detail about each meeting. However, I would like to remind you the significance of one of them, namely a meeting with Professor Borhanoddin Rabbani, the head of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. The negotiations with him which took place in Kabul and the meeting which is scheduled in Dushanbe will be a reliable basis for resolving the most important task of the day, which is to complete the repatriation of refugees and to transform the border between the two states into a zone of friendship and good-neighborliness. Taking advantage of this admirable opportunity, I express the sincere gratitude of my nation to Professor Borhanoddin Rabbani. In addition other negotiations were of similar importance and significance.

Generally speaking, the year which has passed was a first stage and the beginning of our social and political life and we were mainly busy in this period in resolving those issues which the times required. One has to frankly say that being busy with the restoration of our state, we did not pay sufficient attention to resolving the burning social and economic issues. Now that we have ensured the restoration of our state from the political and security point of view, we will be busy with the solution of other issues.

On the other hand, so far there is no significant improvement in the economic field of the country, which has been devastated as a result of the destruction of economic relations with the former Soviet Union republics and the civil war. Industry is in crisis. As a result of the armed clashes and natural disasters the economy of our republic has been badly damaged. This damage is estimated at more than 500 billion rubles. In addition to this, the volume of production in all fields of industry has been reduced. This situation has negatively affected the social life of society and the living standard of the people. Agriculture, which is the main branch of the national economy of the republic, has been completely destroyed. Similarly, industry is in difficulties because of a shortage of experts and raw materials. The republic's transport system, agro-industrial complex, and housing and communal services have suffered badly as a result of the civil war. Damage to the social sphere is great [words indistinct].

That is why we have to learn lessons from the past and to enter more seriously into a new stage, as the final results of our work depend to a large extent on making a good start. The first priority tasks of a new stage, first of all, are the restoration and development of those things which have been destroyed, implementation of economic reform, entering into a wider circle of the market economy, improving living standards in backward regions, and so on. Special government programs have been prepared and improved to tackle these issues. It should also be pointed out that we cannot achieve our goals only by preparing and improving these programs; they should be implemented in practice, and their implementation depends on our efforts.

Similarly, one has to admit that it is not easy to save the country from such deep crisis. That is why, addressing all inhabitants of the republic, I would like to ask them to work honestly to improve our life. [passage omitted]

Today we need such an education system and schools that can bring up good individuals who, besides all-round knowledge, should possess modern skills and good behaviour. We do not need sham high education diplomas any more. We need experts at international level. We appeal to the poets and artists to use the cultural wealth of the world, and to them to make efforts in order to bring our culture and literature up to international level. At the same time we do not allow pornography and other negative influences on our national customs to be developed. We will struggle against any kind of extremist efforts, and appeals for war and for national, tribal, and religious clashes. While providing conditions for future development of the Tajik language and literature together with teaching of the official Cyrillic alphabet, we will provide wider conditions to teach our old script.

Dear compatriots, as you know, the 16th session of the Supreme Soviet has declared the respect of our republic to the principles of creation of a law-based, democratic, and secular society, which are approved in the world. By creating a secular society, however, we do not provide any obstacles to religious belief of our compatriots. Let the people practice any religion they like. Being a country, nearly 90 percent of whose population follow the Islamic religion, we cannot distance ourselves from the Islamic world. We will make efforts to learn and to teach the humanitarian wealth of the Islamic religion, since the spiritual wealth, ancient science and literature, and the customs of our ancestors have close connections with the religion of Islam. We respect the religious people and the religious figures, who can help society in

religious education, national reconciliation and mutual understanding of the people. In order to implement our plans we will cooperate with all kinds of parties and organizations which aim to serve the people.

Dear comrades, the issue related to selection and placement of the leading cadres was always an important one but in this period of time this issue will occupy a more important position. Unfortunately, our experience of the past year has shown that we rushed the selection of some cadres and appointed unworthy people to responsible positions. The majority of our mistakes are connected with this, and only the leaders of many fields of the national economy are to blame for lagging behind. At this difficult time, the leaders of some ministries and departments, such as the Ministry of Social Security of the country, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Rural Construction, and others are able to display initiative and thus resolve their most important problems.

However, many other ministries cannot cope with their tasks. Unfortunately, a number of heads of national economy departments have not yet achieved leadership skills in a new economic situation and they are not making efforts to achieve this. So far some leaders are thinking about the old methods of leadership and waiting for instructions and decisions. Many officials spend plenty of their time on long business trips and fail to resolve any problems for the interests of the republic. The agreements signed by them are not useful for the republic; on the contrary they cause harm to the republic instead of yielding any benefits. Today, I want to say frankly that we cannot be on the same line for long with such people who cause harm to our republic.

It is a pity that some officials who cannot cope with one position are thinking about how to get other positions. They are searching for ways of achieving their own goals. One of these ways is to raise an issue related to the formation of new oblasts and rayons. Is it necessary to form new oblasts and rayons at a time hen the budget of the republic is in crisis, people have a difficult life, and we cannot find money to construct boarding schools? Today the expenditures of the government of the republic amount to more than 7 billion rubles. This is only to finance the leadership at all levels, from the soviets to the government of the republic. Is it necessary to double this amount? And finally, is it beneficial for the common people? Of course not. In practice we are thinking of promoting the idea of providing more rights and authorities to local structures and abolishig many ministries and departments which are not beneficial for society, and also of merging some of them.

I have to point out that the role of radio and ttelevision is very significant in agitation and in implementation of the ideas and goals of the present government. They have to cover the everyday activities of the government. Unfortunately, sometimes programs are broadcast which do not fully cover our present life and cause doubts and misunderstanding among the people. The leadership and the employees of the radio, television, and the press have to improve their activities and regard this as a most important ideological method.

Generally speaking, we entering a new stage of our life, in which everybody must work honestly. Of course, I cannot speak about all aspects of life of the republic during the past year. That is why I have made up my mind to answer in this live broadcast your questions concerning the activity of the government. I am ready today to serve my people. Thank you for your attention.

[Ismatov] Let us begin with those question which we have received previously. Here is a question from (Ayni) street and this question was just phoned in by (Zamira Solehova), and she says that together with her husband she gets 50,000 rubles [R] a month. They spend R25,000 on bread alone. Is it possible to feed four children with the remaining R25,000? There are many such questions related to bread prices and salary. What can you say in connection with these questions?

[Rakhmanov] Dear compatriots, the leadership of the government had to increase the price of bread. The people of our republic have to know that although the price of bread was increased by the government, if we take into account allowances which are given by the state and government to the people in connection with the bread price increase, and if we calculate them, then we will find that in comparision with other CIS republics, the price of bread is lower in our republic. [passage omitted]

[Ismatov] (Munavarshoyev) asks this question: Do not we have conditions to grow wheat, and why do not we buy wheat cheaper from the Republic of Kazakhstan as we have signed an agreement with this republic, and we buy wheat from other places such as the United States and Canada? What can you say in connection with this question?

[Rakhmanov] We have signed two agreements with the fraternal Republic of Kazakhstan on the delivery of more than 500,000 tonnes of wheat to our republic. I have instructed Sobirov, the minister of bread of our republic, to sign bilateral agreements with the Ministry of Bread of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and this has been done. Similarly, I had a talk with Nursulatan Nazarbayev, president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, on this matter and he has promised to help us. But unfortunately, some of our buyers purchase wheat from this republic via mediators of other countries, especially the United States of America. [passage omitted]

[Ismatov] Here is a question related to Tajikistan being in the ruble zone. What can you say about this question?

[Rakhmanov] I want to say that it was my fate to be head of state at such a difficult time. I want to say that my aim, the aim of the leadership of the government and the members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was to remain in the ruble zone and so far we have not changed our aim, as we do not have another way. I recently had a telephone conversation with esteemed Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation,

and we discussed this issue in the course of our conversation. A group of representatives of the Russian Federation, headed by Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, will pay a visit to our republic in the near future and once again we will discuss the issue related to Tajikistan being in the ruble zone. [passage omitted]

[Ismatov] There is another question from (Mahdi Solehzoda) of Dushanbe city. He says that some members of the government are not up to their jobs. They have either come to power by coincidence or under pressure from some groups, even anti- government groups. Some others were given their jobs during the opposition's rule. There is a lot of talk among the people about their incompetence.

[Rakhmanov] One cannot hide these things from the people. When the page of history turned and destiny entrusted me with such a great responsibility, it was unexpected to me. The people of the republic know who was working with whom, however, we tried to bring into the government the representatives of all sections of the society as well as all regions of the republic to work together and to save the people from the verge of calamity. Many of them had worked in the composition of the government—the government of national reconciliation—and had dealings with it. We do not deny this and people know this [words indistinct]. People should also know that on many occasions I have appealed to several people, to people who had good expertise and were experts. We proposed that they should become deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, procurator of the republic, and lead the ministries of [word indistinct] and internal affairs. However, they did not trust us. The other thing is that they did not trust the people. They were afraid of what they had been doing and knew that they were guilty. [passage omitted]

[Ismatov] There are many more questions. Some are repeats. One questioner asks whether a session of the Supreme Soviet will be convened this year or not?

[Rakhmanov] Preparations are in hand to convene a session of the Supreme Soviet. We are making efforts to prepare those laws that will be presented to the Supreme Soviet during its next regular session. Some of these laws have been presented to the people's deputies. The people of the republic will be informed of the date of the next session. One thing which should not be forgotten is that today the most basic daily issues facing the people are the issues of currency and fuel. If we gather in the hall of the Supreme Soviet, no matter how many decisions and decrees we adopt, if these decisions are not implemented and just remain on paper, they will not benefit the people.

[Ismatov] This question is about the constitution. In what stage is it in, and approximately when it will be adopted?

[Rakhmanov] Work is going ahead on the constitution. The people of the republic should not be worried about this. During our visit to New York, a working group had [word indistinct] on the draft of the new constitution. They also visited Turkey and other developed countries of the world so as to enable us to adopt a constitution which would conform with the conditions and national traditions of our people. The constitution will be put before the people for discussion and will be adopted after these discussions are complete. [passage omitted]

[Ismatov] There are a few more questions, one of which—sent to us by telegram—refers to Safarali Kenjayev [former Tajik parliament speaker]. The question is, why was Safarali Kenjayev not given any job in the government, because he worked hard for the restoration of the government?.

[Rakhmanov] I want to tell the people of the republic that both during the 16th session of the Supreme Soviet which was held in the historic town of Khojand and also before the 17th session of the Supreme Soviet which was held in Dushanbe, we proposed a number of posts to esteemed Safarali Kenjayev, but they were not to his liking. [passage omitted]

[Ismatov] At the end of this discussion, I would like to say that this discussion you had with our esteemed viewers and with the people will have benefited them and that hopefully this will not be the last such meeting.

[Rakhmanov] I declare to my beloved people that I will try any time, and it is my intention and hope that I will not remain detached from my people and will take advantage of my free time to meet the workers and intellectuals of the republic in order to enable me to correct my mistakes. As I pledged to the people of the republic during the 16th session of the Supreme Soviet—and it was a decisive and strong pledge—all my life will be in the service of the people. In the course of the most difficult moments I feel myself together with my people and I am trying not to be detached from them and not to be a spectator, in order not to commit the same mistakes which were committed in years past. I am fully confident that those who did not receive answers today will receive their answers. I am fully confident that our first discussion with all the citizens of the republic was a free one and it will not be the last one. I will try to hold more meetings in the enterprises, farms, and rayons with my people. Thank you all. I wish you good health.

[Ismatov] Thank you, Imamali Sharifovich. I express gratitude to you on behalf of the staff of Tajik Television [as heard] for your participation in this discussion, and also express thanks to dear viewers who have taken part in this live discussion with their questions and by watching it. I hope tranquillity will come to our lives and our people will achieve the level of prosperity which they deserve. Thank you. Good night.

Russian Officer on Tension Along Afghan Border

LD1611200693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1705 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] There are signs of a possible setback on the Tajik-Afghan border, head of the analytical department

of the Russian military command in Tajikistan Colonel Vladimir Maslivets told Interfax. Tajik rebels and Afghan mujaheddin are poised to resume large scale operations, he said.

In his words, the militants were building up strength both on the Afghan border and inside Tajikistan itself including the area close to the Turg Mount which is under control by Russian guards. Maslivets put the rebels' strength at some 5000 members, many of them involved in previous battles against Russian guards.

The spokesman pledged that there would be no repeat of the July incident in which 22 guards and three servicemen were killed. The 201 motorized division sent troops reinforcements and weapons to all border posts which are also given artillery cover. Plans have been drawn up to deliver supplies by land or air to any part of the border, Maslivets said.

"We are capable of repulsing any cross border attack to the detriment of the attackers, but all sides will stand to gain if border tension is eased in a peaceful way," he said.

Dushanbe Reportedly Not Negotiating With Opposition

LD1611194293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1705 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Tajikistan's Coordination Center of Democratic Forces has rejected assertions of the Dushanbe authorities stating that the republic's government has allegedly started negotiations with the opposition's leadership.

"Until now Tajikstan's leadership has not voiced any official address to the opposition with a proposal to start negotiations and they are not holding any talks now," says the statement of the Center's chairman Otakhon Lafiti distributed on Tuesday in Moscow. In his words, meetings between Deputy Chairman of Tajikistan's Supreme Soviet Kozidavalat Koimdodov with separate groups of refugees should not be viewed as official meetings. Latifi underlined that a peaceful settlement is the only way to solve this problem.

According to the data at the disposal of the Tajik opposition, Tajikistan's leadership has failed to find a common opinion regarding negotiations with the opposition.

The leadership of the Tajik opposition views Russia's peacemaking efforts as the single way out of the existing situation and has declared about its readiness to accept mediation role of Russia as of other interested countries and international organizations as well.

Uzbekistan

Karimov Meets With Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev

LD1611174793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1452 GMT 16 Nov 93

[From the "Panorama" newscast]

[Text] Today, Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Andrey Kozyrev met President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov and had a confidential talk with him. Commenting on the results of his Tashkent meeting, Andrey Kozyrev said, in part:

It seems to me that the main outcome is the consonance, the fundamental coincidence of the brief that President Yeltsin gave me before I left and what President Karimov has said, and that is so, in spite of all the difficulties, be they economic or financial, of the transition to new circumstances, all difficulties relating to people seeking their new place in society, and specifically that includes the Russian-speaking population. But it is a firm intention of the leadership of the two states to cooperate and remain close. What is at issue is a strategic policy toward partnership in accordance with a treaty. All these issues that life is bringing to the fore will be resolved through negotiations and comprehensive debate without dictate of any kind. These are relations of a special kind, relations of partnership and mutual understanding. This, Andrey Kozyrev stressed in the interview, is the most important result.

On the issue of the Tajik-Afghan border conflict, the Russian foreign affairs minister said the following:

On this too, there is much more coincidence of views than it at times appears. In actual fact there is a common policy within the framework of the CIS approach toward promoting a stabilization of the situation in two main ways. The first way is to help the leadership of Tajikistan in stabilization. It is for this purpose that coalition forces are being strengthened, that there is cooperation on maintaining the border, the common border, between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and that economic assistance is being provided, including to Gornyy Badakhshan.

The second way is assistance in establishing a political dialogue. I believe, stressed Andrey Kozyrev, that here in Tashkent there was a very comprehensive and earnest discussion of these aspects at the level of experts, the delegations, and executive departmental representatives. In other words, this is a dialogue aimed at practical cooperation on the border, on the economy, on policy and, naturally, on what relates to aid to Tajikistan.

That was an account of an interview that Andrey Kozyrev gave to our correspondent Maya Ganiyeva in Tashkent.

Talks 'Not at All Easy'

LD1611131893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1123 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Talks between Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Uzbek President Islam Karimov in Tashkent Tuesday were not at all easy, a senior Russian diplomat in Kozyrev's entourage told Interfax.

The reason, he says, was that Kozyrev raised the issue of the Russian-speaking population, reported to be as large as 3.5 Mn in Uzbekistan.

Russian Ambassador to Uzbekistan Filipp Sidorskiy said that a daily average of 700 people applied to the embassy for Russian citizenship and permission to settle permanently in Russia.

"This problem does not exist," Islam Karimov said. He added that if Sidorskiy's remarks prove untrue, the Russian diplomat "will have to answer for his statement."

Official: Afghanistan on 'Verge of Disintegration'

LD1611210193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1908 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] In an interview with Interfax a high-ranking official from the Uzbek Defense Ministry has said Uzbekistan is interested in the territorial integrity of Afghanistan. He claimed that Afghanistan is on the verge of disintegration: it might fall into at least three countries (Tajik, Uzbek and Pushtu) which might cause a conflict of regional or even greater scale.

Afghan and Pakistani Pushtus will try to form a common state. Similar tendencies might prevail among the Tajiks living on both sides of the Pyanj. As for Afghan Uzbeks, Tashkent would not want Pan-Turanian sentiments to prevail among them. "Uzbekistan has enough pressing problems without Afghan Uzbeks," the official said.

He stressed that the present leadership of his country is not nurturing the idea of "great Uzbekistan." "Otherwise we would have long ago accepted the request of Leninabad region of Tajikistan, where Uzbeks constitute a considerable share of the population and incorporated it. But this is not our choice," the official stressed.

More on the subject in Diplomatic Panorama on November 17.

Republic Gets MFN Status in U.S. Trade Agreement

PM1711111193 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Adilbek Kaipbergenov: "Profitable Tashkent"]

[Text] U.S. Ambassador Henry Clarke and Uzbekistan Deputy Prime Minister Bakhtiyar Khamidov have signed an intergovernmental agreement in Tashkent. In accordance with the agreement, exports to the United States from this major Central Asian country will be granted most-favored status.

Armenia

Situation in Karabakh, Azerbaijani Border Reported

NC1611171193 Yerevan Radio Yerevan in Azeri 1430 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, we now present a report on the latest incidents in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] and the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Wide-scale military operations have not taken place along the NKR's front lines. However, the situation is unstable. The main reason for this state of affairs is the provocative activities of the Azerbaijani military units during the past day.

The NKR's defense positions have been fired on almost every day. The NKR defense headquarters has disclosed that Azerbaijan's military forces uninterruptedly fired on the Armenian positions in the northwestern and northern parts of the front lines yesterday and the two nights ago. For example, the Armenian defense positions in Fizulinskiy Rayon were fired on from Azerbaijan's positions in Kelbadzharskiy Rayon two nights ago. Consequently, two Armenian soldiers were killed, and five others were wounded. However, Azerbaijan's military units did not end their provocative activities after that incident. They also fired on the defense positions in (Matavis) from the occupied areas in Mardakertskiy Rayon.

The NKR defense forces refrained from retaliating. They remained committed to the orders they received from their command headquarters to unilaterally observe the cease-fire agreement. Meanwhile, the NKR's military intelligence units have reported that Azerbaijan is massing volunteers and armored vehicles in the eastern sector of the front lines. [passage omitted]

Negotiations are the only way to resolve the dispute. However, the political ambitions in Azerbaijan have a significant bearing on the situation. In fact, they are deepening the confrontation.

Azerbaijan has not relinquished it policy of using force. Explaining the danger of that policy is unnecessary. The consequences of that policy are obvious. Dozens of residential areas have been destroyed, and their peaceful residents have been forced to become refugees. It is a crime to play with the people's future.

Tension continues to be high on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, there were no serious incidents in that region yesterday or last night. We hope that the sides will contribute to the process of establishing peace and security by refraining from any move that might worsen the situation.

National Currency Introduction Expected Soon

LD1611194093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1705 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] In an interview with Interfax on Tuesday, Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of Armenia Aravat Minasyan reaffirmed information on introduction of Armenia's national currency, the dram, which was printed in 1992 in Germany, in the short term. In his words, the need to secure the domestic market from the ruble intervention from republics which have recently introduced their own currencies, for example, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and to halt inflation rate in the republic has forced the government to undertake this move.

Well informed sources in Yerevan's financial circles told Interfax that information on the drama's introduction will be officially made public on November 19. Exchange of rubles issued in 1961-1992 for drams is expected to be started on November 22.

Azerbaijan

Yeltsin's Envoy Continues Talks on Karabakh

NC1611190693 Baku TURAN in English 1251 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Baku, November 16 (TURAN)—The plenipotentiary of the Russian president at the talks over Nagorno-Karabakh Vladimir Kazimirov have been intensively negotiating with the Azerbaijani leadership in Baku for the fourth day already. Though, according to the preliminary program Kazimirov had to leave for Yerevan for the consultations with the Armenian leaders even on Sunday. The Azeri delegation at the talks is presented by president G. Aliyev, speaker R. Guliyev and prime-minister S. Guseynov. The Russian Embassy in Baku refused to give any details on the course of the talks, they only said that the talks with the Azeri leadership go on. The Russian Embassy confirmed, that the visit to Khankendi [Stepanakert] and Yerevan is included to the program of Kazimirov's visit to the region.

The political observers in Baku say, that Kazimirov's visit to Yerevan and Khankendi will make sense only in case Baku and Moscow make a deal. The question is Azerbaijan's acceptance of the Russian plan of regulation of the conflict. As known, Russia insists that all the parties to the conflict recognize Moscow as an exclusive power to settle the Azeri-Armenian conflict. At this stage of talks Moscow offers Baku to agree to the following terms: Russia takes the Azeri-Iranian border under its control, the economic interests of Azerbaijan at the Caspian are limited to 12-miles broad zone, the Russian troops return to Azerbaijan and get the status of a military base, Baku recognizes in this or that way, the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The fact that V. Kazimirov's consultations in Baku are dragged out witnesses that the atmosphere at the talks is

tense. As Moscow correspondent of TURAN reports, Baku's obstinacy in these questions irritates Russia.

Aliyev Proposes Meeting of All Political Parties

LD1611210593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1908 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev has proposed holding a meeting of the leaders of all political parties on November 17 "for the sake of national consolidation and reunification of all social and political organizations on the basis of protecting the country's sovereignty and repelling the foreign military aggression," the presidential press office told Interfax in Baku today.

The proposal was made on the eve of the Day of National Revival to be celebrated in Azerbaijan on November 17.

A spokesman for the president said the meeting will focus on the principles of Azerbaijan's surmounting the political and economic crisis mainly caused by the "aggression on the part of Armenia."

Baku Appeals for Aid in Coping With Refugees

LD1611205593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2010 GMT 16 Nov 93

[by ITAR-TASS correspondent Bors Sitnikov]

[Text] United Nations, 16 Nov—Azerbaijan has called on the international community to help Azerbaijani refugees survive the winter, for it will not be able to cope with such a massive tragedy all on its own. This is stated in the report of Azerbaijan's permanent representation to the United Nations, which was circulated at the headquarters of the community of nations today.

"Approximately 37,000 people have left their homes since 1 November as a result of Armenia's concentrated offensive in the southwest of Azerbaijan. Many of them were forced to cross the Araks river into Iran. Others headed for the overcrowded refugee camp in Imisli, where more than 15,000 people have already gathered. There are fears that this will be the fate of even more thousands of people if the Armenian attacks on Azerbaijan continue. An acute need for blood and foodstuffs has arisen, and the authorities in Azerbaijan are insistently appealing for foreign aid to be rendered to the refugees so that they can survive the winter," it notes in the report.

Georgia

Black Sea Fleet Marines To Begin Withdrawal

LD1611141993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1356 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy]

[Text] Moscow November 16 TASS—Black Sea Fleet marines are expected to begin their withdrawal from Georgia this afternoon, military sources in Sevastopol told ITAR-TASS.

According to them, a total of 750 Black Sea Fleet marines and 40 APCs will be withdrawn aboard a Black Sea Fleet ship squadron from Poti to Sevastopol. One or two Black Sea Fleet ships will stay in Poti to control the situation.

The marines landed from nine Black Sea Fleet ships on November 4-5 on request of the Georgian leadership and on coordination with the Russian and Ukrainian presidents. Since then the local authorities have managed to stabilize the situation in the area of Poti and Zugdidi with active support of Russian marines and Black Sea Fleet ships that took under protection vital transport routes and Georgian ports.

The marines and the ship crews have had no casualties during the humanitarian action.

Forces Not To Fully Withdraw From Poti

LD1611173293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1536 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 16 Nov—The Black Sea Fleet operational force will not be fully withdrawn from Poti, Admiral Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet has told the Georgian authorities. An ITAR-TASS correspondent learned this today by telephone from the fleet headquarters. In the words of the admiral, a limited contingent of Black Sea Fleet forces, needed to maintain order in the town and guard the staging area [reyd] will remain in Poti; the military commandant's office and commandant's guard company will operate; and a senior naval officer has been appointed for the port. These are expected to interact with the Poti authorities, the Georgian naval leadership, and Russian sea-based and shore-based border guards. The commander stressed that should the situation in the Poti region become more complex, Black Sea Fleet forces could be quickly transferred and reinforced, not only by sea but also by air.

According to a report made to the ITAR-TASS correspondent at the press center of the Black Sea Fleet, in keeping with a plan adopted earlier, the peace-keeping forces of the Black Sea Fleet are leaving Poti today. The commandant's office of the Black Sea Fleet and an amphibious assault force group on a small amphibious warfare ship are remaining in this region, as well as patrol ships on the approaches to the port. The amphibious asault force group and the commandant's office are manned by warrant officers and sailors who have taken the oath to Russia and have decided to serve in this region on a voluntary basis. The sub-units of the Black Sea Fleet peace-keeping forces remaining in Poti will be guided in their activity by a specific plan, proceeding from wartime conditions and sanctioned by the fleet's commander.

The press center reports that according to the views of the local population, representatives of the administration of Poti, and the leadership of Georgia, the amphibious assault group of the Black Sea Fleet forces has stabilized the situation in this region and has revived the local economy. The Georgian side is sincerely grateful to the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet.

As learned by the ITAR-TASS correspondent from Georgian military sources, the main force of the amphibious warfare and patrol escort ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet left Poti today for Sevastopol. According to a report from this source, Admiral Eduard Baltin, the commander of the fleet, who is directly in charge of the humanitarian operation, is planning to leave Poti today on the last ship.

Zviadists Attack Government Unit; 6 Casualties

LD1611171693 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1600 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Zaza Bilikhodze, an officer at the press center of the Georgian Interior Ministry, informed CONTACT news agency that a group of eight or 10 men communicating in the Georgian language opened fire on two vehicles carrying eight people belonging to a paramilitary section of the Rescue Corps and the military police in the village of Dacheli, near Anaklia today at about 0300. Two men were killed and four wounded as a result of the shooting. One of them is in a critical condition and is being treated in an intensive care unit of Zugdidi hospital.

Full responsibility for this act lies with groups of dispersed gangs loyal to Gamsakhurdia, still in Zugdidi and its surrounding areas.

Azerbaijani Official Briefed on Azeris' Problems

NC1611204493 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] An Azerbaijani delegation led by Secretary of State Lala Shovkat Gadzhiyeva arrived in Georgia to study the living conditions and problems of Azeri people in that country on 15 November. Gadzhiyeva began to study the situation of the Azeri people in [place-name indistinct]. She was welcomed by the town's population. The serious and unresolvable situation in Georgia, which is suffering from civil war, has had negative effects on the residents of that town, as well. As if all that is not enough, local Georgian gangs use various means to intimidate the Azeri people in that country, forcing them to leave their homes. Azeris' homes have been frequently attacked, and several people have been kidnapped and taken to unknown places. They were released after their families and relatives were forced to pay large ransoms. Several people were killed in the attacks. [passage indistinct]

The officials have been unable to take the necessary measures to obstruct these activities. Consequently, many of the local citizens have been forced to leave their birthplaces.

The members of the delegation attended a meeting in the town and were briefed on the economic and social problems. They were informed that the economy is at a standstill because fuel is in short supply. Acquiring [word indistinct], bread, and other foodstuffs is difficult. The people are faced with a very difficult situation. Schoolbooks in Azeri and other materials needed for education are in short supply.

The speakers at the meeting said that they were distressed by the provocations but stressed that nothing can create animosity between the two peoples. They said: We can do without bread, electricity, and fuel. However, we must believe that something is supporting us. That must be none other than the government bodies of Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Gadzhiyeva addressed the meeting. She said: A serious situation exists in Azerbaijan and Georgia. A war is being fought in the two republics. Many people have become refugees. The disruption of relations has dealt a significant blow to the economy of the two countries and [words indistinct]. However, do not forget that bandits, robbers, and criminals can be of any nationality. Georgia is the homeland of Georgians, Azeris, and other peoples. You must have close cooperation to successfully resolve the existing problems. The Azeri and Georgian peoples have had fraternal relations for many centuries. Nothing can create discord between them.

Official Meets With Shevardnadze

LD1611194993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1724 GMT 16 Nov 93

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze has promised to make every effort to settle the situation in the predominantly Azerbaijani Marneuli, Dmanisi and Bolnisi regions. He told Azerbaijani State Secretary Lala Gadzhiyeva in Tbilisi on Monday [15 November] that Georgians and Azerbaijanis had lived together for centuries and that they had no disagreements.

Gadzhiyeva said that the current problems facing Georgia had had a strong impact on the ethnic Azerbaijanis and caused the crime rate in the predominantly Azerbaijani regions to grow. He expressed hope, however, that the traditionally friendly and cooperative relations between Georgia and Azerbaijan would continue to develop.

On the same day, the two parties exchanged ratification papers to the treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual security.

Meanwhile, chief of the Dmanisi regional police Vano Tsikhelashvili told INTERFAX that more than 15 criminal groups operating in the region were engaged in plunder and kidnaping. Through their fault, automobile traffic was interrupted with Armenia. We cannot tackle this problem on our own, said Tsikhelashvili.

IF [INTERFAX] Note: An official Azerbaijani delegation, led by Lala Gadzhiyeva, arrived in Tbilisi on Monday. In the morning the delegation visited the predominantly Azerbaijani Marneuli Region. This region is the place through which the only pipeline supplying gas to Armenia runs. At the beginning of the year, despite the Georgian authorities' pledges to ensure security in the region, the gas pipeline was exploded several times. The police failed to prove the involvement of local Azerbaijanis in these subversive acts.

Official Discusses Current Situation in Abkhazia

AU1611183693 Bratislava SME in Slovak 10 Nov 93 pp 1,6

[Interview with State Council Press Secretary Ramin Chelidze by Ivan Drabek; place and date not given—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The clash between the Abkhaz units and the Georgian Army allegedly occurred yesterday by the Inguri River on the border between Abkhazia and the "narrower" Georgia. If this INTERFAX report of yesterday referring to the Abkhaz Defense Ministry is confirmed, it could be the beginning of the second Georgian-Abkhaz war. The first, which claimed 20,000 casualties in 14 months, ended just six weeks ago with Georgian troops being pushing out of Abkhazia.

[Drabek] Can you confirm the information regarding the renewed Georgian-Abkhaz fighting?

[Chelidze] I know that the Russian press agency released a report on clashes near the railroad bridge over the Inguri River. I have not received this information, however, from our official sources. Since our units and Abkhaz units were practically within arm's reach after Zviad Gamsakhurdia's illegal factions were pushed across the Inguri River, the possibility of some incident cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, it certainly is not a beginning of our offensive. I do not believe that the Georgian government troops are preparing for a crossing into Abkhazia. At least, not yet.

[Drabek] Russian paratroopers are taking over the guard duty at strategic facilities in western Georgia. From the military- strategic point of view, the protected rear echelon frees your hands for an offensive in the direction of Abkhazia. Why should you not use it?

[Chelidze] At this time, we are very busy with the revival of the liberated regions in western Georgia devastated by the raging illegal factions. In addition to the infrastructure, the local administrative bodies must also be revived.

[Drabek] Will the removal of the blockade on the railroad and road communication between the Transcaucasus and Russia immediately continue in Abkhazia?

[Chelidze] The first stage of the plan for the control over the main transport links has affected only western Georgia, i.e., a territory recently controlled by Gamsakhurdia's bands. I only returned from Zugdidi last Monday [8 November], so I can be quite positive when I say that the first part of the plan has been completely implemented. True, the October agreement between the highest representatives of Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia included the removal of the blockade of the transport link through Abkhazia, but that is the second stage of the plan. It is too early to say when this stage is going to be implemented.

[Drabek] Could it be that the reason for your restraint is the fear that an anti-Abkhaz offensive would cause displeasure in Moscow?

[Chelidze] It would be futile to discuss this, because it is absolutely impossible for the Georgian Government troops to start some operations against the separatists right now.

[Drabek] The reports from Tbilisi say that Gamsakhurdia withdrew to the Gali region in Abkhazia. Nevertheless, the Abkhaz official sources deny this. Allegedly, this claim is to serve as an excuse for another attack on Abkhazia....

[Chelidze] Both we and the Abkhazians know that Gamsakhurdia is on their side of the Inguri River. That is 100-percent certain, for there simply was no other way of escaping. Our reconnaissance confirmed that Gamsakhurdia set up his staff half-way between the Abkhaz cities of Gali and Ochamchira.

[Drabek] If you are not preparing an armed offensive, does it mean that you still believe in a peaceful settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict?

[Chelidze] We believe that the political alternatives for a solution have not yet been exhausted. We must return to the Sochi agreements (after their violation in the middle of September, the victorious offensive of the Abkhazians ensued—editorial note), but they must be modified. One of our conditions is the resignation of the current Gudaut administration.

[Drabek] It is not very likely that the Abkhaz leadership will accept this. What will happen in such an event?

[Chelidze] Russia will intensify its anti-Abkhaz measures and the world community will probably join the economic blockade.

[Drabek] And then?

[Chelidze] We will see.

Deputy Speaker Criticizes Belarusian 'Negative' Views

LD1611224393 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Russian 1545 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Vakhtang Rcheulishvili, deputy speaker of the Georgian parliament, made a statement pointing out that the decision of the head of state to join the CIS has already at the preliminary stage shown positive results for Georgia. First, it has resulted in a change of Russia's attitude toward Georgia.

As for the refusal of Belarusia to endorse Georgia's membership in the Commonwealth, the deputy speaker emphasized that this must have been caused by a negative attitude of conservatively thinking Belarusian leaders toward the Georgian head of state as well as Yaroslav [name as received] Shushkevich's personal position. It is generally known that the Belarusian leader had an extremely negative reaction to the December-January events in Georgia followed by the downfall of the pro-fascist regime.

Abkhazians Claim Many Refugees Returning Home

LD1711120793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1038 GMT 17 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow, November 17 (TASS)—Refugees who left Abkhazia in the days when fighting was on between the Georgian Government troops and separatist forces, "started the mass crossing of the border Wednesday on their way back home from the territory of Mingrelia (western Georgia)", the press service of the Abkhazian Parliament reported today.

The source said Abkhazian troops "are conducting an operation to clear the Cala region of Abkhazia from bandits" apparently meaning the remnants of pro-Shevardnadze forces.

The press service reiterated the warning that Georgia is concentrating troops along the border river of Inguri.

Estonia

Russian Troops Could be Withdrawn by 31 Aug

LD1611215193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1908 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Russia is ready to pull out its troops from Estonian territory before August 31, 1994, the head of the Russian delegation, Valeriy Svirin, said today in the town of Lohusalu near Tallinn where the Russo-Estonian negotiations are being held.

He pointed out that this step was not easy for Russia, as the enormous number of troops withdrawn from Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak republics and other countries creates an extremely difficult situation with the accommodation of the servicemen.

At the same time, "this decision is another confirmation of the good will of the president and the Government of Russia and their intention to ensure the complete withdrawal from the territory of the Estonian Republic," Svirin stressed. Russia made this decision with the hope that basic principles of the formation of truly equal and neighborly relations with Estonia will be laid down, he pointed out.

Paper Views Submission ot No-Confidence Vote

MK1611143793 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 3

[Unattributed report in the "Estonia" column]

[Text] Yesterday the State Assembly began discussion of a draft statement on no confidence in the incumbent government. The document was submitted by 24 parliamentarians.

The newspaper KHOMMIKULEKHA [as transliterated] writes that this draft can be seen merely as a show of force by the opposition deputies. The newspaper's commentators believe that nothing will happen in the Estonian parliament because 24 deputies will not get the 27 votes necessary to give the government a vote of no confidence. Furthermore, the draft statement does not contain a specific analysis of the government's failures and therefore does not put in the right perspective the real extent of the ministers' blame for the republic's deteriorating economic situation.

Endel Lippmaa, former minister without portfolio who is now deputy of the Tallinn City Council, believes that the Estonian-Russian summit meeting scheduled for the end of this November will take place at a time and under conditions that are less favorable for Estonia than during the Estonian leadership's presence in Moscow in 1939 (at that time the government of independent Estonia was forced to sign a treaty whereby several Red Army units were introduced into the republic).

According to Lippmaa, one of the reasons for the opposition's lack of confidence in the Mart Laar government was further unwarranted concessions to Moscow. If we continue in that spirit we can end up in the CIS, Lippmaa stated. Incidentally, Laar himself and his ministers are accusing the previous government of making concessions.

Laar Says Return of KGB Records Not Likely

WS1711112193 Tallinn BNS in English 1722 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Tallinn, Nov 16, BNS—Estonia has yet to get to the heart of the KGB's archival documents, and it isn't likely to, Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar claimed at a press conference Tuesday.

Laar stated only the KGB's historical papers are at the Estonian authorities' disposal. The other documents, the ones with pertinent information on people in the organization, left the country with the organization. Estonia has since fallen flat in trying to get those documents back.

"Even if some documents are handed over to us (now), we cannot be certain they haven't been doctored," he said.

In the premier's opinion, Estonia's only chance to recover the documents was in 1991 when the KGB was abolished in Estonia.

The parliamentary commission formed to investigate the KGB and other states' security and intelligence operations claims Estonian authorities have access to only a part of the KGB dossiers that contain information on eminent Estonian politicians and cultural figures.

Hardo Aasmae, the head of a former commission on dissolving the KGB, told BNS that Laar's Cabinet "has not dared to ask Russia to return the KGB archives."

Laar told BNS that the government has made several attempts to retrieve the documents.

"When I hear Aasmae's statements on the subject of the KGB, I can't help thinking, here's a wolf guarding sheep," Laar said. "It was Aasmae's commission that should have taken care of retrieving the documents."

Latvia

Government Considers Russian Troop Withdrawal Proposals

LD1611211293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1952 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Jurmala November 16 TASS—Latvia continues to ponder over the new proposals put forth by Russia during the current round of talks on the withdrawal of troops from Latvia. By the end of the second day of negotiations in Jurmala outside Riga, the capital of Latvia, Latvian delegation head Martins Virsis said "There is still no clear-cut answer".

As reported earlier, the Russian delegation proposed ending the withdrawal of Russian troops from the neighboring republic by the end of August 1994, instead of December 1994. Russia also gave up its earlier intention to preserve two strategic objects on Latvian territory for some time after the withdrawal, but insists on continuing operations of another one—in Skrunda, where an advance missile attack warning radar station is located.

According to Russian delegation leader Sergey Zotov, the station is one of the major components of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty, as it ensures not only Russia's national security but also serves to maintain a balance of forces in the world as a whole.

Russia said it will need six years to build a replacement on its own territory, after which the radar station in Skrunda will be dismantled.

Journalists learned that the Latvian side has formulated several additional conditions in this connection. Sergey Zotov said he is not authorized to disclose these conditions, but explained that "in response we agreed not to view this object as a pure military installation. We are ready to provide relevant guarantees to international organizations and sign a pledge not to extend the deadline for action concerning the radar."

According to Zotov, the Russian delegation has replied "yes" to all questions. Zotov said Russia has made substantial steps towards signing the main agreement, on the basis of which a prompt withdrawal of troops can be effected.

Zotov pointed out that the same stance is expressed in a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted on Monday, which is in line with Russia's desire. "We now have to wait and see what the Latvian authorities have to say to this," Zotov said.

Andrejevs on Russian Interest in Skrunda Site

LD1611191893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1538 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Voskoboynikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy, and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] Moscow's proposal to bring forward the Russian forces' withdrawal from Latvian territory if the parties reach an agreement on preserving the Russian radar station in Skrunda "deserves special attention." Latvia understands Russia's interest in preserving this strategically important facility to ensure its security but believes that the presence of Russian military personnel on Latvian territory "does not permit talk of them complete withdrawal of Russian forces from the republic," Latvia's Foreign Minister Georgs Andrejevs declared in an interview with Interfax on Tuesday.

He does not rule out possibility of this facility's further functioning if military personnel is replaced for civil experts and Latvian authorities guard the facility. Andrejevs also pointed out that over the last period of time Latvia's authorities had received a great number of claims from people living within a radius of 30 kilometers from the radar station in Skrunda "due to the deterioration of their health." In his words, "this issue also demands thorough investigation."

Speaking about preparations for the summit between Russian and Latvian Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Guntis Ulmanis, the head of the Latvian Foreign Ministry expressed the opinion that "the parties need this summit under any provisions." "The presidents can solve many issues which cannot be resolved at any other level. It's a pity if the issue on the president's summit is directly linked with the results of the state delegations' talks underway in Jurmala," he said.

The minister also underlined that Latvia "expects Russia to officially recognize the republic's annexation in 1940 and present its assessment of this fact as it was with Poland and Hungary." "We need to overcome this fundamental diplomatic barrier in order to move forward," he said.

Speaking about the activity of the Latvian Citizenship and Migration Department, Andrejevs reported that on Tuesday the corresponding committee of Latvia's Saeima discussed this issue. "We receive many claims from Russians in Latvia and from representatives of the law enforcement organization Helsinki Watch and if the facts of abuse are reconfirmed we shall undertake appropriate measures," he said.

The minister also indicated that "currently Latvia's inner- political forces stick to quite various points of view regarding further relations with Russia." "One should find a golden middle here not to run to extreme," said Latvia's foreign minister in conclusion.

'Dozens' of Non-Citizens Being Deported

PM1611162193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Report by Irina Litvinova: "Latvia Believes the USSR Still Exists"]

[Text] Riga—Latvia is deporting people to Russia but cannot explain on what grounds.

The Latvian Citizenship and Immigration Department recently issued dozens of orders on the deportation of citizens from Latvia to Russia. The entry in the "destination" column is "Russia."

These people, who have been given seven days to leave Latvia, consider the officials' actions to be inhumane and unlawful. In many cases families are being split up: Husbands are being separated from wives, children from their parents. Instructions to leave Latvia has been issued not only to immigrants but also to people born here. Sometimes the only link that these people have with Russia, the country where they are being sent, is ethnic origin [natsionalnost].

Igor Zaretskiy was born in Latvia, which he left in 1986 to study at a Russian higher education institution. He returned to Latvia last year but did not register for residence in time. Igor, who has a brother and other relatives in Latvia, has been ordered to leave. Zaretskiy cannot understand why he is being sent from his native country to Russia of all places?

"My father is Belarusian, my mother has no ties with Russia either. So are they sending me to Russia because I speak Russian?" the bewildered Igor asked journalists on the platform at Riga station.

Ugis Shultss, who is on the staff at the Citizenship and Immigration Department, told journalists from the newspaper DIENA that there are around 1,000 deportation orders under review. Anastasiya Khulap, who came to Latvia with her husband to work in 1963, also has to leave the republic, leaving her husband, children, and grandchildren behind. She spent a few years working outside the country prior to her retirement to the north, and for that reason she has been refused a residence permit and ordered to go to Russia.

At the Citizenship and Immigration Department I managed to obtain explanations as to why Russia specifically had been chosen as the country of deportation. It is well known that international practice and law presupposes the existence of bilateral treaties in such instances. No such documents have been signed between Russia and Latvia.

Latvia remains a unique state on the territory of the former Union because it is the only one which recognizes the existence of the state which has now disappeared—it enters "USSR" in its residents' documents as the country of citizenship. That entry is made in the documents of those who have been living in Latvia for the past 50 years but were not citizens of the Latvian Republic prior to 1940 or their descendants. Children whose parents are not citizens of Latvia are regarded as citizens of the USSR and the same entry is made in passports issued to 16-year old residents who are not citizens. According to the experts, this practice is aimed at reducing the number of stateless persons in Latvia for which the state should bear responsibility, according to international criteria. The deportation of people to Russia, which is now underway, shows that Latvia is trying to shift the responsibility for the fate of some of its unwanted inhabitants onto the neighboring state.

Lithuania

Farmers, Slezevicius Meet; Strike Threatened

WS1711080493 Tallinn BNS in English 1044 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Vilnius, Nov 16, BNS—Negotiators failed to make any positive gains in talks Monday [15 November] between Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius and representatives of the republican farmers' strike committee, which has threatened a nationwide strike.

Lithuanian farmers want state support for needs like preferential loans and state-regulated prices for their produce.

Strike leaders said after the meeting that the premier "did not hear" their demands and asked him to give them some more time.

The farmers have scheduled a rally in Vilnius Friday to demand a memorandum between the government and the farmers. If the government rejects the farmers' demands, the farmers say they plan to start a general strike.

Radioactive Metals Said Sent to West

WS1711120593 Tallinn BNS in English 1045 GMT 17 Nov 93

[Text] Vilnius, Nov 17, BNS—A Lithuanian trucking company reportedly transported radioactive metals to the west at least once on request of a Moscow firm.

The Lithuanian company in the town of Vievis was hired in late October by a Moscow firm called Mars to transport the goods. A pair of trucks soon returned home with empty trailers. Something appeared to be wrong with the cargo, and the clients suggested the company examine the vehicles, the drivers said.

Measurements showed that the level of radioactivity in one of the trailers considerably exceeded permissible standards.

The RESPUBLIKA newspaper attempted to investigate the matter but failed to find the drivers who presumably know more about the mysterious appearance of radioactivity in the trailers.

The newspaper found out, however, that Mars earlier placed orders for "radioactive" deliveries at least once. In mid-October, Lithuanian trucks picked up 25 tons of non-ferrous metals near Moscow and took them to Germany via the Klaipeda-Mukran sea ferry in Lithuania. The cargo was unloaded at a small metal factory in the town of Essenkrei.

On their way home, the trucks were examined on the Polish-German border, where equipment showed increased radioactivity.

The Lithuanian Customs Department said Lithuanian border guards do not have the necessary equipment to measure radioactivity. According to regulations, permissions to transport dangerous substances are given by the Lithuanian Environmental Protection Department.